ONE

The Disciplined Subject of Musical Analysis

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[Schenker's achievement] may be likened to a particular kind of high-level achievement in science: the discovery or development of a fundamental principle which then opens the way for the disclosure of further new relationships, new meanings. Regarded in this way, Schenker's achievement invites comparison with that of Freud. Just as Freud opened the way for a deeper understanding of the human personality with his discovery that the diverse patterns of overt behavior are controlled by certain underlying factors, so Schenker opened the way for a deeper understanding of musical structure with his discovery that the manifold of surface events in a given composition is related in specific ways to a fundamental organization.

ALLEN FORTE

STRANGE ECHO

Allen Forte's essay "Schenker's Conception of Musical Structure" comments on a graphic analysis by Heinrich Schenker, in order to exemplify Schenker's approach to tonal music. In a typical remark, he paraphrases Schenker's sketch: "Schenker then shows how this initial prolongation is followed by a restatement."

Then he does something odd. In the next sentence, Forte writes: "To recapitulate, there are two prolongational classes shown in this background sketch" (12–13). The odd part is the echo between "restatement" and "recapitulation," and the way the words resonate across the obvious distinction between the music and Forte's own text. The music, interpreted by Schenker, restates; immediately after, Forte the theorist recapitulates. The words have almost the same meaning, though they refer to different things—one a musical event, the other an event in Forte's text. Curiously, Forte applies the concept "restatement" to the music and "recapitulation" to his own words. This reverses the more natural pairing, as though to emphasize (through the rhetorical figure of chiasmus) a symmetry or mirroring between media.

Why would this echo or mirroring occur? Many people, reading the essay, might not be puzzled by this: it is easy to ignore such a detail of language,

not allowing it to distract from the "content" of the essay. You might not register it consciously or, perhaps, you might enjoy it as a rather subdued form of wit, as decoration. But what if you want to take that bit of matching more seriously, rather than setting it aside? What if you want to include it as part of the message of the essay? What context of other passages in Forte's essay, and of broader considerations about music theory, could make this play of "restatement" and "recapitulation" more than a mishap or a small joke?

IDENTIFYING THE MUSIC THEORIST

From the late 1950s on, the field of music theory and analysis enjoyed rapid professionalization and growth in North America. The *Journal of Music Theory,* first published in 1957, and *Perspectives of New Music,* appearing in 1962, promoted the image of a sophisticated scholarly field devoted to technical theory and analysis, with its main focus on tonal and post-tonal music. In 1977, formation of the Society for Music Theory embodied this image in a distinct professional society, now for many scholars the primary professional affiliation just as other scholars affiliate primarily with the American Musicological Society, the Society for Ethnomusicology, and so on. For about half a century, "music theorist" has been a professional identity. Schools, journals, and scholarly societies seem to agree that a theory specialization constitutes one way of being professional about music.

What is a music theorist—specifically, what is a later twentieth-century North American professional music theorist? What is this identity, and why might someone identify with it? I want to suggest a partial answer through close attention to a classic of mid-century writing, the famous Forte essay from which I just quoted. First published in 1959, it holds a strategic position near the beginning of the recent professionalization of scholarly theory. It offers to inaugurate responsible, informed discussion of the early twentieth-century theorist Heinrich Schenker's ideas, in place of the disorganized, inadequately informed polemical writings of the past. It proposes, therefore, to create and circulate an image of a particular kind of person, a responsible, intelligent music theorist. In framing an identity, proposing a role model, this text not only says "Read and evaluate the following claims," but also: "Be like me. Do as I do." And, of course, "Write like this." What is the rhetoric of this performative, inaugural essay?

One remarkable, even breathtaking aspect of the essay is the calm assurance with which Forte refers to the discipline of music theory, evoking a coherent, purposeful area of research at a time when almost none of the present institutional structures of music theory existed. Many of Forte's references to music theory are abstract. There are exceptions; in several passages at the beginning of the essay, he writes as though music theorists are a social group of actual people, interacting in shared discourse. He mentions the need to find criteria for "intelligent public discussion" (4), and he

expresses hope that, "as Schenker's work becomes more widely recognized, serious music theorists will make further applications of his ideas" (23). These passages evoke music theorists as people who reflect and converse. But in many other passages, a reified music theory floats free from any particular social embodiment. Forte writes of "certain problems which stand before *music theory* today" (4); he identifies "five unsolved problems in *music theory*" (24); he suggests that "*music theory* is responsible for developing new concepts and new analytical procedures" for contemporary music (33). (Here and in subsequent quotations throughout, I add italics to draw attention to wording.) Music theory itself. Is anybody home?

Yes: at several points Forte invokes an abstract, generalized figure, "the music theorist," whose behavior contributes to this field. "From the viewpoint of *the present-day music theorist,*" he suggests, Schenker's achievement "may be likened to a particular kind of high-level achievement in science" (7). Extant writings on rhythm, he claims, "have little significance to *the theorist* whose proper concern is with the structural role of what we ordinarily designate as 'rhythmic' " (24). His concluding paragraph states that "in many respects Schenker's work provides us with a model of what the work of *the music theorist* should be" (34). This last sentence lays some of Forte's cards on the table: the essay is not merely about some interesting ideas of an intriguing historical figure, Heinrich Schenker; rather, it is meant to articulate a particular model of a normative subjectivity, a way to be a musician. By following the model, you can discipline and transform your existing self to become a specimen of "the music theorist."

Of course, as I already suggested, Forte's own writing contributes to the model. While admiring and emulating the repetitiously named Schenker, a reader should also want to emulate the agent or self constructed in Forte's essay, the subject of its many first-person pronouns. Given the common conception of professional music theory as impersonal and science-like, you might not expect to see so much self-reference, so many first-person pronouns, but there they are. Surely this personal self-referring subject offers an exemplary instance of "the music theorist," the agent of music theory.

So who is this music theorist—who, in Forte's essay, says "I"?

The music theorist of Forte's essay is conspicuously a writer, concerned to dispose the words of the essay in the allotted time or space. Sometimes the presence of these words, these items that the writer disposes, becomes reflexively explicit. Introducing an account of Schenker's musical activities outside music theory, Forte writes that "I should like to devote a *few words* to a description of them" (7). In suggesting possible applications of Schenker's views, he writes that "I should like to devote *the following paragraphs* to a discussion of five unsolved problems in music theory" (23–24). From the words on the page, you construct a voice or a subjectivity, and then you find that this subjectivity is addressing you about the acts of arranging those very words.

More broadly, temporal references conjoined to the first person pronoun are common in this text, and they almost all refer to the "time" (or "space") within the essay, the ordering and pacing of the essay's materials. For instance: "*Before* describing the content of Schenker's work in greater detail, *I* should like to survey his achievement in general terms" (7). "*I shall first* make a quick survey of this analytic sketch *and then* give a more detailed explanation" (10). "Schenker invented a special vocabulary and devised a unique representational means. *I will* explain these *further on*" (7). "*I* shall attempt to answer this question *as concisely as possible*" (5). "*I* wish to emphasize *at this point* that . . ." (7). "*Further on I* shall provide a commentary . . ." (9). "*First,* however, *I* should like to *complete* this brief survey . . ." (9). "*I shall first* make a quick survey . . ." (10). "criteria which *I shall* explain *further on*" (10). "*As I have already mentioned,* he shows . . ." (15). "However, because of space limitations *I shall not* undertake a summary *here* . . ." (17). "*I* turn *now* to the development of Schenker's theory . . ." (18). Such marks of organizational control are common in academic writing, but their density in Forte's essay is impressive. They exhibit the writer, but almost as though the subjectivity of the writer exists only within the confines of the essay: as though the writer is a special creature existing purely to arrange and display the materials of this text.

There is a moment of pathos near the beginning of the essay, where, for once, the theorist of the essay imagines a time outside the span of the essay, and an encounter with a diverse world in which incomprehension is likely: "I hope that this review of [Schenker's] work, by providing accurate information to those who are unfamiliar with it, will serve to place future discussions on a somewhat more rational basis than they have been in the past. Yet, *even as I write these words,* I prepare myself to be misunderstood—such is the price of disputation long conducted in an atmosphere of general misunderstanding" (4). It's a delicate, sad passage, and strangely concrete: you see before your eyes the very words that this writer, in an uncharacteristically tremulous moment, braces himself to send to an uncertain fate. (Does this make you feel protective, as though you, for one, should try to appreciate these endangered words? Or perhaps it makes you a little anxious, as though you are about to have your intelligence tested?) This isolated moment, associating the future fate of the essay with the writer's vulnerability to misunderstanding, creates, by contrast, a sense that the continuous, enclosed temporality of most of the essay offers a kind of shelter.

MIRRORING

Indeed, within much of the essay, as you read the confident account of Schenker's thought and of the structure of a song ("Aus meinen Thränen spriessen," from the Schumann/Heine *Dichterliebe*), misunderstanding does not seem to be a live possibility. The sense of rapport among Forte,

Schenker, and the music results partly from an extraordinary feature of the essay, the same feature I pointed out in my opening comments: repeatedly, details of language create patterns in which the behavior of Schumann's music, as depicted by Schenker, and the behavior of Forte's essay mirror one another within the space of a sentence or two. The relationship seems undeniable, but bizarre—not just the broad relation of mimicry, but the placement of musical and textual mirror-images in such close proximity. Here are more examples:

(1) Forte expands a point: "In *amplification* of this, example 1.9 shows how the inner-voice component A is stated at the beginning of the song, prolonged by the lower adjacent 7 tone, G-sharp, in the middle section, then in m. 12 begins the descent to C-sharp." And in the next sentence, Forte continues: "In Schenker's terms, this linear progression is the *composing-out* of an interval" (28). The theorist amplifies a point, the piece composes out an interval.

(2) Commenting on Schenker's sketch, Forte writes that "the adjacent-tone D *recurs* in m. 14, where Schenker assigns more structural weight to it, as indicated by the stem. I *reiterate* that conventional durational values are used in the analytic sketches to indicate the relative position of a given component or configuration in the tonal hierarchy" (14). A tone in Schumann's piece recurs, and the theorist reiterates.

(3) Forte discusses the Schumann song's use of a particular secondary dominant. He indicates parenthetically that this point does not continue his explication of Schenker's analysis: "(To avoid misunderstanding, I point out that this discussion is not directly related to Schenker's sketch.)" After breaking continuity to offer this special explanation, he writes that "the A7 chord seems abrupt, has the effect of a *discontinuous* element, and therefore requires special explanation" (27).

(4) Writing about the notion of interruption, Forte comments that "the idea of the interrupted fundamental line provides the basis for Schenker's concept of form." After a few sentences of explanation, Forte continues: "Before explaining the middleground, I should like to direct attention again to the diminution which spans the third below C-sharp" (13). Like a composition, the theorist proceeds by interrupting his structure, delaying the continuation.

Indeed, such interruptions or delays, basic to Schenker's conception of musical time, occasion many of Forte's first-person pronouns: "*I shall return* to this often neglected facet of Schenker's work later" (7); "*further on I shall provide* a commentary upon an analytic sketch" (9); "*I shall explain* the black noteheads *shortly*"(12); "*I shall return* to this *further on* when I consider the general problem of constructing a theory of rhythm for tonal music" (15).

(5) Forte completes his account of the Schumann sketch by showing the form of the complete song: "One final aspect of the foreground sketch

deserves mention: the form" (17). Closure and completeness in song, sketch, and Forte's commentary align.

(6) At several points Schenker is also drawn into this pattern of matching. Forte identifies a passing chord, and writes: "it belongs only to the foreground and therefore is to be distinguished from the initial tonic chord, *a background element.* Two of Schenker's most important convictions *underlie* this treatment of detail" (15). Convictions underlie a particular analytical treatment, as background elements underlie a foreground chord.

(7) Writing of Schenker's motivic thought, Forte notes that "throughout his writings he demonstrates *again and again* that tonal compositions abound in hidden *repetitions* of this kind" (14). Schenker repeatedly identifies musical repetitions.

(8) A more complex transfer of qualities, brought about by a conjunction of temporal references involving Schenker, the composition, and the writer of Forte's essay, appears in the following sentences: "Here we have an example of the careful distinction which Schenker *always* draws between major bass components, or *Stufen,* which belong to the background level, and more *transient,* contrapuntal-melodic events at the foreground and middleground levels. A *brief* consideration of three additional events will complete our examination of the middleground level" (14). "Always," "transient," "brief": the distinction between endurance and transience appears in dazzling succession for Schenker's thought, musical structure, and Forte's exposition.

How strange that Forte's essay, beyond making assertions about musical structure, should also mimic procedures of Schenkerian musical structure. I doubt that Forte consciously formulated such a project, or that his readers have typically perceived the pattern consciously. Nonetheless it adds to the sense of authority in the essay: music theory seems to find something like a musical voice. Or perhaps the essay, and the theory it promotes, gives music the prosaic, reasonable, well-organized voice of an academic essay, placing music within comfortable reach of Forte's writing and concepts.[1]

CONTROL

Beyond the specific moments where Forte's language creates parallels between music and theoretical discourse, there is a more general resemblance between the theorist and the composition in the essay. At the beginning of the explication of Schenker's analysis of Schumann's song, Forte identifies the foreground, middleground, and background levels of the sketch, and meanwhile employs the terms "subordination" and "control." Indicating the middleground level, he states that "it should be evident now that the analytic procedure is one of reduction; details which are *subordinate*

with respect to larger patterns are gradually eliminated." And he continues: "Finally, on the upper staff, [Schenker] has represented the fundamental structural level, or background, which *controls* the entire work" (10). These terms imply an anthropomorphic construal of the composition as organized by a kind of behavior: certain actions, acts of subordinating and controlling, give shape and order to the musical events.

This construal continues in details of his analysis, with particular emphasis on the notion of control: he refers to "the triadic third which *controls* the upper-voice motion of the entire song" (28); he identifies the "prolongational motion from 3 to 2" as "the *controlling* melodic pattern of the first phrase" (13); he explains that Schenker, "by slurring E to. . . . indicates that he considers that motion to be the *controlling* bass motion" (14). In one passage, "the lowest voice . . . is *subordinate* to the voice which lies immediately above it" (17). A slur connecting two tonic chords "indicates that the IV and V chords lie within the *control* of that chord" (16).

Forte's drama of control and subordination features one preeminent structure, "the background, which *controls* the entire work," along with subordinate structures which, in turn, exert more local forms of control. In Schenkerian reduction, "detail is gradually eliminated . . . so that the underlying, *controlling* structure is revealed" (18).

It would be accurate to summarize the theorist's activity in this essay, dramatized by the first-person pronouns, as the controlling of verbal material. As agents who control material, arranging it within a particular time or space, repeating, delaying, returning, interrupting, the theorist and the agency of the music are well suited to achieve understanding. Such a theorist can identify with such music. And you, too, could learn the discipline of writing about music in this controlled, mirror-like way.

The more specific, localized instances of mimicry that I pointed out earlier are moments when the broad similarity of theorist and musical agency creates little bubbles on the surface of the prose. Of course, the point of Forte's essay is not that others should imitate this particular play of first-person pronouns and momentary mirroring. But these features display a subject position that you can also occupy less explicitly. I suggest that a similar pattern of matching is present whenever someone writes in a controlled, rational, masterful way, and depicts music as the product of a controlled, rational, masterful agency. Perhaps the desire to write a lucid, coherent account of the lucid coherence of a composition typically derives from the hope of structuring one's writing as a meeting of like minds, from a kind of identification between theoretical and musical agency. In such writing, the music theorist and the music share the strengths and limitations of a rational, controlling mind, and it is no wonder they get along so well. The theorist and the music are made for each other. Tidy, isn't it?

But there is more: another, different resemblance between song and essay.

SUPPLICATION

Forte's essay describes the patterning of musical sound in time, and mirrors it with a patterning of words in the essay. Forte offers the essay to his readers, and permits himself an isolated moment of pathos near the beginning, when Forte steels himself for anticipated incomprehension. Now let's turn to Heinrich Heine's text for Schumann's song. You will not learn from Forte's essay that the famous poet has anything to do with this music—the word "Heine" is absent (the word "Schumann" barely appears).[2] Nonetheless Heine's text is apposite:

> From my tears spring up
> many blooming flowers,
> and my sighs become
> a chorus of nightingales.
>
> And if you love me, child,
> I give you all the flowers,
> and before your window shall sound
> the song of the nightingale.[3]

Heine writes of metaphorical transformations, just as Forte maintains a pattern of matching between musical and linguistic phenomena. The persona in the poem and the writer in the essay offer the products of their transformation to an audience, an addressee of these texts. And both are uncertain about the response of the audience. Here is a diagram to show the shared structure:

	Heine	*Forte*
Starting point	tears, sighs	Schenker's graph, Schumann's notes
	transformed into/symbolized by	
Result	flowers, birds	Forte's words
Addressee	beloved	readers (theorists)
Uncertainty	Will you love me?	Will you understand me?

Obviously this relationship between song and essay is different in its effect from the mirroring that I described before. I suggested that the mirroring creates matched images of music and theorist and, however subliminally, enhances the authority of the theorist. But Forte's structural rhyme with Heine's text occurs in an essay that omits any mention of the poem. It is as though, rather than showing the parallel, Forte prefers to substitute his own new text to go with the music of the song, concocting a loose translation of the original.

But after all, what advantage would Forte's stance derive from attention to the words of the song? As Forte depicts it (drawing upon Schenker), Schumann's song is a display of structural mastery, a disciplined deployment of repetition, delay, interruption, and so on, all subordinated to the background that controls everything. In contrast, Heine's character is mostly out of control, in the grip of strong emotions, the symptoms of which turn miraculously into beautiful natural objects, useful perhaps as gifts; and this lover is dependent, asking for reciprocity, hoping for the mutuality of shared love. The hope for love brings a need for response from the interlocutor, whereas Forte, in his essay, seems secure in his knowledge of Schenker: he doesn't need the readers, though he hopes to benefit them by sharing his knowledge.[4]

It is intriguing to find, a generation later, another Schenkerian analyst, Arthur Komar, directly expressing his disdain for Heine's protagonist: "The words [of *Dichterliebe*] actually impede my enjoyment of the whole cycle—to the extent that I heed them. The moping, distraught lover portrayed in German song cycles bores me, but this feeling in no way detracts from my enthusiasm for the music of the great song cycles of Beethoven, Schubert, and Schumann" (Komar 1971, 11, note 20). As this implies, Komar's extended essay analyzes the music of *Dichterliebe* while disregarding the words. Asking in what way the whole cycle is "an integrated musical whole" (63), he replies by identifying a "tonal plan" and "modal plan" established in the first five songs; taken together, these plans "essentially *control* the remaining course of the cycle" (78). Once that mopey lover is out of the picture, Komar can display the control that gives wholeness to the cycle and purpose to his own analytical writing. I suppose Forte's evasion of Heine's poem has a similar point.[5]

Heine's lover addresses the second half of the poem to the beloved, ending in suspense as the lover awaits a reply. Forte's essay uses the second person pronoun twice, with uniform rhetoric: Forte anticipates a question, which he promptly answers. "But, you ask, what about the books and articles . . ." (5). "You may ask how one accounts for a motion of this kind . . ." (22). Forte ventriloquizes the reader, creating a dependent interlocutor who elicits his own authoritative responses. Rather than "I need your love," we read that "I know what you need to know just now, and here it is." In these approaches—of Heine's lover to the beloved, of Forte to his readers—the trajectories of need and potential satisfaction are opposite. Heine's lover supplicates the beloved, who might return his love; the projected reader supplicates Forte, who offers satisfaction promptly.

The song text is about erotic desire and the transformation of feeling into symbols. Psychoanalysis specializes in such topics. It is interesting, given the omission of such a text, that Forte's essay mentions psychoanalysis prominently. While Forte does not say that music theory is a science, he seems to

think it benefits from an increasingly scientific attitude, or an attitude influenced by science. To illustrate the point (which remains rather vague), he compares Schenkerian theory to psychoanalysis: they represent the same kind of achievement. How can Forte praise psychoanalysis, identifying it as an exemplary science and associating it with his own favored style of music theory, while showing no interest in the erotic concerns and symbolic substitutions of Heine's text?

But in fact, Forte's way of evoking psychoanalysis is precisely (if quietly) a refusal of psychoanalysis as a critical tool for understanding music. In likening psychoanalysis and Schenkerian theory, Forte indicates that psychoanalysis is "a particular kind of high-level achievement in science" (7), and that music theory is a parallel achievement for music. Psychoanalysis is a successful scientific approach to the human mind, and Schenkerian theory has a similar success with music. Built into the comparison is a distinction between the mind and music as separate objects of study, each with its own theory (even while the comparison implies, attractively if indeterminately, that studying a composition might resemble, somehow, the study of a person).

Forte uses a specific and limited conception of psychoanalysis, pertinent to the comparison he offers. "Freud opened the way for a deeper understanding of the human personality with his discovery that the diverse patterns of overt behavior are *controlled by certain underlying factors*" (7), and this is similar to Schenker's achievement. As you can see, Forte's analogy is precise, because Schenkerian theory, on Forte's account, also identifies the "underlying factors" that "control" other events. Like Schenker, Freud shows how to master the diversity of "overt" or "surface" phenomena by identifying the underlying, controlling factors. In a mind or a composition, certain factors are in control, and by recognizing and understanding those factors, the psychoanalyst or music theorist attains cognitive control.

What about psychoanalysis as therapy? as a style of conversation between therapist and patient, shaped by conscious and unconscious processes on both sides? as a tool for altering sensibility and experience? What about its depiction of the mind, not simply as an orderly configuration of control and subordination, but as a site of conflicting desires, many of them sexual, many of them unsatisfied? These are aspects of psychoanalysis that do not help Forte's analogy, issues that do not resonate with his conception of music theory, and they go unmentioned.[6]

The essay conjoins identification between Forte and the music with silence about the poetic text—and therefore, of course, silence about any relation between Forte and the poetic text. Someone influenced by psychoanalysis might wonder whether Forte's omission of the text is disavowal, that is, refusal of a recognition or identification that would be threatening in some way. But what would Forte disavow, and why?

IDENTIFICATION AND DOMINATION

The features I have noted in Forte's essay are not easy to interpret on the basis of that essay alone. It will be helpful, now, to turn to a more explicit account of the issues of control and identification that have emerged, inexplicit and untheorized, from Forte's writing. Edward T. Cone's book *The Composer's Voice* (1974) offers such an account. The use of Cone to interpret Forte might be surprising: many musicologists regard Cone's writing as an important alternative to technical theory like Forte's, articulating a contrasting perspective. *The Composer's Voice,* some of Cone's least technical work, is about the imaginary personae and agents with which composers, performers, and listeners populate musical compositions, and that emphasis might seem quite different from a technical Schenkerian concern with pitch hierarchy. Nonetheless, there are shared concerns between Cone's book and Forte's essay. Cone shares some basic assumptions with Forte, but develops the ideas in a different direction. The difference between the two writers will be useful in interpreting Forte: specifically, it will be useful to ask why Forte might wish to avoid certain ideas that appear in Cone's writing.

Cone's book insists at many points that the multiple personae or agents of a composition should be understood in terms of a single encompassing persona, and here he theorizes about issues that recall Forte's essay. According to Cone, a single persona (named in various ways, as "the complete musical persona," "the composer's persona," or "the composer's voice") controls everything in the composition: "It is to be posited as an intelligence *embracing and controlling* all the elements of musical thought that comprise a work" (1974, 109). The notion of a single controlling presence recalls, of course, Forte's account of the "background, which controls the entire work." Though a piece of instrumental music may create a sense of many interacting agents, embodied by the instrumental parts, Cone affirms that "in the last analysis all roles are aspects of one *controlling* persona, which in turn is the projection of one creative human consciousness—that of the composer" (114). Similarly, in vocal music "the composer's persona *governs* words as well as music" (18). The unity of opera, too, "forces us to look for a wider intelligence at work and hence to assume *the constant presence of a single musical persona.*" No real opera could be "free from this persona's *hegemony*" (14).

Unlike Forte, Cone sidesteps issues of technical analysis, and instead offers an account of listening, along with related accounts of composition and performance. Appropriate listening, according to Cone, seeks identification with the controlling persona. "The goal of participation [as a listener] must be *identification* with the complete musical persona *by making its utterance one's own*" (122). "To listen to music . . . is *to make the composer's voice our own*" (157). These formulations are not immediately clear: what do you do, while listening silently, to make the persona's utterance, or the composer's voice,

your own? But, despite obscurity, to make the persona's utterance your own must be, somehow, to feel the persona's power and control as your own, and this idea has, one might feel, a general affinity with Forte's procedure of mirroring between the controlling musical forces and his own linguistic control.

Cone's account is complex. Alongside descriptions of identification, other passages emphasize the domination of listeners by music. I already indicated a flow of power within the music, depicted in both Cone's and Forte's accounts: some powerful force, the background or the persona, controls all the subordinate events of the composition. To this, Cone adds that the music exerts control over the listener.[7]

Elaborating the psychology of listeners' experiences, Cone cites the fact that many people have imaginary musical sound in their minds much of the time, involuntarily, and he defines composing and listening in relation to this musical stream of consciousness. "To compose is to *control* this inner voice, to shape it into new forms, to make it speak for us. To listen to music is to *yield* our inner voice to the composer's *domination*" (157). You might have an ongoing stream of musical thoughts, in which case you can simply let it continue. As a composer, you might take your existing stream of musical thoughts and exert conscious control over it: composers make a distinctive use of control in their own mental lives. As a listener, you can yield the stream to the influence of something outside, letting the composer's control (or, as Cone might put it at his most precise, the persona's control) extend to your own mental life.[8]

I want to reflect a bit on this interesting idea of an inner musical voice, offering a more differentiated description than Cone provides. The inner activity can vary widely, ranging from aimless sonic doodling, to full-fledged inner performance of familiar music, to vivid inner improvisation; it can fluctuate from periphery to focus of one's awareness; it can be uncontrolled and spontaneous, or one can shape it in various respects. And, beyond Cone's alternatives of the composer's and listener's roles, the inner stream can flow out into performance, solo improvisation, or musical interaction, and can also emerge in such half-externalized forms as humming, rhythmic fidgeting, finger-tapping, and so on. For me and, I assume, for many people, this ongoing musical stream, and the various fluctuations in its character, are important aspects of what it is to be conscious! Cone's descriptions of the composer, who forcefully directs this inner stream with the goal of producing a score, and the listener, who completely relinquishes control and allows someone else's music to take over, are extremes in a complex range of possibilities. Perhaps Cone's selective account reveals that, despite the calm, affable surface of his writing, he is drawn in some way to these extremes of control and domination. Or, at least, he has not developed the account beyond what he needs to give his description of the classical concert setting.

Cone's conception, in which we experience music by encountering pow-

erful forces that control everything in the piece, and that also control our own inner musical voice, has a complex relationship to his other idea about identification. The listener is dominated by, and also identifies with, the persona, seeming to maintain relations of subordination and identification simultaneously. Listeners are, on Cone's account, at once subjected to control that comes from outside, and empowered by taking on that control as though it were their own. Here is Cone's way of putting it, in sentences that conclude the main argument of the book: "To listen to music is *to yield* our inner voice to the composer's *domination.* Or better: it is *to make* the composer's voice *our own*" (157). These sentences conjoin the two aspects of domination and identification, without clarifying their relationship.[9]

This account of listening reminds me of a useful general concept formulated by the psychoanalyst Christopher Bollas. Bollas (1987) writes of a phenomenon that he calls "extractive introjection": sometimes two people interact so that some mental content or process, originally belonging to one person, seems to be taken away from that person, subsequently belonging only to the other one. Bollas illustrates the concept through a series of anecdotes. For instance, he describes a four-year-old, B, at play, "engaged in a private drama that is nonetheless realized through actual objects. The space is entered by A, who creates such distraction that B loses his playfulness." A might be a parent, who "appropriates the playing by telling the child what the play is about and then prematurely engages in playfulness." With repetition of such interruptions, the child's "sense of spontaneity would diminish" and B "will come to experience an extraction of that element of himself: his capacity to play" (1987, 159). Something that was in the child, an ongoing activity, is now gone, replaced by something outside; the playfulness has been extracted from the child and introjected into the adult. Bollas describes a number of similar interactions, many of them between adults. He goes on to suggest that "a child who is the victim of consistent extractive introjection may choose to identify with the aggressive parent and install in his personality this identification, which then functions as a false self" (164). That is, the response to a theft of part of oneself might be, not exactly a recovery of what was taken, but an imagined identification with the other person and the act of theft.

Similarly, in Cone's account of listening, many people usually have music passing through their minds; but when you listen attentively, you experience a displacement or extraction of the source of musical thought, from your own stream of inner music to the activities of external sound sources. In performance settings that strictly limit sonic participation, such as modern classical concerts, the musical source is entirely outside the listener. However, as Cone describes it, this "extraction" leads immediately to an act of identification, in which the listener somehow identifies herself with the external source of musical activity.

The vocabulary of "theft" and "aggression" may seem melodramatic for ordinary musical listening. Reading Bollas's story about the four-year-old, it is easy to regard the child's play as valuable, and the adult's "extraction" as intrusive. But we are not used to thinking much about the ongoing inner musical lives of most people, and may not have much sense of how to value them: Cone's treatment is helpful in drawing attention to this pervasive music activity. Disruption of a listener's inner voice may or may not strike you as intrusive. Perhaps the slight sense of strain in moving from Bollas's concept to the musical case reflects a useful stretching of concepts. Maybe the process of "extraction" that Bollas describes is not as determinate in its value as his uniformly negative examples suggest; maybe, on the other hand, an alignment of his examples with Cone's account of listening hints at unnerving evaluative possibilities for routine aspects of contemporary musical life.

At any rate, we have reached a tantalizing congruence and gap between Cone's and Forte's writings. The two men agree that a single controlling force governs each composition, and that recognition of this force is central to musical understanding. And both texts suggest some kind of emulation as a proper way of relating to that force. But Cone's account of listening gives a central role to musical domination of the listener, for which there is no clear counterpart in Forte's essay. And, while an element of emulation is present in both writers, the specific forms of mimicry—identification while listening, mirror-like control of a written text—are different.

LISTENING, SCORE-READING, AND "FANTASY RECOMPOSITION"

At this point, a certain speculation becomes attractive. Perhaps Cone gives a prominent role to domination because he writes about the experience of listening, which has obvious aspects of receptivity or passivity in relation to musical sound. And perhaps Forte, in contrast, can sidestep issues about listening, because he writes about professional analysis.

But can Forte really sidestep issues about listening? Listening is relevant to analysis, isn't it?

Actually, the typical practices of analysis can raise questions about the role of listening. As students of musical analysis know well, academic courses in analysis usually proceed with every participant looking at a musical score; discussions that derive exclusively from listening, without ongoing reference to scores, are rare, and often the listening takes place outside the classroom altogether, as private class preparation. Similarly, the activity of making an analysis normally involves continuous consultation of a score; much academic analysis is created in a silent room, by an analyst who stares thoughtfully at pages of musical notation.

I've sometimes encountered a rather simple objection to the primacy of

scores in theory and analysis, on the grounds that they distract from, or replace, musical sound—as though analysts are, in some way, thinking about scores *rather than* musical sound. Such a blunt criticism seems ill founded or, at best, undeveloped. The idea that score-readers replace sound with sight is too simple. Experienced score-readers do not just look at visual symbols; we use them as a starting point for remembering or imagining sound. *The Composer's Voice* gives a more helpful point of departure for thinking about score-reading, by considering scores in light of power relations and subject positions.

A score contains the composer's instructions. Therefore, Cone suggests that it can serve as a symbol of the all-powerful persona, and this can give value to its visible presence in live performance settings. "The physical presence of the score (or of its parts) is a constant reminder—for both performers and audience—of the *control* of the complete musical persona" (64). And Cone describes score-reading in terms of identification: "Score-reading . . . permits a musician (the reader) to *identify himself fully and intimately* with the complete persona, and . . . gives him *total control* over the direction of the persona's musical activity" (136). Score-reading, it seems, is the best way to feel like the persona. It even, somehow, gives you control over the persona's activity! How can this be?

As Cone explains, score-reading is "a kind of abstract performance" (136); a performer has the task of bringing musical events into being, and a score-reader does this too, at least in imagination. Performance and score-reading occupy complex positions, neither fully creative nor fully receptive. The performer or score-reader must respect the composer's instructions but, by so doing, can assume responsibility for the creation of musical events, in actual or imagined sound.

In fact, the score opens a wider range of subject-positions for a score-reader than Cone indicates. (Again, as in his account of "our inner voice," Cone seems drawn to a somewhat simplified account.) You can use the score to imagine hearing a performance, in a kind of imaginative listening. Or you can imagine yourself following the composer's notated instructions in a performance, taking the role of an imaginary performer. Or you can imagine choosing the symbols that constitute the score, as though making the decisions that compose the music. Or, less literally, you might imagine creating all the musical gestures of the piece from your own musical initiative, like a composer, but in the ordering and time of a performance; this is probably closest to Cone's conception of identifying with the persona. And of course your imagination might do things that remain a little vague about these distinctions. The most powerful positions, identifying with the composer or his imaginary reconfiguration as the persona, are readily available to a score-reader, probably more available than to a listener. But also, even if you imagine yourself in the least powerful role, as a listener, your own imagination has

to conjure up the musical sounds that you imagine yourself hearing. Imagining oneself listening is different, in that way, from just listening. In general, it seems that an emphasis on score-reading is likely to diminish the subordination that listening may bring. So, to the extent that analysis is based on score-reading rather than listening, it may be able to evade issues about the dependency or receptiveness of listening.

But, whatever you think about the general tendencies of analytical practice, it would be too simple to say that Forte's essay emphasizes score-reading and ignores listening. The truth is stranger and more complex: Forte places very strong emphasis on listening experience, but does so at just five scattered points, with no perceptible effect on the rest of the essay. There is a pattern: each reference to listening occurs within a single sentence, after which he drops the topic immediately.

Forte cites Schenker's belief that a performer could play well only "if he had developed *an aural sensitivity* to the hierarchy of tonal values which [the score] expressed" (8). Forte also mentions Furtwängler's emphasis on Schenker's discovery of "*Fernhören* (literally, 'distance-hearing')" (19), and he explains Brahms's curiosity about parallel fifths and octaves by the "contradiction" between pre-Schenkerian theory and Brahms's "own highly-refined sense of hearing, which encompassed large spans" (30). Apart from their paradoxical combination of emphasis, brevity, and lack of consequences, these remarks about listening share other traits. They are all about someone else's hearing, not Forte's. And they concern the listening experiences of good performers, or of those imposing authorities Furtwängler and Brahms, not the experiences of mere listeners as such.

Forte's most important reference to listening comes in a general discussion of methodology. He asserts that Schenker's theory derives from "the organization of the music itself," and explains: "Schenker consistently *derived* his theoretical formulations from *aural experiences* with actual musical compositions, and *verified* them at the same source" (7). Evidently, for Forte, the appropriateness of Schenker's theoretical work depends on the foundational role of those listening experiences. Schenker's valuable contributions rest on his listening. Can we discuss and ponder his listening experiences? No: they are not otherwise acknowledged in Forte's essay, and consequently they occupy a curious position as something crucial that, nonetheless, one barely mentions. In the essay, Schenker's experiences as a listener are both the source of his musical wisdom and, it seems, something private. Schenker's secret life.

In one more passage, Forte suggests that Schenker teaches a particular kind of hearing. Someone who encounters Schenker's thought must learn many new things—"a new terminology, a new set of visual symbols, and*, most important, a new way of hearing music*" (6). As you might expect from the other

examples, this assertion of the importance of listening is laconic, tight-lipped.

The whole essay reveals nothing about Forte's personal listening experiences, except insofar as he is included within the generalization that Schenker teaches a "way of hearing." For all the proliferation of first-person pronouns, and the terse assertions of the centrality of listening, the essay never depicts Forte as a listener.

How does Forte propose to teach Schenkerian thought, if not through a direct exploration of listening experiences? He approaches Schenker through an activity that closely resembles shared score-reading: the reading of an analytical sketch. Not only does the contemplation of analytical sketches resemble score-reading, it also includes, almost always, a reading of the actual score along with the sketches; studying the sketches shapes a particular relation to that score.

Following the typical practice of Schenker's analytical essays, Forte begins with the background level and moves to the foreground. That is, he begins by allowing his readers to understand the "underlying, controlling structure." In the process of moving from the background toward the foreground, you move from something generalized toward the familiar "surface" of the actual piece.[10]

Such analyses do not claim to reproduce the sequence of thoughts of the actual composer, but the analogy with composition is hard to miss. Forte's essay brings out the analogy obliquely: he writes that "reduction is approximately the reverse of variation . . . Reduction accomplishes the reverse; detail is gradually eliminated" (18). If reduction, which yields the set of sketches, is like the reverse of variation, then the musical process one follows in reading the sketches from background to foreground must resemble variation.

William Benjamin, two decades later, makes a related point about the process of writing Schenkerian graphic analyses.[11] He emphasizes "the demand [Schenkerian analysis] places on its users of *total creative involvement* with pieces of music" (Benjamin 1981, 159). To create a middleground graph, according to Benjamin, is to compose a piece: he offers this claim as literal truth. The middleground is at once a commentary on an existing composition and, itself, a new composition, a "work of art or, more specifically, . . . anti-variation" (160).[12]

My point is different from Benjamin's but they can work together to confirm a general "compositional" quality in Schenkerian analysis. Benjamin distinguishes between the familiar interpretive or explanatory aspect of analysis and the less-remarked creative aspect, the analyst's artistic composition of middlegrounds. To this, I add that the interpretive aspect also has a compositional quality, though now in an imaginative rather than literal sense: the process of reading a series of graphs feels like composing, as one shares the step-by-step work process of an imaginary composer. The score,

which by itself does not determine a reader's subject-position as imaginary creator, performer, or listener, now becomes a prop in a game of make-believe: you imagine, of the score, that it is the goal and result of the quasi-compositional thought-process that you follow.[13] Joseph Dubiel summarizes this elegantly in referring to Schenker's "fantasy recompositions of the 'masterworks'" (Dubiel 1990, 327).[14]

The idea that you can understand music by taking on the perspective of a fictionalized creator brings Schenkerian thought, and Forte's essay, especially close to the ideas of *The Composer's Voice*—close enough that one can refer to the "persona" of a Schenkerian analysis, the imaginary intelligence who creates the music through a kind of variation technique. A Schenker essay, then, might be understood as a novella that narrates the activity of this persona.[15]

Nonetheless, for Cone the persona and identification with it are important aspects of *listening experience,* while in Forte's essay, and Schenkerian practice generally, the analytical understanding that brings you close to the persona is, in a certain way, *incompatible with listening.* Schenker's "fantasy recompositions" present two kinds of musical time, the familiar exoteric time of the music in performance, moving from beginning to end, and the esoteric time of the music as it develops from the background structure by variation, gradually becoming more complex. When you identify most closely with the Schenkerian persona, following its thoughtful decisions step by step, you must occupy the esoteric time of imaginary composition, and this necessarily takes you out of a listener's swifter, less meditative temporality. The two kinds of time dramatize the distinction between a listener's perspective and that of the creative persona. The two perspectives eclipse each other.[16]

A broad pattern begins to emerge. Forte's essay identifies with the persona: it both mimics the creative activity of a musical persona through its depiction of an active, controlling author and also, more directly, encourages the theorist and reader to share an imagined process through which a persona creates a song. On the other hand, his essay avoids any detailed account of listening, despite a few assertions that give listening a kind of abstract importance, and I want to link this to Forte's decision to analyze a song and neglect the text of the song, with its supplicating lover who awaits a response. Perhaps musical listening and Heine's erotic need share qualities of sensuality and dependence.

It seems ever more plausible that the essay's emphasis on control and creative activity is a way of disavowing dependence, receptivity, sensuality, or passivity—disavowing what Cone calls the "domination" of listeners by music. If Forte's essay downplays certain aspects of musical experience, you can't expect it to give a helpful account of those experiential possibilities. For further insight into the dynamic of identification and domination, I'll return once more to Cone's book.

SEDUCTION

In using Cone's writing to interpret Forte's, I have treated Cone as, in certain ways, the more explicit of the two writers. I have looked to his text for relatively direct statements of ideas that can then be read back into Forte's essay. In particular, while Forte does not do much to describe listeners, I have suggested that Cone's account provides an account of listening that works well with Forte's account of control and subordination.

Now, though, I want to change tactics and start teasing out some less explicit aspects of Cone's position. In particular, I want to identify an implicit eroticization of musical experience in *The Composer's Voice.* Just as I have used Cone's views to fill in gaps in Forte's account, now I want to interpret Cone's 1974 book by drawing on a more recent musicological tradition, from about 1990 on, that directly explores relations between musical experience and sexuality.[17] In *The Composer's Voice,* an eroticization of musical experience sometimes comes close to the surface, but Cone's habitual discretion normally keeps sexual issues in the realm of implication and connotation.

Recently, Philip Brett has drawn attention to passages in *The Composer's Voice* about four-hand piano performance, passages that evoke, not quite directly, the eroticism (and, in male–male performance, homoeroticism) of that ensemble. Brett (1997, 154) observes how close Cone's writing comes to raciness, and asserts that "This is surely as close as musicology of a perfectly respectable kind can come to exploring the (deviant) sexuality surrounding music without advertising what it is doing." A few years after *The Composer's Voice,* Cone published "Schubert's Promissory Note" (1982), his most direct treatment of music and sexuality, linking certain passages in Schubert to sensuous pleasures and their horrifying consequence of syphilis. That essay confirms my sense that Cone himself sometimes experiences music as sensual or seductive, and also shows that he is likely to be circumspect in his descriptions.[18]

Closer to the main concerns of this paper, an intriguing passage implies an eroticized power relation between personas and their listeners. In order to clarify his account of identification, Cone contrasts a listener's relation to music with a reader's or listener's relation to language. The contrast concerns the separation between the musical or linguistic "voice" and its audience: according to Cone, it is far easier for an addressee to maintain a sense of independence in perceiving linguistic communication. Music has an invasive aspect, a way of dissolving a listener's control, that distinguishes it from language. After emphasizing this "extraordinary power that music seems to exert over our inner life," and stating that "music can speak *to* us only as it speaks *through* us," Cone offers a model, stating that Zerlina, in the duet "Là ci darem la mano" from Mozart's *Don Giovanni,* "admirably symbolizes the situation" (155). Who is Zerlina, and how might she symbolize you, or me, as a music-listener?

In "Là ci darem la mano" Don Giovanni approaches the peasant girl Zerlina, drawing her away from her impending wedding to suggest that he, rather than her fiancé, the peasant Masetto, will marry her. The duet shows his seduction of her—his wooing, her initial resistance, and her eventual assent just before the two start off for Don Giovanni's house. Though the opera is all about Don Giovanni's successes and failures in seduction and rape, this is the only seduction depicted onstage.[19] The subject matter of the duet—Don Giovanni's destructive, manipulative use of his prestige and charm—is unpleasant, but the duet is widely known and loved, a favorite bit of the opera.

Cone mentions this familiar duet in order to make a specific, delimited point. He brings out a subtle contradiction between textual and musical patterning at the beginning of the duet. Don Giovanni addresses Zerlina invitingly. Zerlina replies by describing her indecisiveness, but while her words seem to resist his invitation, she sings them to the melody of Don Giovanni's invitation. According to Cone, "her melody, her subconscious reaction, reflects his. Already, long before she gives in verbally, she has identified herself with his music" (155). Zerlina's words can keep their distance from the content of Don Giovanni's words. She does not reply by saying back to him what he just said to her (it would be odd if she did!), but that is exactly what happens musically. Cone goes further, interpreting her use of his music as a sign that a part of her, which Cone identifies as her "subconscious," is already beginning to give in to the attempted seduction.[20] It is clever of Cone to cite this example where the musical repetition and the verbal non-repetition seem equally natural, and where the onstage interaction can model a relation between musical persona and audience.

But, while Cone cites this duet to illustrate that music creates identification more irresistibly than words, the example overflows the boundaries of his explicit purpose, in a manner typical of indirect, connotative communication. For one thing, it complicates the politics of identification. In identifying with Don Giovanni by repeating his music, Zerlina models her behavior on his, but the sense of equality or participation that she gains from this mimicry is delusive. By the end of the duet, she feels that she is choosing Don Giovanni, electing to share his prestige and power, but in fact the sensation of choice is part of his snare. Her identification with Don Giovanni's purposes is the mechanism through which Don Giovanni achieves domination. How much of this could one carry into Cone's account of musical identification? Does musical identification, rather than countering the persona's domination of the listener, instead somehow deepen and disguise that domination? "Là ci darem la mano" has sinister implications as a model of musical identification.

The example also raises issues about gender. Cone's analogy offers a banal, predictable alignment between gender and the persona/listener

opposition: the active, powerful persona resembles the masculine Don Giovanni, the more passive listener the feminine Zerlina. Cone's use of the duet brings closer to the surface the potential association between listening and femininity.

Cone's analogy also draws in the notion of seduction. If listeners resemble Zerlina, does that mean that music acts as a lover to its listeners, seducing them in some way? In fact, the choice of example makes it hard to avoid thoughts of musical seduction, for this duet that depicts seduction is itself quite beautiful, an especially seductive composition. You don't need to take my word for it; analogies between Don Giovanni's seduction of Zerlina and Mozart's seduction of the listener recur in commentaries on the duet. Critics often notice that the duet delights its listeners into a suspension of their better judgment, just as Don Giovanni's flattery delights, confuses, and persuades Zerlina.

For instance, Nino Pirrotta (1994, 127) emphasizes the music's capacity to persuade listeners of the reality of the seduction: "Up to this point the recitative dialogue has been convincing in its declamation but not in the seduction, even if we grant that Zerlina needs little convincing; the magic of the duettino that follows convinces us." Like Zerlina, we succumb to a magic that produces the effect of conviction. Wye Jamison Allanbrook (1983, 262) emphasizes that listeners enjoy the depicted seduction, rather than judging it sternly: "'Là ci darem la mano' is the sweetest imaginable of love duets . . . all irony and cynicism must be suspended in the fact of the sheer beauty of this dialogue of seduction and acquiescence." Allanbrook's account brings a listener's cognitive condition especially close to Zerlina's: intellectual resistance, one's conscious evaluation of the situation, is undone by the pull of sensuous attraction. Paul Henry Lang (1971, 87), again, spreads the seductive qualities from Don Giovanni to Mozart: he asks, "Was there ever set to music a more delightful, a more tender, a more ravishing and enticing acquiescence to a tryst than 'Là ci darem la mano'?" Zerlina's acquiescence, as Mozart shows it, ravishes and entices the audience. Otto Jahn's version of the same idea is more graphic (1882, 3:187): "[Don Giovanni's] seductive powers are first practised towards Zerlina . . . that which can neither be analysed nor reproduced is the effect of the tender intensity of the simple notes, which penetrate the soul like the glance of a loving eye." Mozart's notes penetrate you, as though someone were gazing at you in just the right way. The vocabulary of these passages—magic, sweetest, sheer beauty, delightful, ravishing, enticing, tender intensity—shows clearly the non-rational allure that, for these critics, undoes any more distanced or reflective judgment.

So Cone is not the only critic to sense, in the relation between Don Giovanni and Zerlina, a model for the relation between the music (or some creative force, a persona or composer) and its listener. But these other writers make the analogy specifically in terms of seduction. Cone's discussion of "Là

ci darem la mano" is characteristically reticent about sex and sensuality, but I think his choice of this outstandingly seductive example as the basis for a general model almost inevitably evokes questions of whether musical power is seductive, whether personas seduce their listeners.

If Cone does not comment on the seductive qualities of Mozart's music, I think he *deploys* its gorgeousness instead: surely the duet appears at the conclusion of Cone's argument partly because of its beauty. Incorporating the duet into his presentation, Cone can count on it to add a special glow to the relation between him and his audience. Part of Cone's charm is his deft, timely use of such charming music. Perhaps he would weaken his own seductiveness if he became too analytical about the issue of musical seduction. But if Cone is reticent about any sexual quality in the persona's approach to the listener, his choice of example speaks sweetly enough, giving his account of music a delicately sexy tinge.

BATTI, BATTI

Nonetheless, if "Là ci darem la mano" implicitly eroticizes the relationship between persona and listener, the notion of seduction still does not offer the most precise account of the erotic qualities of that relationship. In "Là ci darem la mano," Don Giovanni talks Zerlina into going away to have sex; subsequently, were they not interrupted, they would move along to his house and do the act. But Cone's analogy likens Don Giovanni's and Zerlina's preparatory conversation to the act of listening, which is itself, for a listener, a consummation, not a negotiation about some future event. Listening, then, would resemble both seduction and sex act, the two occurring simultaneously. But a more exact sexual analogy is possible, one that matches many aspects of Cone's account of listening.

To see this other analogy, let's begin by remembering embodiment: in sexual activities, bodies interact, and so one might ask how the bodies of listeners affect these analogies. As it happens, Cone's book—which really is remarkably comprehensive—addresses the embodiment of listeners. In suggesting that a listener "mentally performs the work he is hearing," Cone specifies that a literal performer shapes the course of musical events, while "the listener has no such opportunity: he must *submit* to the direction of others." This submission includes a suppression of bodily movements. Some listeners might "hum, or beat time, or make other physical gestures," but "most sophisticated music lovers . . . frankly recognize the limitations of their roles and *sublimate their desires for physical activity*" (136–37). A simpler account of listening might deny the relevance of embodiment; Cone's account, on the contrary, identifies a particular bodily experience—an inhibited or "sublimated" desire for movement, linked to submission—as a constituent of sophisticated musical love. As one might expect, Cone complicates this sub-

mission by adding an aspect of identification: "At the same time, an *imaginary physical involvement* underlies the listener's successful *identification* with the musical persona. For this reason, the visual stimulation of watching a performance is important" (137).

Now what is going on in a musical performance, according to Cone? *Literally,* the performers are moving to make sounds, in part through their own choices, in part under the direction of the composer's score; various listeners sit in a group, silent and immobile, and pay attention, receiving and responding to the sounds that performers direct at them. *Imaginatively*—that is, in the imagination of Cone's normative listener—there is an intense interaction between a persona and a listener, both understood as individuals. The persona, embodied in the notated music and the actions of the performers, dominates the musical sounds and the listeners. Holding still, and knowing that she is not permitted to make any sounds, the listener submits to the persona's will, accepting the distinction between the roles of active, willful persona and passive, receptive listener. At the same time, while the listener is inhibited and dominated by the persona, she also identifies with the persona's power and activity.

A listener's imaginative experience, then, has a strange multiple consciousness, conjoining an awareness of submission (the persona's power over her) with a thrill of identification with power (even though that power takes effect, in part, by domination of herself). To this doubled experience is added, I suppose, a third aspect, a listener's awareness that the whole configuration is, to some extent, fictional and consensual, a chosen style of imaginative submission rather than a literal subjection to force. And the whole complex configuration seems to be itself an object of desire. *The Composer's Voice* describes, as normative, a type of listener who seeks out such experiences. She approaches each new musical encounter with the desire to find, submit to, and identify with an all-powerful persona who will "embrace and control" the musical material and the listener herself.

This is starting to sound kinky. It is easy to nudge Cone's account toward the range of sexual activities known as sadomasochism, or bondage and discipline, those activities where partners agree that one partner will relinquish overt control and activity to the other. Indeed, Cone's text provides us with the words "bound," "domination," "submit," "power," and of course "control."

Sadists and masochists eroticize physical pain, and I am not suggesting that musical experience shares in that. But classical concerts render listeners still and silent, as though bound and gagged. There may also be elements of humiliation in accepting the restricted role of listener; as Henry Kingsbury (1988, 76–80) points out, becoming a listener instead of a performer or composer often results from a series of failed or discouraged attempts at musical production. More generally, sadomasochists, and the music-lovers

that Cone describes, find intense pleasure in experiences structured by an extreme dichotomy between active and passive roles. The classical concert, like the S&M session, depends on different people assuming, for the moment, clearly-defined roles as "tops" and "bottoms."[21] To fill out this account, one could say that musical performers and listeners enjoy and perhaps eroticize the "extractive introjection" that I described before: rather than physical pain, the listener feels, and enjoys, the depletion of her own inner musical initiative, the exclusive assignment of music-making to the persona's activity, and the concurrent identification with a power that originates outside herself.

Now I want to quote a pertinent, experience-based account of masochistic identification. In Dossie Easton's and Catherine A. Liszt's *The Bottoming Book,* a well-received self-help manual, the authors indicate that S&M might be understood as an exercise of "power-over," of one person exerting power at the expense of another. But, they emphasize, it is better to understand the interaction in terms of "power-with." "Power-with is based on the idea that we can all become more powerful by supporting each other in being more powerful" (Easton and Liszt 1995, 19). Or, less obscurely:

> when we [acting as bottoms] give up our power, we feel more powerful. When we give up control, we feel freer (27). When we bottom we feel fabulously powerful . . . When I'm being flogged, . . . I struggle and wonder if I can take it all. That struggle seems to make me stronger, and soon I feel intense energy running through me, as if all the force with which the whip is thrown at me is injected into me, becomes my energy to play with. While my tops throw the whips at me as hard as they can, I take in their power and dance in the center of their storm (17).

These violent images are, of course, outside the range of *The Composer's Voice;* it is remarkable that they replicate Cone's psychology of listening so closely. As Cone might have put it, to listen to music is to grant the persona "power-over" our inner voice; or better, it is to make the persona's power into the "power-with" that we share.

In relation to my present argument, the match between Cone's account of listening and this account of masochistic subjectivity suggests, at the least, that Cone has developed his views in a plausible, non-arbitrary way. Starting with an extreme contrast between the power of the persona and the submission of the listener, Cone attributes to listeners the same mingling of subordination and identification that some S&M bottoms report in their own, similarly-structured experiences, and in a way this confirms Cone's account.[22]

I have argued that Forte and Cone share a starting point in treating each composition as the product of a powerful controlling force, and I observed

that Forte's text has little to say about listening, despite proclaiming its importance. If you want to add an account of listening to the shared conception of musical compositions, *The Composer's Voice* offers such an account. Cone describes sharply contrasting roles. The powerful agency of the compositional persona finds its complement in the submission of the listener; simultaneous identification with the persona complicates that submission. Given the shared starting point, Cone's book shows where Forte might end up if he gave direct, sustained attention to the listener's role. In particular, Cone's account describes a passivity, perhaps masochism, in listening, bringing out traits that are commonly devalued and associated with femininity. They are traits that some writers would surely wish to deny or disavow.

FORT/DA

In a well-known formulation, Anna Freud describes a common "defensive mechanism": someone who experiences aggression from outside may respond by imitating the aggressive behavior. For instance, she tells the story of a little boy who had been hurt by the dentist. He came to Freud's home and tried to cut various items—a piece of rubber, a ball of string, some pencils (Anna Freud 1966, 111–12). As Anna Freud puts it, "by impersonating the aggressor, assuming his attributes or imitating his aggression, the child transforms himself from the person threatened into the person making the threat" (113). One active/passive pairing gives way to another; in the first, the subject is passive and then, repudiating the passive role, the same subject becomes active instead. This account resembles Sigmund Freud's description of the game of "fort" and "da" that a small boy played. As Sigmund Freud interprets it, the child responded to his inability to control the disappearance of his mother by inventing a game in which he threw away his toys, saying "fort" ("gone"); with one toy on a string, he was able afterward to pull it back and say "da" ("there"). He was "staging the disappearance and return of the objects within his reach . . . At the outset he was in a passive situation—he was overpowered by the experience; but, by repeating it . . . as a game, he took on an active role" (Sigmund Freud 1961, 8–11). More broadly, Freud identifies the active/passive antithesis as one of three basic "polarities" of mental life. The goal of avoiding passivity is central to masculinity, which routinely seeks the active role in active/passive complementary relationships (Sigmund Freud 1963, 97).

These narratives, in which mastery comes through reversal of active and passive roles, give a helpful model for understanding Forte's essay. Forte's conception of a masterful, controlling force at the heart of each composition tends to imply a subordinate, submissive role for listeners. The event of listening seems to bring together an active, controlling, perhaps aggressive composition and a submissive, receptive listener. Cone writes about listeners

who accept this submission as part of their listening experience, while adding an identification with the active position. But a listener who is unwilling to accept or acknowledge such passivity might react defensively: he might want, through reversal, to escape or deny the passive role, occupying instead a purely active role in a new pairing. Becoming a theorist or analyst could accomplish that reversal. Listening experiences, with their passive qualities, would be the starting point and motivation for a narrative of reversal that ultimately places the theorist in active roles, as both the fantasy composer in an act of imagined re-composition and the writer who displays control over verbal material.

Listening, in such a conception, is the excessively passive and, therefore, disturbing or problematic moment in a normative progression from a composition to its analysis. If the motivation for analysis is to replace passivity with a display of activity, then analysis would owe its existence to the very experiences that it tries to disguise or displace. It seems that Forte's essay teaches its reader how to be a bottom in the sheets, a top on the streets.

Beyond reformulating some of Forte's and Cone's ideas, as I have done, tasks of interpretation and evaluation are important but tricky.

It is natural to wonder what alternatives can be found to Forte's and Cone's shared preoccupation with control—that is, discursive alternatives, other accounts of classical music, listening, or the concert setting.[23] When I first started thinking about alternatives, I remembered my own use of *The Composer's Voice,* in the article "Music as Drama" and elsewhere (Maus 1988, 1991). I drew upon Cone's ideas about agency and anthropomorphism, but replaced the single imaginary persona with a play of indeterminate agents. This makes it harder to tell a story about the all-powerful persona and the submissive listener. Still, I am not sure that this difference somehow increases the power or independence of listeners; unlike Cone, I didn't develop my views to include listeners in the dramatic interactions I described.

I also thought of Suzanne Cusick, who writes of "the choice I cherish, which is to attend or not, to let the music 'do it' to me (which the musics I love can only do if I have paid the most careful, intense, co-creative attention) . . . or not" (Cusick 1994, 76). On one hand, Cusick seems to value an element of choice, a possibility of refusal, in a way that goes beyond a simple notion of submission. On the other hand, it seems that the basic relationship is still one of musical power over the listener; if Cusick values a particular sense that power is continuously offered and accepted, rather than deployed in an overwhelming way, she still seems to position the listener as either submitting or opting out.

In general, what would constitute a convincing alternative to the active/passive complementarities that I have been describing? Here is one line of thought. Psychoanalyst Jessica Benjamin (1988) argues that participants in S&M adopt fixed roles as a way of avoiding the continuous negotia-

tions, tensions, and uncertainties of intersubjectivity between equals.[24] It is not easy for two people to recognize each other as distinct and equal; it is easier, and in a way more relaxing, to place one person in the position of power and agency. How could one draw on Benjamin's ideas about interaction, uncertainty, and tension in relation to experiences of classical music?

Her ideas apply nicely to musical performance: that is, you can think of performers and composers as, at best, entering into a tense, complex relation of shared agency and responsibility in the production of music, and you can think of more authority-based or work-based concepts of performance as attempts to evade the complexities of joint creativity. But it is harder to apply this positive model of shared creation to the relation between performed music and a concert audience.[25] Perhaps Forte's and Cone's preoccupation with power, even if simple and exaggerated, derives from important aspects of classical music culture.

It may be appropriate to accept and develop an account that likens a certain normative type of musical listening to masochistic submission. An extended consideration could draw on a rich literature about sadomasochism, with some very distinguished recent contributions.[26] Recent discussions suggest that one should not be quick to condemn sadomasochistic practices, and the same goes for potential musical analogs: to compare normative listening to masochism is not necessarily a way of denigrating concert institutions. In this essay, I hope to have shown the relevance of such issues for, among other things, the contemporary discipline of musical analysis. As with concert life, I have tried to reach a better understanding of analytical experience and motivation. It would be premature to offer negative general conclusions about analysis. However, I have suggested that professional analysis involves the formation of identities around a defensive response to musical experience: conscious recognition of this defense and disavowal may be incompatible with the perpetuation of current analytical styles.[27]

NOTES

I presented versions of this paper at New York University (November 2000) and the University of Virginia (February 2001), and benefited from stimulating discussion on those occasions. I am especially grateful to Suzanne G. Cusick, Andrew Dell'Antonio, Nadine Hubbs, and Katharine Eisaman Maus for reading drafts and responding with insightful comments. Epigraph: Forte 1977, 7. The article appeared first in *Journal of Music Theory* 3, no. 1 (April 1959): 1–30. I give page references to the 1977 version.

1. It is important, here and throughout, that I am writing about Forte's essay, rather than directly addressing Schenker's ideas. Study of Schenker's self-conception and positioning of music theory is a separate, demanding enterprise, with a growing literature. See, for instance, Dubiel 1990 or Snarrenberg 1997.

2. Snarrenberg (1994, 53), in his interesting treatment of the essay, notes that

Forte mentions Schumann only once. For another discussion of Forte's essay see Kerman 1980. Marion A. Guck (1994) offers pertinent comments on another essay by Forte.

3. Translation from Komar 1971, 16.

4. My description of the poem simplifies a little. Heine's poem shows the lover's passivity and dependence but also shows, by describing the beloved as a "child" with whom one might bargain (trading love for flowers and birds), a defensive attempt to reverse roles, making the beloved seem dependent instead. Near the end of this essay I will place such reversals at the center of my account of Forte. If my interpretation of Forte's essay is correct, the depiction of such a defensive reversal in the poem would hardly make it more appealing to him.

5. Of course, I understand that Forte is commenting on a sketch by Schenker, and that the omission of text is already present in the original analysis. Still, I think it is fair to ask why he repeats this omission, especially since the music of this particular song is odd and, in certain ways, mysterious without the words. Kerman (1980) emphasizes the role of the poem in understanding the music. It is interesting, too, that Forte chooses a song as his main example to introduce Schenker's theories, as though making a special point of Schenker's, and his own, willingness to disregard verbal text.

6. Snarrenberg (1994, 51) states succinctly that Forte's "reading of Freud seems more colored by his reading of Schenker than vice versa." However, ideas of psychoanalysis in the 1950s were often scientistic, and Forte's general conception of psychoanalysis as, ideally, an objective, impersonal science would have been widely shared. Much later twentieth-century psychoanalytic thought has worked to diminish this scientific allure.

7. A third kind of control comes from the obligatory nature of music's power. Cone is not content to say just that someone might choose to yield control to the composer, as one possible relation to music: obscurely but insistently, he states that you *must* yield control. (Must? Why? What if you don't?) "When we listen to music, whether with words or not, we *must* follow it as if it were our own thought. We are *bound* to it" (156). His account of performance is similar: "The 'convincing' interpretation is the one that *forces* its listener to follow it, no matter whether he knows the piece by heart or has never heard it before" (138–39). And, in a passage I already quoted, Cone asserts that operatic unity "*forces us* to look for a wider intelligence at work."

8. It is not quite clear in Cone's text whether the persona is the force that acts on listeners: various passages seem to identify the music (145), the performers (137), or the composer (in the passages just cited) as exerting this control. On the other hand, Cone disparages listeners who experience music through imaginary relationships to real performers rather than fictional agents or personae (119–21). An interesting account emerges if you think of the imaginary persona as dominating the listener, but the text leaves Cone's intentions unclear, and perhaps he did not think the issue through. A more intricate account, with which I shall not burden the present essay, can acknowledge and interpret Cone's unclarity on this issue.

9. The lack of clarity comes partly from verbal ambiguity: "domination. *Or better* . . . to make the composer's voice our own." What does Cone mean when he says that the second alternative is "better"? Does he mean that the formulation in terms of identification is more accurate? Should it replace the formulation in terms of domination? Or is Cone describing two different possibilities, two rela-

tionships to the composer's voice, and saying that the second is preferable? Or should the two relationships be taken together somehow? In this essay I suggest that domination and identification co-exist in the experiences Cone describes, but exploration of alternative readings would be fruitful, in ways I have set aside for present purposes.

10. The background-to-foreground approach, characteristic of Schenker's essays, is less characteristic of Forte's pedagogical writings. The textbook *Introduction to Schenkerian Analysis* by Forte and Steven E. Gilbert (New York: W. W. Norton, 1982) emphasizes reduction, the elimination of detail to move toward middleground and background levels. The review by Dubiel (*Musical Quarterly* 70, no. 2 [Spring 1984]: 269–78) notes this departure from Schenker's procedures.

11. Recently Benjamin has offered an alterative to this view; see W. E. Benjamin 1999, 112.

12. And Benjamin, in the heat of anti-modernist polemic, suggests that the composition of middlegrounds satisfies an otherwise frustrated desire for tonal composition: "If one subscribes to the notion of Schenkerian analysis as a kind of traditional composition, it follows that many creative musicians will turn to it as a way of gratifying their impulses to work in a language which is natural to them" (168).

13. I am drawing on the useful vocabulary of Walton 1990.

14. Notice, by the way, that this conception of imaginary composition is in tension with another aspect of Forte's language that I emphasized before, the specification of certain musical elements as controlling or subordinating others. That is, one conception treats musical elements as fictional characters, the other describes a fictional creator who stands outside, and controls, all the musical material. I have identified similar tolerance of apparently contradictory descriptions in Maus 1988; Guck (1994) also makes this point about imaginative language in analytical writing.

15. In referring to the persona in a Schenkerian analysis, then, I am not referring to that other all too audible voice, Schenker's own violent, vivid self-depiction—a creature that could also be referred to, in a different usage, as the "persona" of a Schenkerian text.

16. Cone (1989) acknowledges that analysis takes you out of the fast-paced, sequential time of listening. But he emphasizes that the goal of analysis lies in the return to an enhanced experience of music in real time. Unlike Cone, Schenkerian analysts seldom try to tell this story to the end.

17. The crucial contributions are McClary 1991 and Brett, Wood, and Thomas 1994.

18. Cone's own abstract of the essay in RILM is chastely technical, and summarizes the sexual content thus: "As a final conjecture, an attempt is made to connect this meaning with specific events of Schubert's life" (RILM No. 82–01540-ap).

19. Curtis 2000 is valuable for its unusually direct and politically committed account of Don Giovanni's relation to the women in the opera.

20. There is a bit more in Cone's interpretation. The interaction continues as the two characters trade inconclusive, briefer phrases in a middle section. Then, when they return to the opening material, they trade material back and forth rapidly, completing each other's musical thoughts, while the text shows Zerlina on the verge of assent. At the same time, when either one falls silent, an instrument continues in the same vocal register, a subtle touch. "When the flute doubles Don Giovanni's voice . . .

can we not take it as an audible representation of her whole-hearted participation in his vocal line, just as the bassoon that doubles her answer can be assumed to reveal the extent of his identification with hers?" (155). When the flute and bassoon play, it is as though the audience can hear the "inner singing" of the characters.

21. For other discussions of listening, analysis, and sexual positions, see Cusick 1994; Maus 1992, 1993, 1996; and Cusick 1999. The last essay also uses the vocabulary of "tops" and "bottoms," but in the gay male sense of, roughly, "inserter" and "insertee," rather than the S&M usage. Cusick also suggests that the "top/bottom" vocabulary, in its relative lack of gender specificity, may improve on the vocabulary of "feminine" and "masculine" roles in musical interaction (Cusick 1999, 494–95). The bottom role, in either usage, has strong associations with femininity or diminished masculinity but also with male practitioners.

Rosen's eroticized account of Mozart attributes to his music a mingling of pleasure and pain (in expressive content rather than in the relation between music and audience—though one should not hope for too clear a distinction here). He refers to "the violence and the sensuality at the center of Mozart's work," claiming that "in all of Mozart's supreme expressions of suffering and terror . . . there is something shockingly voluptuous . . . the grief and the sensuality strengthen each other, and end by becoming indivisible, indistinguishable one from the other" (1972, 324–25). It is difficult not to read this as a knowledgeable, thinly-veiled reference to sadomasochism.

22. Sigmund Freud, in "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes," also emphasizes the identification of masochists with the sadist's position. He suggests that masochism develops out of an earlier sadism, through reversal from an active to a passive position. "Whether there is . . . a more direct masochistic satisfaction is highly doubtful. A primary masochism, not derived from sadism in the manner I have described, seems not to be met with" (Sigmund Freud 1963, 83–103). (Subsequent attempts to integrate the "death instinct" into his theories led to changes in Freud's account of masochism.)

While this passage seems to support Easton's and Liszt's more experiential account, it also suggests caution. Accounts of masochism that stress identification with the sadist may reflect a sense that sadistic behavior is more intelligible, by itself, than the masochist's—that is, such accounts may result from incomprehension, or intolerance, of masochistic subjectivity. The same may be true of Cone's emphasis on identification with the persona.

23. Another kind of alternative would be *practical* rather than *discursive:* rather than seeking alternative descriptions of normative classical music behaviors, one could contrast those norms with, for instance, traditional musical practices that are more participatory, or recent creations such as Pauline Oliveros's *Sonic Meditations* that break down audience/performer distinctions.

24. Benjamin is in the tradition of feminist thought that disparages sadomasochism. Alternative accounts are possible, giving an important role to mutual understanding and support between sadomasochistic partners. My goal in this essay is not to choose among accounts of S&M, but at most to show a way that such accounts might be pertinent to musicology.

25. This may help explain why "On a Lesbian Relation with Music" (Cusick 1994) moves from a relatively brief account of listening to a more extended account of performance, in which Cusick construes performance as an erotic interaction between

performer and music (with no clear role for the audience). Marion Guck makes a similar shift. She writes eloquently of the power of music: "Experience of music's power is definitive of music loving. The powers I've described seem to me genuinely part of close involvement with music. I can understand intellectually how they might seem so disturbing that one would want to deny them. However, I cannot say that these experiences feel dangerous to me, nor can I endorse denying them" (1997, 347–48). But, in moving to a sustained example, a passage from a Mozart piano concerto, Guck suddenly places herself in the role of pianist, thereby taking on agency in the production of the music (1997, 348–50). Again, as in Cusick, the audience disappears from this scene of performance.

26. Recent publications cover an enormous methodological range, including psychological and psychoanalytical theory, ethnography, social history, literary criticism, political advocacy (pro and con), and fiction. Hanly 1995 includes a selection of important psychoanalytical papers. The volume *Masochism,* trans. Jean McNeil (1989), joins Leopold von Sacher-Masoch's short novel *Venus in Furs* and an influential essay, "Coldness and Cruelty," by Gilles Deleuze. Other recent work includes Califia 1988; Stoller 1991; "A Poem is Being Written," in Sedgwick 1993, 177–214; Noyes 1997; Hart 1998; Savran 1998; and much more. It is an especially active area of research and writing.

27. I presented early versions of the interpretation of Forte (the origin of the first four sections of this essay) at the joint meeting of the American Musicological Society, Society for Music Theory, and Society for Ethnomusicology, Oakland, 1990, and at the conference Feminist Theory and Music, Minneapolis, 1991. Other material dates from 2000–2001.