



Elephants, Crocodiles, and Beethoven: Schenker's Politics and the Pedagogy of Schenkerian Analysis

Author(s): Carl Schachter

Source: *Theory and Practice*, Vol. 26 (2001), pp. 1-20

Published by: Music Theory Society of New York State

Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41054326>

Accessed: 01-04-2019 01:46 UTC

REFERENCES

Linked references are available on JSTOR for this article:

https://www.jstor.org/stable/41054326?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references_tab_contents

You may need to log in to JSTOR to access the linked references.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at <https://about.jstor.org/terms>



JSTOR

Music Theory Society of New York State is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *Theory and Practice*

Elephants, Crocodiles, and Beethoven: Schenker's Politics and the Pedagogy of Schenkerian Analysis¹

Carl Schachter

In Canto 1 of his unfinished masterpiece, *Don Juan*, Byron writes about young Juan's education. The boy's mother was worried about his reading the Greek and Latin classics, with their indecent passages describing the "filthy loves of gods and goddesses," who "never put on pantaloons or bodices." Byron describes an attempted solution to this problem. I quote stanza 44 and part of 45:

Juan was taught from out the best edition,
Expurgated by learned men, who place
Judiciously, from out the schoolboy's vision
The grosser parts, but fearful to deface
Too much their modest bard by this omission,
And pitying sore his mutilated case,
They only add them all in an appendix,
Which saves, in fact, the trouble of an index;

For there we have them all at one fell swoop,
Instead of being scattered through the pages;
They stand forth marshall'd in a handsome troop,
To meet the ingenuous youth of future ages,

The learned editors of whom Byron writes were trying to safeguard the questionable innocence of adolescent schoolboy readers while at the same time remaining faithful to their Greek and Latin authors—a hopelessly self-contradictory enterprise. All that their transplanting accomplished was to facilitate their readers' gorging themselves on the forbidden fruit, now conveniently gathered into one place. Such editions, by the way, really existed and in fact still do, and in our own

field. Readers of Schenker can encounter precisely the same editorial procedure in Appendix 4 of *Free Composition*, which contains a number of passages from the first edition of *Der freie Satz*, translated by John Rothgeb and belatedly inserted when the book was prepared for publication after the death of its editor and translator, Ernst Oster. Most of these had already been removed from the second German edition by its editor, Oswald Jonas, and all were intended by Oster to be excluded from his English translation.² Incidentally, some items from the first edition never found their way into the English version, whether by design or through oversight, I don't know. In Appendix 4 as it stands, the "ingenuous youth" who study in our graduate music programs can find "at one fell swoop" a number of Schenker's statements about matters philosophical, pseudo-scientific, political, social, and esthetic. Some of these passages are quite interesting, but almost none deal directly with music-theoretical issues. Many reveal a strongly elitist, anti-democratic attitude, especially in matters relating to art. A very few express the German chauvinism that so strongly characterizes Schenker's writings after the defeat of the Central Powers in World War I. Whereas the editors in *Don Juan* were trying to protect their readers from their authors, the editors of *Free Composition* were trying to protect their author from their readers. I know from conversations with Oster that he felt that the passages in question would so alienate people that Schenker's musical ideas would not receive a fair hearing; he also believed that they were in no way an essential part of the book's contents. I am certain that Jonas felt the same way. My teacher, Felix Salzer, was in complete agreement with Oster about the cuts, though the two of them disagreed strongly on many other issues. Their fears were not altogether misplaced. I know one gifted young theorist, an American of Italian ancestry, who was offended by Schenker's slighting remarks about Italian music, and no doubt there have been others who have had similar reactions. Nevertheless Schenker's approach has won its greatest number of adherents precisely in the twenty years since the publication of *Free Composition* despite whatever ill feelings these passages might have aroused.

The following is one of the more bizarre extracts, but it is by no means atypical. Remember that the book was hurriedly published, shortly after Schenker's death on January 22, 1935; he did not live to complete the proofreading and final revision. Hitler had already consolidated his power in Germany, but the annexation of Austria, where the book was published, lay three years in the future.

Just this passion for flying over drives people to revolt against nature. Nature hews to landscapes as rubrics according to which she arranges and attunes her creations. But modern man thinks he can ignore the differentiations of landscapes simply because he can fly over them. There is no doubt, however, that nature, like art, will win out. Just as nature will always place elephants and crocodiles, for example, where she can provide their life's necessities, so she will place a Beethoven—if indeed ever again—among the German people.³

Behind the amusingly incongruous juxtaposition of Beethoven with exotic beasts, there lurks a rather grim idea: that out of all the world's peoples, nature has endowed only the Germans with the ability to produce geniuses like Beethoven,

just as she has endowed only tropical landscapes with the ability to support the existence of elephants and crocodiles. As I mentioned earlier, there are only a few passages in *Der freie Satz* where Schenker vents his German chauvinism. And in fact there is one aphorism in the Introduction in which he explicitly states that "music is accessible to all races and creeds alike," and that anyone—presumably of any race or creed—who learns to master linear progressions creatively "produces art which is genuine and great."⁴ I suspect that this tolerant statement is a late addition to the book, intended to distance Schenker from Nazi ideology, and that the reactionary elephants and crocodiles represent fossilized survivals from an earlier version, survivals that he might have removed had he lived to complete his proofreading and revision of the manuscript. (Schenker worked on *Free Composition* over a period of many years.) In any case, even the most outspoken polemical passages in *Free Composition* are mild and innocuous compared to those in some of Schenker's earlier publications.

Schenker's writings prior to World War I are not especially chauvinistic, but those from the 1920s are full of nationalistic statements, often expressed with a most unattractive contempt for Germany's opponents in the war. This harshness of tone, by the way, also characterized Schenker's comments about music theorists with whom he disagreed—a feature of his writings that undoubtedly increased opposition to his musical ideas. Three works in particular contain nationalistic outbursts; all three are highly important from the musical standpoint. In 1920 Schenker published his *Erläuterungsausgabe* (Explanatory Edition) of Beethoven's Piano Sonata, Opus 101; this is the first publication in which he utilizes the concept of the *Urlinie*. In it Schenker explicitly likens the decline of German music after the death of Brahms ("a final, eternal Bismarck of German music") to the sad political situation of post-war Germany and urges the German people to return to an understanding of and reverence for the works of genius formerly produced by their own culture and to reject foreign influences, including democratic political structures borrowed from the nations of the West.⁵ In the following year, 1921, he began to issue *Der Tonwille* (The Tone-Will), a series of pamphlets almost completely devoted to analyses based on the *Urlinie*; the very first article, however, "Von der Sendung des deutschen Genies" ("On the Mission of German Genius"), was entirely given over to the topic of German cultural superiority and the moral and intellectual worthlessness of the Western democracies and of those Germans sympathetic to them.⁶ Schenker had at one time intended this essay for inclusion in the second book of *Kontrapunkt*, but his publisher had vetoed the idea. In any case, the eventual Preface to *Kontrapunkt II*, which appeared in 1922, continued along similar lines, though thankfully with somewhat milder language and not at so great a length.

It is quite startling to turn from these xenophobic outbursts to the musical discussions a few pages on—from statements, like one in *Kontrapunkt* about "the peoples of the West, contaminated by deception and profiteering and barely touched by civilization"—to the first discussion of three-voice counterpoint six pages later on, which calmly and lucidly explains how the principles of two-voice counterpoint govern writing in three voices as well.⁷ Schenker himself obviously believed that his political fulminations and his musical ideas belonged together,

that both were armaments, as it were, in a cultural struggle that would eventually lead to a regeneration both of music and of society at large in the German-speaking world. What I want to do in this paper is first of all to survey Schenker's political views and attempt to place them in historical context. Secondly I wish to consider whether the musical and political ideas are necessarily bound together for Schenker's readers today (few of whom would welcome the kind of societal regeneration he sought). And finally whether the teaching of his approach nowadays needs to incorporate references to his political ideology. In making this survey, I have been heavily indebted to two books: Hellmut Federhofer's biography, based on Schenker's diaries and letters,⁸ and Martin Eybl's *Ideologie und Methode: Zum ideengeschichtlichen Kontext von Schenkers Musiktheorie*, a study of the ideological context in which Schenker's theories evolved.⁹ Let's start by considering the German chauvinism.

Read in the light of subsequent events, Schenker's nationalistic statements are quite disheartening, to say the least, but in one crucial respect his pan-German nationalism is very different both from the National-Socialist ideology it partly resembles and from the proto-Nazi racist theories of Houston Stewart Chamberlain and Adolf Josef Lanz.¹⁰ As Eybl points out, Schenker's nationalism is not based on biological determinism—this despite his invoking "nature" as the agent who might place another Beethoven among the Germans.¹¹ Schenker, himself a Jew, believed that it was quite possible for culturally assimilated Jews to participate in and contribute to German national life, and he said specifically about Beethoven, whose ancestry was partly Flemish, that what made him German was not his bloodline but rather the breadth of his linear progressions: "The creator of such linear progressions must be a German even if foreign blood perhaps flowed in his veins!" (This comes from a paragraph in the first edition of *Der freie Satz* that never found its way into Appendix 4 of the English translation.¹²) Thus when Schenker writes about the German "race," as he sometimes does, he means it primarily as a cultural entity, not a biological one—he never refers to "Aryans." He certainly regarded Mendelssohn as a German composer; and he once even cited Chopin as a kind of honorary German. And of course he thought and spoke of himself as German although he was a Jew and born in the Polish-speaking part of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. Schenker's reference to the importance of landscapes (in the elephants and crocodiles quotation) might resemble the Nazi slogan of "Blut und Boden"—blood and soil—but he seems to have believed in the soil more than the blood.

Schenker was by no means free from racism. In the Opus 101 commentary and the *Tonwille* essay, he criticized the French army's use of African soldiers, calling France the "Franco-Senegalese nationality" and referring to the black soldiers then occupying the Saar district of Germany as the "vanguard of the [Frenchman's] itchy genitals, flesh of his flesh, cannibal esprit of his cannibal esprit."¹³ I'm not trying to defend him when I state that such racism was shared by many—perhaps most—white people in those days, not only in Germany and Austria but also in Britain, France, and the United States; witness the cinematically great but revoltingly racist film "Birth of a Nation" by D. W. Griffith (1915). But it is significant that Schenker, when invoking German superiority, never speaks of

purity of blood, of the mongrelization produced by racial mixing, of skull measurements, or indeed of any of the concepts of so-called racial science.

I am sure that Schenker's German chauvinism was partly brought about by the undeniable fact that a disproportionate number of the great composers of tonal music were German and that the long-range and multi-layered musical thinking and hearing he valued were especially characteristic of the German masters. But his belief in German superiority was not restricted to music. He repeatedly writes that no other people could have produced either Germany's musical geniuses or her giants in other fields—Luther, Kant, Goethe, and so forth. German culture, for him, was uniquely suited to the fostering of superior creative spirits. (One wonders how he accounted for Thomas Aquinas, Dante, Shakespeare, Michelangelo, Montaigne, Newton, Descartes, Rembrandt, Darwin, Tolstoy, to name a few.) Another facet of his chauvinism was his passionate preference for the German language. This preference possibly relates to his own qualities as a writer. Except for a few terms like "Prolongation" and "Diminution," Schenker's technical vocabulary is deeply rooted in the German language and in fact some terms have proven impossible to translate into English without a loss of meaning. And what Oswald Jonas called Schenker's "recalcitrance toward any form of belletristic presentation" also reveals a rather typical German suspicion of verbal facility and decorative, elegant writing.¹⁴ In any case Schenker believed that German was the richest and most artistic language and the only one capable of expressing great flights of thought, in contrast to the "inferior, corseted, mechanically plotted" French language and "the lowest of all languages, the completely degenerate English."¹⁵ I don't know how well he knew French, but his judgment about the language of Shakespeare reveals a confidence born of ignorance: Schenker could barely read English and, near the end of his life, had to have translated for him a simple magazine article (an interview in New York between the music critic Irving Kolodin and Schenker's pupil Hans Weisse).¹⁶ Martin Heidegger, by the way, had related views about the superiority of German—he thought it was the only modern language suitable for philosophy.

Heidegger was not the only German thinker whose views sometimes paralleled Schenker's. It helps put Schenker's nationalism in perspective to realize that it was shared by many important intellectuals and artists in the German-speaking world of his time, including a large number of Jews. In her fascinating history of the city of Berlin, *Faust's Metropolis*, Alexandra Richie writes about the chauvinism of influential historians in late nineteenth-century Germany, who proclaimed "the superiority of German culture above all others" and "Germany's sacred mission to preserve and disseminate German *Kultur*."¹⁷ Closer to our own time and in our field of music, there is Schoenberg's well-known statement from the 1920s that with his twelve-tone system he was insuring the supremacy of German music for a hundred years—a prediction that time does not exactly seem to be bearing out. The great conductor Otto Klemperer, a converted Jew and an ultra-patriotic German, wrote a jubilant letter from Los Angeles in June of 1940. He was exulting over the fall of France and the triumphant entry of the Nazi army into Paris (he called it a "miracle"), which he felt would mean an imminent end to the war (an end on Hitler's terms, of course).¹⁸ This from a man whose spectacular career in

Germany was destroyed by the Nazi government and who was forced to emigrate.

Klemperer, to be sure, was a clinically disturbed man with severe emotional problems. Perhaps even stranger is the case of Anton Webern. It is also more significant, since it concerns an artist of greater importance. Webern was originally suspicious of the Hitler regime, as one would expect from his socialist tendencies and his veneration for his Jewish teacher, Arnold Schoenberg. Gradually, however, he became more and more sympathetic to the Nazis, believing that over time Hitler would curb the initial excesses of the regime. This sympathy was no doubt engendered by his strong belief in German cultural superiority—a belief shared with people like Schoenberg, Klemperer, and of course Schenker. According to the violinist Louis Krasner, who knew him well (and who gave the first performance of the Berg Violin Concerto, with Webern conducting), “he was passionate about his belief in the superiority of German culture and its destined, historic role.”¹⁹ Webern suffered under the Nazis. His compositions were banned, and were held up to ridicule and opprobrium as specimens of “degenerate music.” After the German annexation of Austria, Webern was living in straitened circumstances. Performances of his music were forbidden, and his income from teaching was sharply reduced (at least partly because there were fewer and fewer Jewish students and eventually none). Despite all this, he was capable of writing effusively in a letter to a friend during the early days of Nazi victories in 1940: “Are things not going forward with giant steps? This is Germany today! But the National Socialist one, to be sure! . . . It is something new! Created by this unique man!”²⁰ Who would have imagined that Anton Webern of all people would have singled out just the grandiosity, the “giant steps” of Nazi Germany, for his praise?

In his published writings, Schenker never commented on the contemporary party politics of Germany or Austria, nor did he broadcast his political preferences except in the most general terms; for information about specific political issues, one must turn to the few comments found in the posthumously published letters and diary excerpts. Federhofer quotes an appalling letter in which Schenker praises Hitler for getting rid of the communists, and one can imagine his approving the strongly nationalistic and anti-democratic features of the Nazi regime, at least at first.²¹ It is clear from comments in other letters and in his diary, however, that he was no adherent of National Socialism. Throughout his life, Schenker remained an assimilated but believing Jew, unlike Klemperer and Schoenberg, both of whom were baptized (though Schoenberg later converted back to Judaism and Klemperer began to attend synagogue services in later life). His strong sense of Jewish identity alone would have prevented Schenker from becoming a follower of Hitler. Nazism’s reliance on street demonstrations and huge mass rallies would also have revolted Schenker. In another of the Appendix 4 passages, he writes: “Art can bring together as many as two or three thousand people. But to assemble and entertain 50,000 people--this can be accomplished only by bullfights, cock fights, massacres, pogroms: a brutal ranting and raving, a demented and chaotic outcry.”²² On the surface this passage expresses Schenker’s elitism—his view that art is not for the masses. But it also seems to me to contain an anti-Nazi subtext. I’m not sure he had the Nazi demonstrations and rallies in mind when he wrote it, but I strongly suspect that he did; the inclusion of the word “pogroms” is especially

telling.

According to Federhofer's biography, Schenker was a supporter of Engelbert Dollfuss, who was Chancellor of Austria in the early 1930s.²³ Dollfuss suppressed the Austrian Nazi party, but he was equally opposed to the parties of the left. After riots by Austro-Marxists in Vienna (February 1934), brutally put down by the army, he instituted a "corporate state" (*Ständestaat*) somewhat resembling Mussolini's fascist regime in Italy. Hoping to receive support from the Italian government, Dollfuss continued to oppose the Nazis. As it turned out, he was assassinated by Austrian Nazis a few months later, paving the way for the German annexation of Austria in 1938. Schenker's support of Dollfuss's fascistic regime is consistent with his rejection of democracy as a political system, and this rejection relates directly to his belief that only in an aristocratic society can the arts flourish. As John Rothgeb cogently argues in his Preface to the English translation of *Kontrapunkt*, Schenker was "adamant in his rejection of both communism and Western-style democracy as ideologies exalting the masses (and thus the lowest common denominator). . . . He believed that genius—the single source of high Art—could only flourish in an elitist, aristocratic culture."²⁴ In rejecting communism and democracy, Schenker also rejected the concentration of political power in the hands of the proletariat (whom he associated with communism) or the bourgeoisie (whom he associated with democracy).

Schenker, of course, was an anti-modernist, especially but not exclusively with regard to music. Many modernist writers and artists, however, shared his contempt for the values of mass culture. Indeed, as far back as the 1850s, early modernists—Gustave Flaubert is an outstanding example—helped to define their own artistic stance through opposition to the aesthetic preferences of the bourgeoisie. In the early twentieth century, quite a few artists and writers, modernists as well as traditionalists, were at least temporarily beguiled by Fascism or Nazism. Some, like the Italian Futurists, were attracted by the very violence and destructiveness of these political ideologies—they liked the "brutal ranting and raving," the "demented and chaotic outcry," to use Schenker's words.²⁵ Other more conservative types, possibly including Schenker, may have felt that totalitarian governments represented a return to aristocratic principles. What they all had to have overlooked was the fact that these were mass ideologies promoting a mass culture as debased and vulgar as anything the democracies had to offer. The Fascist sympathies (at least for a while) of English-language writers like William Butler Yeats, Bernard Shaw, and of course Ezra Pound, have been documented for a long time. But, in the field of music, it is only fairly recently that such scholars as Michael Kater, Harvey Sachs, and Richard Taruskin have begun to investigate the at least temporary Fascist or Nazi leanings of figures as significant as Anton Webern, Luigi Dallapiccola, and Igor Stravinsky. And in general, the attraction of totalitarian regimes of both the right and the left for many artists, writers, and intellectuals of the first half of the twentieth century is a component of modern cultural history that is still incompletely investigated and understood.

To round out and a little bit to purposely complicate the picture of Schenker's opposition to democracy, I should mention that a diary entry from as early as 1923 states that he was opposed to democracy "less in the political than in

the cultural sense."²⁶ And although Schenker regarded "popular art" as a contradiction in terms, he welcomed instances of it with enthusiasm if he felt they were truly artistic. Thus there are analyses of Waltzes by Johann and Josef Strauss in *Free Composition*, mixed in with those of pieces by Bach and Mozart. And there is a 1931 diary entry which refers to the Swiss clown and silent movie comedian "Grock" (Adrian Wettach) and to Charlie Chaplin as "distinguished by human kindness; both, so to speak, are missionaries of the eternal religion of love, surpassing popes, statesmen, generals, journalists, organizations, and congresses in noble effect."²⁷ Of course, Schenker would have maintained that artistic productions like Strauss Waltzes and Chaplin films are "popular" only in that they appeal to a wide public; their creation, however, is due to individual artists of uncommon ability. And who could deny that this was true? Schenker's opposition to cultural democracy as the glorification of the lowest common denominator raises questions that are still current, as can be seen from recent controversies regarding the National Endowment for the Arts. Whether a populist, anti-elitist society and government like ours can foster valuable artistic production is doubtful, at least in my view; in any case, recent trends in this country are not encouraging.²⁸ And in Britain, an anti-intellectual, reactionary regime initiated by Margaret Thatcher and an anti-intellectual, populist, Labour government led by Tony Blair have between them brought about a decline in cultural standards that seems even worse than what we have here, if only because the standards were a bit higher to begin with.

As Martin Eybl indicates, Schenker's anti-democratic position formed part of a belief system that seems to have been organized in an extraordinarily hierarchical manner.²⁹ The Germans are ranked above all other nationalities. Other Europeans, inferior as they are to Germans, are nonetheless superior to us Americans. (What he thought of Asians and Africans I don't know, but his comments about the "Franco-Senegalese nationality" lead me to doubt that his view was a flattering one.) German superiority, however, does not reside in each individual German, but in their collective existence. The German masses constitute a kind of nourishing soil—"humus" is Schenker's word—in which superior individuals, and eventually geniuses, can grow. Why the German "humus," in contrast to the Italian, or French, or Slavic, has this genius-growing propensity, he never explains, although, as we know, he compares it to the tropical environments that sustain the lives of crocodiles and elephants. Within each society, there is thus a hierarchical distinction between average people and the gifted elite (and, especially in Germany, the geniuses) that more or less mirrors the distinction between the German people and the rest of humanity. Certainly a monarchical and aristocratic society with its stratification by hereditary class would accord better with this kind of world-view than a democratic one. Schenker believed that an aristocracy of some sort—at least in cultural matters if not also in political structure—would promote the selection and support of gifted individuals among whom the rare genius might emerge. That he was altogether wrong in this last view, I'm not prepared to say. In any case, similar ideas, more cogently argued, occur elsewhere, for example in Alexis de Tocqueville's *Democracy in America*.

Schenker's obsession with geniuses has, in part, a distinctly personal quality. In the field of music, he rather naively believed that his concepts of the *Urlinie* and

Ursatz provided an objective criterion for determining who was a genius and who was not. And since most of the geniuses given his "Good Voice Leading" seal of approval were German and all of them long dead, Schenker could unite four of his preoccupations within one focus: musical structure, German superiority, the decadence of modern times, and the incomparable, transcendent gifts of the genius. This synthesis was uniquely Schenkerian, but all the elements except for the *Urfinie* and *Ursatz* were common in his milieu. Consider the following passage:

. . . a time when art is content with daubs . . . ; the time of superficial anarchy, with no feeling for Justice and the State; a time of communistic ethics, of the most foolish of historical views, the materialistic interpretation of history; a time of capitalism and of Marxism; a time when history, life and science are no more than political economy and technical instruction; a time when genius is supposed to be a form of madness; a time with no great artists and no great philosophers; a time without originality and yet the most foolish craving for originality.

Except for the reference to painting, almost every word in that paragraph could have been taken from one of Schenker's polemical essays. The paragraph, however, comes from Otto Weininger's *Geschlecht und Charakter (Sex and Character)*, published in 1903.³⁰ This demented book became enormously influential partly because of the lurid manner of Weininger's death—he committed suicide at the age of twenty-three in the house where Beethoven had died—but also because it corresponded to currents of thought quite common in Europe at that time. The book is extraordinarily misogynistic and anti-Semitic, and it far outdoes Schenker in genius-worship—Weininger asserts the worthlessness of all human endeavors except the products of genius, and maintains that the only point in human life is to make oneself into as much of a genius as one can. (This road to salvation, by the way, is barred to women.) An inordinate preoccupation with geniuses can be traced much further back in German cultural history than the time of Weininger and Schenker; Alexandra Richie dates it as early as 1774, when Goethe's *Sorrows of Young Werther* created a kind of national cult around the notion of the misunderstood genius.³¹

Like everyone, Schenker was a child of his time and place. Many people have noted analogies to his musical ideas in the works of some of his contemporaries such as Karl Kraus, Sigmund Freud, Edmund Husserl and others. In his own domain of music theory his contributions are as original and significant as any of theirs. He is, I think, the only theorist of tonal music except Rameau who single-handedly produced a kind of paradigm shift in his field; and his musical ideas have far greater explanatory powers than Rameau's. As I have tried to show, he is also a child of his milieu in his nationalism, his mistrust of democracy, and his preoccupation with genius. More than sixty years after his death, his musical ideas are still alive and active and continue to stimulate new and creative work. His ideas about society and politics, for the most part, enjoy no such productive afterlife, and many are thoroughly discredited. Not only are some of them all too familiar from other sources, but they are also more than a little frightening, resonating as they now do with some of the most horrific events of modern times.

To what extent do Schenker's political views impinge on his analytical approach? Allen Forte, in his Introduction to *Free Composition*, notes that English-language readers might be puzzled or even offended by some of the passages in Appendix 4. He goes on to state: "Almost none of the material bears substantive relation to the musical concepts that he developed during his lifetime and, from that standpoint, can be disregarded; it is, however, part of the man and his work."³² Twenty years ago almost everyone in the Schenkerian community would have agreed with Forte's statement. Nowadays many would disagree. My own view hinges upon how one understands the words "none bears substantive relation to the musical concepts." If one takes them to mean "none plays a role in the development of the theory," then Forte is clearly wrong. If, on the other hand, one takes them to mean (as I think Forte intended) "none is inseparable from the musical ideas," then I believe that he is completely correct. For Schenker himself there was certainly a felt connection between his ideology and his musical ideas. As Ian Bent points out in an interesting article, Schenker's later treatment of form—as the outward manifestation of inner forces arising out of the tonal materials themselves—applies to music what Schenker and others (notably Thomas Mann for a time) regarded as special qualities of German thought—a thinking from the inside out that shunned superficial verbal dexterity and elegance. For Bent, the momentous changes in Schenker's thinking signalled by the discovery of the *Urlinie* and *Ursatz* and the eventual move to a mostly non-verbal mode of analytic presentation were partly brought about by his belief that the unique character of German thought was reflected in the music of the great German masters.³³ Bent's argument is certainly plausible. If it is correct, Schenker's German nationalism, sinister as it appears today, must have played a formative and essentially positive role in the genesis of the theory.

Martin Eybl also points out that the development of the *Urlinie* concept coincided with Schenker's post-war writings on German superiority and his denunciations of the Western democracies.³⁴ Schenker regarded the masterpieces of tonal music from Bach to Brahms as the supreme expressions of the German soul and, by extension, of the human spirit altogether. He regarded the dissolution of tonality as a wilful rejection of genius, a kind of blasphemy against these almost divine creations, parallel to the dissolution of an aristocratic polity in Germany and Austria. And he viewed his theoretical work as possibly a prelude to the reconstruction, in the distant future if at all, both of German society and of German music. His calling Brahms "a final, eternal Bismarck of German music" is a clue to how close he felt the connection between music and society to be. Thus Schenker certainly saw relations between music and social organization, as did others before him, going back to Plato and Confucius. But mainly he viewed music as a model for an ideal society, not society as a model for music. For example, he closes the Preface to *Kontrapunkt II* with the following statement:

The sum total of my works present an image of art as self-contained, as growing of itself—but despite all infinitude of appearance, as setting its own limits through selection and synthesis. It is my fervent wish that mankind may ultimately be permitted to be guided through the euphony of art to the noble spirit

of selection and synthesis, and to shape all institutions of his earthly existence such as state, marriage, love and friendship into true works of art according to the laws of artistic synthesis.³⁵

Schenker perceived in music not only the model for an ideal political entity but also and much more importantly the image of a world charged with the grandeur of God. Indeed he saw a direct connection between his theory of the *Ursatz* and the Jewish religion. In his diary, he noted a conversation with Oswald Jonas in May 1933, a conversation partly devoted to the perilous situation of German Jews in the earliest days of the Nazi regime: "Jonas is deeply moved by my avowal of Judaism. Parallels: in the cosmos, one cause in God—in music, one cause in the *Ursatz*—thus monotheistic thought in both. Any other way of observing the world and music today [is] a pagan adherence to a foreground idolatry of isolated details."³⁶ This remark of Schenker's is related to several of the passages in *Der freie Satz*, though there without the specific reference to Judaism. Here is passage E from Appendix 4 of the translation:

Between fundamental structure and foreground there is manifested a rapport much like that ever-present, interactional rapport which connects God to creation and creation to God. Fundamental structure and foreground represent, in terms of this rapport, the celestial and the terrestrial in music.³⁷

And note in another of the Appendix 4 passages (F), a related thought couched in quasi-scientific rather than religious language:

Just as life is an uninterrupted process of energy transformation, so the voice-leading strata represent an energy transformation in the life which originates in the fundamental structure.³⁸

Thus Schenker certainly saw many connections between music and the world at large. The primary thrust of his theory, however, is to understand music in musical terms as an autonomous domain rather than through concepts borrowed from literature, mathematics, history, philosophy, or other domains of thought. Remember his words from *Kontrapunkt II* about his works showing music "as self-contained, as growing of itself . . . as setting its own limits." Even the famous graphic analyses based on the elements of musical notation have the effect of reducing (though not entirely eliminating) language as an analytical vehicle. Indeed, in the Preface to the *Fünf Urlinie-Tafeln (Five Graphic Music Analyses)*, Schenker proudly states that he has developed the presentation in graphic form to the point where no explanatory text is needed. For Schenker the symbolic connections between music and the world take on validity only when the music is heard and understood in its autonomy, when the extra-musical image is precipitated by the combination of musical sounds. The view of music as an autonomous domain is also reflected in the layout of Schenker's publications. The polemical statements are only rarely attached to the analytical monographs or the theoretical explications; they appear as separate essays, as introductory material (perhaps in a fore-

word), or as aphorisms placed in a section of miscellaneous remarks. Schenker himself had a lot to say about the self-sufficiency of music. Here, for example, is an excerpt from an article about the *Urlinie* in the first *Tonwille* issue; the excerpt is a good sample of Schenker's polemical tone when discussing writers on music with whom he disagreed:

The *Urlinie* also gives the lie to the so-called "poetic idea." Never mind how many images of human life cross over into music—how could an art engendered by humans not reflect humanity? Never mind how often the "poetic idea" is pulled in as a help by certain muscle men of expression, who don't understand that it is only valid to assimilate oneself to art but not to assimilate art to oneself. Never mind how often it is invoked by certain hermeneutical chatterboxes about affect, whose incompetence forces them to look into music as though it's the world of objects instead of hearing their way into it—thus they turn music into an ear-cinema. Far above all that remains music, with the *Urlinie* a world unto itself comparable to the cosmos; like it, abiding only within itself, unfolding its actions without [an external] goal.³⁹

It was perhaps because of Schenker's belief in the autonomy of music that some of the most devoted members of his circle felt they were not traitors to the cause if they rejected his political ideas outright while following him in his musical thinking. Oswald Jonas, one of Schenker's most gifted students, and one who made significant and lasting contributions to the theory, moved in the 1920s from Vienna to Berlin largely because he could not stand Schenker's politics, yet revered him so much as a musician and man that he did not want to get into disagreements with him.⁴⁰ Walter Dahms, a Berlin music critic and biographer of composers, was a disciple of Schenker's from 1913. Federhofer's biography tells us that their relationship was conducted mainly through letters, but that they met in the summer of 1919, soon after the end of the war. The meeting was very stormy and was followed up by an outspoken letter from Dahms to Schenker. Dahms had fought in the war and had developed a violent revulsion against German militarism; indeed he wanted to leave Germany (and eventually did so). He made the most insulting remarks to Schenker about Erich Ludendorff and Paul von Hindenburg, the two field marshalls who had led the German armies in the war, and whom Schenker revered. Dahms also made clear his view that as a civilian, Schenker had no right to his opinions about the war. Significantly, this heated political dispute had no effect on Dahms's enormous admiration for Schenker the musician or, for that matter, on Schenker's very warm feelings for Dahms as a person and writer.⁴¹ Schenker's close friend, the artist Victor Hammer, also strongly disagreed with Schenker's politics; he was very much an internationalist. At the same time he continued to be fascinated by the *Urlinie* concept.⁴² Thus the removal of political ideology from Schenker's approach—a trend that developed in full force here in the United States—actually began early on in Austria and Germany among some of Schenker's pupils and followers, who distanced themselves from the ideology while holding on to the musical concepts. If Allen Forte writes that little of the polemical material bears significantly on Schenker's musical concepts, he

is in the very good company of people who knew Schenker well, who were formed in the same Austro-German cultural milieu, who believed in his musical ideas, and who rejected the politics.

What about those of us studying and teaching Schenkerian theory and analysis today? It depends, I think, on whether we are viewing Schenker's approach primarily as a theory or as a practice, to invoke Charles Burkhart's valuable distinction.⁴³ If our aim is to study Schenker's writings not only as important artifacts in the history of music theory but also in relation to literary and philosophical currents of thought, then attention to the ideology is certainly a necessary part of the study. Only we must be careful to view Schenker's polemics in the context of other writings of his time and not to judge them as if they were the products of a person writing after World War II. Bent's article does a good job of locating Schenker's nationalistic writings in the context of their time and place. We must also beware of making facile connections between the political ideology and the music theory. After all, Hugo Riemann also believed in German superiority, and his views on World War I were, as far as I know, not so different from Schenker's; but their music-theoretical ideas were mostly very far apart. And while it might be tempting to relate Schenker's hierarchical world view to his hierarchical theory of levels (and tracing such a relationship is not necessarily invalid), we should remember that the structure of tonal music is, to a considerable extent and in various ways, hierarchical, and that one does not need to be a monarchist or a pan-German nationalist to perceive musical hierarchies. Schenker was far from the first theorist to demonstrate hierarchical thinking, and if he envisioned a new kind of hierarchy—one based on the contrapuntal/harmonic structure of whole pieces—he also abandoned some earlier hierarchical theories. For Rameau and his followers, the fundamental form of a triad was the $\mathfrak{3}$ position and the $\mathfrak{2}$ and $\mathfrak{4}$ were almost always to be considered inversions, that is, derived and subordinate forms. For Schenker the $\mathfrak{3}$ was also in principle the basic form, but voice-leading context often required reading a particular $\mathfrak{3}$ as standing for a $\mathfrak{2}$ or even a $\mathfrak{4}$. This contextualizing of harmonic analysis also led Schenker to reject a basic component of "functional harmony": that tonic, dominant, and subdominant represent overarching categories to which every chord can be referred. For Schenker, a II might indeed sometimes stand for a IV, but like Freud's cigar, which was sometimes just a cigar, it might also simply be a II. And at times a IV might stand for a II, a seeming I might not be a tonic at all, and indeed many chords, arising out of voice leading, might have no harmonic function of any kind.

Which brings us to the practice of Schenkerian analysis, to the study of the theory as a guide to analytical practice, to the further development of the theory, and to pedagogy. Here I hope I may be forgiven for writing about myself, but I must confess that I never think about Schenker's politics, religion, or philosophy when engaged in analyzing a piece or refining a theoretical concept, and I very rarely discuss these matters when teaching analysis. I do attempt to incorporate in my teaching a sense that music relates to the world at large and to human life in particular. But I try to let this perspective emerge out of the study of the music rather than discussing it as a topic in itself. I'd like to close this paper by briefly describing a course I recently taught at the Mannes College of Music—an elective

course in the analysis and performance of Chopin Etudes. Enrollment in the class was restricted to pianists who had previously completed a Schenker course. I made this requirement a prerequisite because I used Schenker's numerous analyses of the Etudes—both published and unpublished—as guides to performing them. (The unpublished material came from the Oster Collection at the Music Division of the New York Public Library.) The students in the class were on very different levels of pianistic ability and analytic sophistication, and some were far more receptive than others to the study of analysis. Yet all benefited from the course, and their playing showed it.

I mention this class—surely the first of its kind ever given—because it suggested to me some of the directions that future Schenkerian work might take. First of all, there is the relationship of analysis to performance. In many of his published analyses, Schenker included beautiful suggestions for performance, and there are extensive notes on *Vortrag* in the unpublished material as well. Later Schenkerians, however, have contributed relatively little to this area, at least in print. It is time, I think, for us to return to this Schenkerian preoccupation. One of Schenker's unpublished analyses—an excellent reading of the C-minor Etude, Op. 25/12—is especially revealing. In his foreground graph, Schenker places diminuendo signs to mark every appearance of the ubiquitous two-note descending motive. These diminuendos are not Chopin's markings. Nor are they analytical symbols in any conventional sense. Their presence indicates that for Schenker the analysis, at least of the foreground, was not separate from a realization of the piece in sound. Observing the diminuendos in performance gives the Etude a much more differentiated and distinct melodic profile than the unrelieved loud arpeggios one usually hears. And for the analyst, Schenker's graph with the diminuendo signs forms a kind of object lesson. Part of the analytic process should be becoming aware of the implications for performance of one's analytic choices. It is clear from looking at the markings in Schenker's scores of piano music that even some of his fingerings were conceived together with his conception of a passage's linear structure, so that there is a kind of muscular-kinetic component to his analytic readings.⁴⁴

Schenker's analyses of some of the Etudes are astonishingly brilliant, but others are by no means convincing. The unpublished papers, of course, may well contain work in progress that he had no intention of committing to print. But even some of the published readings are dubious. The graph of Op. 10/2 in *Free Composition*, for instance, has a very doubtful interpretation of the middle section.⁴⁵ Edward Laufer tentatively suggested a better reading in his review of *Free Composition*, but even his improvement is not altogether satisfactory.⁴⁶ I think that I came up with a still better reading for my students; in any case the attempt to find such a solution brought me closer to the piece. And this is another task for a Schenkerian analyst: to use Schenker's ideas to arrive at readings that are better than some of Schenker's own. Among present-day Schenkerians, Edward Laufer is an outstanding example of one who follows closely in Schenker's footsteps, but who has arrived at many analyses that are more carefully thought out and more internally consistent than Schenker's readings of the same pieces.

Another task is to expand the limits of the theory in places where it gives an inadequate account of musical experience. The student who played Op. 10/2, for

instance, was a remarkably gifted seventeen-year-old boy, who had mastered the Etude's formidable technical difficulties, and who played with real musical understanding. Still, even with Schenker's help, there was something not quite satisfactory in his performance. It seemed to me that he needed to pay more attention to vertical sonorities—specifically to some of the dissonant clashes formed by the chromatic passing tones of the right-hand part when they sound together with the triadic harmonies. Especially the first of these clashes, the collision of the right-hand's C♯ against the C♮ of the A-minor tonic harmony of m. 1, made too small an impact. This augmented octave becomes a signature of the piece, motivating the minor ninth C–D♭ that initiates the middle section, and finding a kind of resolution in the Picardy third that colors the final tonic chord. To make these sonorities heard requires a consciousness of their significance, something the boy did not at first have. It is also important to take a tempo that is not faster than Chopin's metronome marking, ♩=144.

Schenker himself had little if any interest in the kinds of non-functional verticalities that characterize this Etude, but they can be an important element in the design of a composition. Awareness of them is perfectly compatible with a Schenkerian orientation in other matters, but it extends the analyst's (and performer's) reach into areas that Schenker himself did not enter. And why not extend it? The disruption caused by the first C♯, its transformation into a somewhat more functional D♭, and its eventual resolution in the final chord create a kind of scenario, and one which is far from obvious. It is just such subtle relationships that create the need for analyzing music, and it is just such analytical observations that can benefit performers. Another narrative interpretation: the contrast between natural and raised forms of the same scale degree—especially A♭ and A♯—which Schenker highlights in his analysis of the "Revolutionary" Etude, can be understood in an almost programmatic sense as a struggle against the tragic destiny symbolized by the 6–5 descending semitone. Schenker might not have objected to this interpretation, since it grows out of the musical sounds.

In my Chopin Etude class, I had a natural opportunity to discuss Schenker's German chauvinism. Near the beginning of the term, we worked through the *Meisterwerk* essays on the E♭-minor and G♭-major pieces from Opus 10. I could have initiated a discussion of Schenker's statement near the beginning of the first essay that "for the profundity with which Nature has endowed him, Chopin belongs more to Germany than to Poland. May German musicians at long last give him their attention and understanding."⁴⁷ I could have, but I didn't. I saw no reason to risk antagonizing any of my students, several of whom were Eastern Europeans, with what they might legitimately regard as an ethnic slur. To deal with the bad feelings that this quotation might evoke would have required lengthy explanations, and to what musical purpose. Not one of the countless musical ideas that we gleaned from Schenker's analyses would have been in any way changed by such a discussion. I'm not saying that my decision was the best possible one, but it was the only one I felt capable of making at the time. Thus I began to feel some sympathy for Jonas's and Oster's decision to cut out passages from *Der freie Satz*, though I still think that that decision was incorrect. Where the main object of study is the theory, then all aspects of the writings must be considered, and readers must have

access to all the aspects. Where the main object of study, however, is the music of Chopin, or Haydn, or Brahms, and the theory a means to that end, then only the relevant parts of the theory need come into play. If Schenker's writings had consisted only of his philosophical ideas and his social and political ideology, he would be completely forgotten today. It is only because of his musical insights—insights without parallel in the long tradition of tonal theory—that he is remembered and read. His politics would hold no interest for anybody were it not for the music theory and analysis. I firmly believe that the ideology is in no way an essential component of the analytic practice.

NOTES

1. An earlier version of this paper was read at the CUNY Graduate School on 17 December 1998 as part of the series "Perspectives in Musical Scholarship."
2. Heinrich Schenker, *Free Composition (Der freie Satz)*, vol. 3 of *New Musical Theories and Fantasies* trans. and ed. Ernst Oster (New York: Longman, 1979). The first German edition was entitled *Neue musikalische Theorien und Fantasien, III, Der freie Satz: Das erste Lehrbuch der Musik* (Vienna: Universal Edition, 1935). The 2nd edition (Vienna: Universal Edition, 1956) ed. Oswald Jonas, dropped the subtitle.
3. Schenker, *Free Composition*, 160, passage H (Rothgeb's translation). The German (*Der freie Satz*, 1st ed., p. 22) is: Schon treibt die Leidenschaft des Ueberfliegens die Menschen auch dazu, sich wider die Natur aufzulehnen: sie, die Natur, hält sich an Landschaften geradezu wie an Rubriken, nach denen sie ihre Schöpfungen richtet und abtönt, der Mensch von heute aber glaubt, auch die Unterschiede der Landschaften aufheben zu können, nur weil er sie überfliegt. Kein zweifel, aber, daß sowohl die Natur, wie die Kunst obsiegen wird. Wie die Natur z. B. Elephanten, Krokodile immer nur dorthin setzen wird, wo sie die ihnen gemäßen Lebensbedingungen wird bereitstellen können, genau so wird sie z. B. einen Beethoven, wenn überhaupt noch einmal, wieder unter den Deutschen erstehen lassen.
4. Schenker, *Free Composition*, xxiii, (Oster's translation). The German (*Der freie Satz*, 1st ed., 6; 2nd ed., 19) is: Erkennt meine lehre die Züge als ein Hauptelement der Stimmführung, so ist die Musik dadurch allen Kirchen, allen Menschen gleich zugänglich geworden: wer Züge schaffend beherrscht, beherrschen lernt, dessen Kunst ist echt und groß.
5. Schenker, *Die letzten fünf Sonaten von Beethoven: Kritische Ausgabe mit Einführung und Erläuterungen, Op. 101, A Dur* (Vienna: Universal-Edition, 1920). The comparison of Brahms to Bismarck ("ein letzter, ewiger Bismarck deutscher Musik") appears on p. 25. All the political comments were removed from the 2nd edition (Vienna: Universal Edition: 1972) by its editor, Oswald Jonas.

6. Schenker, "Von der Sendung des deutschen Genies," *Der Tonwille*, Heft 1 (Vienna: A Gutmann, 1921), 1–21.
7. Schenker, *Kontrapunkt. Zweiter Teil: Drei- und mehrstimmiger Satz* (Vienna: Universal-Edition, 1922), viii. Schenker's words are "Die lug- und nutzverseuchten und zivilisationsgetünchten Völker des Westens." English translation from Heinrich Schenker, *Counterpoint*, Book II, trans. John Rothgeb and Jürgen Thym, ed. John Rothgeb (New York: Schirmer Books, 1987) xiii.
8. Hellmut Federhofer, *Heinrich Schenker: Nach Tagebüchern und Briefen in der Oswald Jonas Memorial Collection, University of California, Riverside* (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1985).
9. Martin Eybl, *Ideologie und Methode: Zum Ideengeschichtlichen Kontext von Schenkers Musiktheorie* (Tutzing: Hans Schneider, 1995). Although I disagree with some of Eybl's conclusions, I found his book very helpful in preparing this paper.
10. Valuable accounts of the views of Chamberlain and Lanz can be found in William M. Johnston, *The Austrian Mind: An Intellectual and Social History 1848-1938* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 328–32.
11. See *Ideologie und Methode*, 25–26.
12. Schenker, *Der freie Satz* (Vienna: Universal Edition, 1935), 18–19. Schenker's text is as follows (the English translation is mine, as are all subsequent translations unless otherwise stated). In den weiten Spannungen der Züge lebt sich das Werk der deutschen Musik-Genies aus. Die Kraft der Spannungen und Erfüllungen darf geradezu als Blutprobe angesehen werden, als ein Gut der germanischen Rasse. In diesem Sinne ist z. B. die Frage, wohin Beethoven zuständig sei, unwiderlegbar entschieden: er ist nicht, wie man es haben wollte und noch haben will "...nur halb ein Deutscher," nein, wer so Züge schafft muß ein Deutscher sogar sein, wenn vielleicht auch fremdes Blut in seinen Adern rollte! Hiefür ist das bestimmte weitgespannte Vollbringen mehr Beweis als der aller Rassen Wissenschaft.

The work of German musical genius lives its life in the wide tension-spans of its linear progressions. It is precisely the strength of the tensions and fulfillments that should be viewed as a blood test, as an attribute of the Germanic race. In this sense, for example, the question of Beethoven's nationality is incontrovertibly decided: he is not "only a half German," as some have wished—and still wish—to have it. No, the creator of such linear progressions must be a German even if foreign blood perhaps flowed in his veins! In this regard, the bringing to fulfillment of extended tension-spans is better proof than any evidence from racial science.

13. Schenker, *Tonwille* 1, 16. The passage containing these words reads as follows: "die Schmach seiner schwarzen Truppen, der Vortruppen seiner Genitalitis, des Fleisches von seinem Fleisch, des Kannibalen-Esprits von seinem Kannibalen-Esprit."

14. See Jonas's Introduction to Heinrich Schenker, *Harmony*, ed. Oswald Jonas, trans. Elizabeth Mann Borgese (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1954), vi.
15. Schenker, "Von der Sendung," 11. Schenker's German is "die minder-wertige, gemiederte, gezirkelte, für höchsten Geistesflug unfähige französische oder gar die letzte der Sprachen, die verlotterte englische."
16. I know this from an unpublished letter from Schenker to Felix Salzer, whom he asked to translate the article for him. Kolodin, by the way, referred to the *Umlinie* as the "ear-line," an error that Schenker rather liked.
17. Alexandra Richie, *Faust's Metropolis: A History of Berlin* (New York: Carroll and Graf, 1998) p. 250.
18. Peter Heyworth, *Otto Klemperer: His Life and Times*, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, 1996) vol. 2, 105.
19. See Michael H. Kater, *The Twisted Muse: Musicians and Their Music in the Third Reich* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 72. Kater's discussion of Webern's relation to the Nazi regime (72–74) is well worth reading.
20. Kater, *The Twisted Muse*, 74.
21. Federhofer, *Heinrich Schenker*, p. 329.
22. Schenker, *Free Composition*, 159 (passage B, Rothgeb's translation). *Der freie Satz*, 1st ed., 8. Sogar 2–3000 Menschen können noch durch Kunst gebunden werden—, dagegen brauchen 50,000 Menschen zu ihrer Bindung und Unterhaltung Sport, Hahnen- und Stierkämpfe, Massakers, Pogrome, kurz ein brutales Toben und Rasen, ein irres und wirres Geschrei
23. Federhofer, *Heinrich Schenker*, 356.
24. Schenker, *Counterpoint*, Book 1, xiv.
25. Plus ça change. On Sunday 16 September, Karlheinz Stockhausen is reported to have called the terrorist destruction of New York's World Trade Center "the greatest work of art ever." Speaking to reporters, he added the following: "That characters can bring about in one act what we in music cannot dream of, that people practice madly for 10 years, completely, fanatically for a concert and then die. That is the greatest work of art for the whole cosmos." See *The New York Times* for 19 September 2001, E3.
26. Federhofer, *Heinrich Schenker*, 327.
27. *Ibid.*, 357. Nach der Jause, "Grock": auch ihn zeichnet, wie Chaplin, vor allem die Güte in den Menschen aus, beide sind gleichsam Missionare des ewigen Glaubens an

die Liebe und übertreffen Päpste, Staatsmänner, Heerführer, Journalisten, Vereine, Kongresse an edeler Wirkung.

28. A sign of the times: the marketing strategies that American orchestras now feel they must use in order to attract an audience. Here is the latest brochure of the New York Philharmonic, advertising the Verdi *Requiem*: "this choral classic garbs religious celebration in the vivid hues of Tintoretto and Michelangelo as violins weep, drums pound, and voices soar in fervor and ecstasy."
29. Eybl, *Ideologie*, especially 29.
30. This passage is quoted in Ray Monk, *Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius* (New York: The Free Press, 1990), 20.
31. Richie, *Faust's Metropolis*, 101.
32. See Forte's Introduction to Schenker, *Free Composition*, xviii.
33. Ian Bent, "Heinrich Schenker e la missione del genio germanico" (trans. Claudio Annibale) *Rivista Italiana di Musicologia*, 26/1 (1991): 3–34. See especially 17 and 21.
34. Eybl, *Ideologie*, 105.
35. Schenker, *Counterpoint*, Book 2 (Rothgeb/Thym translation), xx. In *Kontrapunkt II*, xvi, the passage reads as follows: Aus der Summe der Arbeiten wird man das Bild entnehmen, wie sie in sich selbst ruht, durch sich selbst wächst, gleichwohl aber, trotz aller Unendlichkeit der Erscheinungen, durch Auslese und Synthese wieder auch sich selbst Grenzen zieht. O, möge es der Menschheit endlich gegönnt sein, sich durch den Wohlklang der Kunst zum erhabenen Sinn von Auslese und Synthese führen zu lassen und alle Gebundenheiten ihres irdischen Lebens, wie Staat, Ehe, Liebe, Freundschaft nach Gesetzen künstlerischer Synthese zu wahren Kunstwerken zu gestalten.
36. Federhofer, *Heinrich Schenker*, p. 320. Jonas...ist erschüttert von meinem Bekenntnis zum Judentum. Parallele im Kosmos die eine Ursache in Gott—in der Musik die eine Ursache der Ursatz—also monotheistisches Denken dort und hier. Alles Andere in Betrachtung von Welt und Musik heidnisches Festhalten am Vordergrund-Vergottung der Einzelnen heute.
37. Schenker, *Free Composition*, 160 (Rothgeb's translation). In *Der freie Satz*, 1st ed., 18: Aenlich wie von Gott zum Geschöpf, von Geschöpf zu Gott eine Fühlungnahme waltet, stets ineinanderlaufend, stets gegenwärtig, wirkt sich eine Fühlungnahme auch zwischen Ursatz und Vordergrund aus als gleichsam einem Jenseits und Diesseits in der Musik.

38. Ibid., 160 (Rothgeb's translation). In *Der freie Satz*, 1st ed., 19: Wie das Leben eine ununterbrochener Energie-Verwandlung ist, ebenso stellen Stimmführungsschichten eine Energie-Verwandlung des Lebens vor, das im Ursatz seinen Ursprung hat.
39. Schenker, "Die Urlinie: Eine Vorbemerkung" in *Tonwille* 1, 22: Durch die Urlinie wird auch die sogenannte poetische Idee Lügen gestraft. Mögen noch so viele Gleichnisse vom Menschenleben in die Musik hinüberschwingen—wie sollte menschengeseugte Kunst nicht den Menschen in sich enthalten?—, mag die poetische Idee noch so oft Hilfe gezogen werden von all den gewissen Ausdrucks-Kraftmeiern, die nicht begreifen, wie es allein nur gelten kann, sich in die Kunst aufzulösen, aber nicht die Kunst in sich, oder von den gewissen hermeneutischen Affektschwätzern, die Unfähigkeit zwingt, auch in die Musik, wie in die übrige gegenständliche Welt hineinzusehen statt hineinzuhören und dadurch Musick zu einem Ohr-Kino herunterzusetzen—über alles das hinweg bleibt die Musik mit der Urlinie eine eigene Welt für sich, vergleichbar der Schöpfung, wie diese nur in sich selbst ruhend, sich auswirkend ohne Ziel.
40. I heard this from Irene Schreier, Jonas's step-daughter, who was very close to him both personally and musically.
41. Federhofer, *Heinrich Schenker*, 87–96, especially 90.
42. Ibid., 150.
43. Charles Burkhart made this distinction in his Keynote Address, "Reflections on Schenker," at the annual meeting of the Society for Music Theory in New York, 4 November 1995.
44. Schenker himself was well aware of this. In his very first published discussion of the *Urlinie*, he states that "the hand must also help to express the truth of the *Urlinie* [through appropriate fingering] and—it can do so." See the *Erläuterungsausgabe* of Beethoven, Op. 101, 22. The German text reads: So muß auch die Hand die Wahrheit der Urlinie ausdrücken helfen und—sie kann es.
45. Schenker, *Free Composition*, Fig. 42/1.
46. Edward Laufer, review of *Free Composition*, in *Music Theory Spectrum* 3 (1981): 158–84. The discussion of the Etude is on 164–65.
47. Schenker, "Chopin: Etude in E \flat minor, Op. 10, No. 6," in *The Masterwork in Music*, vol. 1, ed. William Drabkin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 81 (trans. Ian Bent). In Schenker, *Das Meisterwerk in der Musik*, 1. Jahrbuch (Munich: Drei Masken, 1925), the passage reads: Um der Tiefe willen, die ihm die Natur schenkte, gehört Chopin mehr zu Deutschland als zu Polen, so möge ihn der deutsche Musiker endlich auch mit Verständnis pflegen.