THE ORIGINS OF SCHENKER'S THOUGHT:

HOW MAN IS MUSICAL

Allan Keiler

I

There is without doubt a growing interest in the earlier periods of Schenker's work and its general course of development as well as in the intellectual background from which it emerged and forms a part. But these aspects of Schenkerian studies have still a long way to go if they are to give us the measure of insight and relevance already achieved in the more practical areas of Schenkerian analysis and its application to the repertories of tonal music. The work that we can point to in these mostly uncharted areas is so far disappointing. The errors of method and interpretation that I see in them can be attributed often to the tyranny of Schenkerian ideology employed in the creation of its own origins and history. The founder himself and most of his later adherents have written the typical history of a movement in terms of the archetypal hero myth, and the usual motifs of isolation, rejection and ultimate teleological certainty all play their role.

Take, for example, the question of the gradual evolution of Schenker's theories. Many of the themes of the myth can be seen, for example, in the pioneering work of Oswald Jonas. In his edition of Schenker's *Harmony,* Jonas took every opportunity to see clear and unambiguous anticipations of Schenker's later work on nearly every page. In his Introduction Jonas

confessed his teleological point of view explicitly: "Metaphorically, one could say that this phylogenetic development [he means here the actual historical development of musical stages in which the final and necessary stage of *freie Satz* was reached] was recapitulated ontogenetically in Schenker's progressive stages of interpreting the masterpieces."[1] In the first two chapters of the second part of the *Harmony,* for example, Jonas found more than one anticipation of the idea of *Auskomponierung,* of *Schichten,* of bass unfolding, and of middle ground and background. I do not think that all that much has changed since Jonas's work.[2]

Perhaps it is just this teleological straightjacket that has limited the study of the intellectual background of Schenker's work to a consideration of the mature period alone. As Kassler has said, ". . . it is this work [*Der freie Satz*] we shall examine here, since it contains Schenker's most mature expression of his theory."[3] But one fault leads to another. The search for patterns of similarity in intellectual history, not to mention influence (another matter altogether) tends toward superficiality and tendentious generality unless that problem is kept separate, at least at the outset, from that of a clear understanding of the dynamic course of development from one internal stage of work to the next. This internal logic very often accounts for and certainly clarifies many of the ideas and insights that are too often loosely attributed to outside influence. Indeed, the whole question of influence can be confronted securely only when each stage is understood synchronically in some coherent (or not coherent) way, and when a comprehensible internal logic of development of such stages points the way to just those problematic areas whose understanding can come only from the outside. How loose is the connection between Schenker's work and its intellectual background can be seen in the literature from the endless points of comparison drawn between it and the history of (mostly) German thought. One study mentions Coleridge, Leibnitz, Kant, Hegel, the Gestalt psychologists;[4] another, Goethe, Schopenhauer and Bertalanffy.[5] These lineups point to the German idealist philosophical tradition on the one hand, and organicism as it relates to biological morphology on the other. The list could go on, and could include, even more reasonably Herder, Schelling, the Schlegels and Humboldt, the group Dilthey named the "poetic idealists."[6]

There is one study about the nature of Schenker's early work that does not recognize a perfect fit with his later ideas.[7] The study argues that Schenker, in his earliest period, was fundamentally anti-organicist in his thinking; it therefore removes any original impulse to what is perhaps the most fundamental characteristic of Schenker's thinking. This claim carries some of its force, of course, from the deeply rooted psychological appeal of conflict overcome, since it hinges on the one impediment of Schenker's early work that must be conquered for it to assume the clear outline of its mature expression. The details of this argument will concern us later. Here

I should say that this interpretation is achieved by the utter disregard of the complicated meaning of the essay from which the evidence is drawn, by the disregard of any other of Schenker's writings during the period, and by the disregard of the many contemporary works of musical historical and theoretical scholarship that must have played a crucial role in Schenker's thinking during the last decade of the nineteenth century. Here again the tyranny of diachronic inevitability plays its part, this time heightened and dramatized by the typical motif in which a serious and even threatening obstacle to the steady march of ideas has to be overcome. After all, what good is the achievement of a necessary outcome without a little healthy struggle. The pity is that the opportunity to consider elements of potential significance to the early stage of Schenker's thought and the possibility of constructing a synchronic meaning and shape to a significant period of Schenker's work, without regard for how neatly it might fit with later periods, is given up by lifting the alien body out of its original context and celebrating its eventual demise.

The remaining parts of this essay are taken up with three interrelated problems. I will begin by discussing the very first decade of Schenker's writings on music, a period largely unknown and unexplored, and I will attempt to place this period of Schenker's work in the context of contemporary musical scholarship and the more general intellectual concerns from which it derives and to which it can be related. Finally, I will try to suggest some connections between Schenker's first decade and his later, more mature work. I also hope, as my introductory paragraphs cannot help but suggest, that the remainder of this essay will serve as a corrective to some of the errors and wrong turns that I have pointed out already.

II

The period of Schenker's early work that I will consider here is his first decade as a writer on music when he was an active music critic for a number of German and Austrian newspapers and musical journals. From the decade 1891 to 1901, Schenker wrote ninety-five articles and concert reviews for four and occasionally a fifth newspaper or journal: the *Musikalisches Wochenblatt,* the *Neue Revue,* which was known alternately as the *Wiener Literatur Zeitung*, the *Zukunft,* the Viennese newspaper *Die Zeit,* and occasionally for the *Wiener Abendpost.*[8]

He takes his place, then, with the other Viennese critics of that period among whom were Eduard Hanslick, the music critic of the *Neue freie Presse,* Max Kalbeck, the critic of the *Neues Wiener Tagblatt,* and Robert Hirschfeld, the critic of the *Wiener Zeitung.* In 1891, three years after his graduation from the University of Vienna, he began to write for the *Musikalishces Wochenblatt,* where he remained for five years and to which he

contributed seven articles. All of these, except for the last on "Bülow-Weingartner," were reviews of newly published music, for the most part the later works of Brahms. But it was also in this journal that his most significant article on music theory and aesthetics, "Der Geist der musikalischen Technik" appeared.[9]

In the next year, 1892, Schenker began to write for *Die Zukunft,* and during the next six years he contributed eighteen articles, all on recent music and performers, but usually from a stylistic or conceptual point of view. In this journal he wrote about Siegfried Wagner, Anton Rubinstein, Eugen d'Albert, for example, as well as about Verdi's *Falstaff,* Mascagni's *Rantzau* and, in general, about the new Italian school of opera, which was all the rage in Vienna during those years. Next came his work for the *Neue Revue,* to which, beginning in 1894, he contributed for five years, although nothing in 1895. Schenker's writings for the *Neue Revue* are the most varied and include examples of all of his kinds of musical journalism for that period: individual concert reviews, mostly of opera, and more specialized or technical articles. In the first category are included discussions of Smetana's *Kuss,* Humperdinck's *Königskinder,* Smetana's *Bartered Bride,* Puccini's *Bohème* and Bizet's *Djamileh.* In the second category were articles on "Das Hören in der Musik," "Die Musik von Heute" and "Volksmusik in Wien." And for two years, 1895 and 1896, Schenker wrote for the Viennese newspaper *Die Zeit,* usually concert reviews, but on occasion technical articles. Schenker's greatest productivity as a musical journalist seems to be from about 1894 to 1897, when the majority of his articles were written. But it is noteworthy that the year 1895 was an exception, and this only helps to confirm the importance of the essay which I mentioned earlier, "Der Geist der musikalischen Technik," which was published during that year.

Schenker's critical writings on music during this first decade of work have been largely forgotten. In a recent anthology of considerable scope Schenker is the only writer of musical criticism of the period who is not mentioned, in spite of the unorthodox and challenging dimension of his work.[10] Even among critics and commentators of his own day his music criticism seems not to have left a recalling trace. Max Graf, for example, in his partly autobiographical *Legend of a Musical City,* does not mention Schenker, even though the two were nearly exact contemporaries.[11] Graf, in fact, entered the University of Vienna only two years after Schenker left, was himself a student of Bruckner and was on friendly terms with Brahms during the years that Schenker was part of that circle. The single reference to Schenker's work during these years occurs in the fourth volume of Max Kalbeck's biography of Brahms, where he has some words of praise for Schenker's review of Brahms's 5 Songs, op. 107, that appeared in the *Musikalisches Wochenblatt* on 1 Oct. 1891.[12] Indeed, it is only in this review, and with some comments on only one of the songs, that it is possible to

find even a suggestion of the kind of analytic insight at all characteristic of Schenker's later work. But any disappointment that one is likely to feel over the absence of the kind of analytic insight usually associated with Schenker's work and influence is more than made up for by the impact that contemporary ideas and writers on music made on Schenker's early writings. We have so long been accustomed to view the development of Schenker's later work as if it remained untouched by the current thinking on music and more generally intellectual trends, that it is particularly significant that the actual beginnings of his work can be interpreted within a more general intellectual context of participation and confrontation. When one remembers that Schenker began to write music criticism only three years after his graduation from the University of Vienna, the decisive role that his studies at the University as well as the Vienna Conservatory must have had on his early thinking could hardly have failed to leave an imprint on the writings from this period. Schenker himself mentioned only his early connection with Brahms and Bruckner. But it is Eduard Hanslick, for example, Professor of the History and Aesthetics of Music at the University, and Ambros, the music historian whose legacy still formed such an integral part of the curriculum at the Conservatory, who, among others, have left their imprint on Schenker the young music critic and writer.

III

Let us turn our attention now to Schenker's writings during this period. The essay I have already mentioned, "Der Geist der musikalischen Technik," is a complicated essay in the philosophy and aesthetics of music in the tradition of Hanslick, Ambros, Hausegger and others, and thus stands out, both in content and significance, from his other writings. Although it is the product of many ideas inspired from many sources and betrays a youthful ambition not fully realized, it is the most fruitful work from this period on which to base any study of Schenker's earliest writings. The essay was published in eight installments during the months of May and June 1895 and was, at least according to the *Musikalisches Wochenblatt,* part of a larger work that Schenker delivered to the philosophical faculty of the University of Vienna, and which has disappeared. Surely there was among the audience Eduard Hanslick, who in less than a year was to retire as the most influential music critic of his time. His position did not go to Schenker, but to Julius Heuberger, a friend of Schenker and the composer of one of the most popular operettas of the time, *Der Opernball.*

Of the eight parts which make up the essay Schenker has given a name to some—III (Polyphony), IV (Harmony), V (Moods [Stimmungen], Forms and the Principle of Organicism). Actually the essay is divided conceptually into two parts: the first four sections discuss musical parameters

and the second four, various questions of formal organization and aesthetic meaning. Schenker begins the first section with the problem of the origin of music and language. Music and language, he argues, arose at the same time, as the necessary and natural expression of different needs that would become associated automatically with particular bodily organs suited to fulfilling those needs. In the case of language, the word arose as a natural response to or expression of everyday activity, and music or song as expressions of joy or heightened sensuality. There then follow two stages of development. First, the purpose or motivation for song is separated from the act itself and became self-stimulating. And eventually man learned to have his musical fantasy stimulated by external associations, through feelings or mental representations, so that musical content could be inspired by some external stimulus. Now Schenker adds that all of these principles of motivation might act in concert; he calls that principle not stimulated by external, verbal association, picture or feeling, the formal principle of creation [das formale Schaffensprincip]. This latter can still be seen in its more primitive guise, for example, in the shepherd, who, without any discernible purpose, satisfies his inner need for song by playing tone sequences that appear to have no discernible coherence.

It is, however, only when the second principle gives way to the third that actual melody or melodies arise: "It must have been a comfort to the need for tone, from the very beginning of time, creating itself and coming into being without aim, to snuggle up to the word and its laws."[13] The tone takes as a prototype the word, and sequences of tones learn to follow the course of the word—its shape, its divisions, its rising and falling—and thus gradually a sequence of tones develops for itself a wholeness, or induces in the listener the sense of wholeness. And this happens continually, by different means and at different times, and so it is still today.

In section two of the first part Schenker introduces the concepts of repetition and motive. Several stages were necessary to make possible the emancipation of the principle of repetition, and this could not happen so long as music followed the natural course of the word. When the disassociation between the two finally took place, new intervals and tonal sequences could be created. But in order for the new musical material to be understood without the help of the word, the motive was created and repetition was necessary to insure musical understanding, since there was no associated referent to make understanding possible, as in the case of language. The musical motive, as Schenker says, is "only a sign of itself, or better, nothing more or less than itself."[14] Schenker emphasizes the importance of the principle of repetition almost in the same way as he spoke about the principle of musical impulse, or impulse toward song, at the very beginning of the essay: "Repetition, this innate discovery of music, should prove better than anything that music already thousands of years ago bore within its own womb an innate principle that could safely fashion itself,

and along these lines was emancipated from the word much earlier than music historians assume."[15] The principle of repetition, then, is an inborn and self-forming musical endowment, which, as Schenker emphasizes, has made a much older appearance in musical evolution than was thought.

I will briefly review what he says about polyphony and harmony in the next two sections of his essay, emphasizing only those characteristics that I think have explanatory importance. In the third section, Schenker describes polyphony at the very outset as "a purely musical principle, creating by its own means and for its own purpose . . ."[16] This principle too went through a number of stages, but it is significant to point out here only that Schenker attempts to demonstrate that it arose as early as it would be reasonably possible to assert, at the very stage when an accompaniment in parallel fourths or fifths was added to a melody.

What Schenker has to say about harmony will come as the greatest surprise, if only because it seems to have less in common with his later ideas than is the case with the other musical materials that he has already discussed. Here again Schenker tries to outline several periods in the history of harmonic development. He defines the first period as coinciding with the concept of harmony as it was understood by the Greeks: "It was the Greeks whose brilliance it was to understand by the term harmony, melody itself; that is, the sequence of tones that make up the whole, together with everything characteristic that occurs in it."[17] This is expanded by Schenker into the claim that ". . . every sequence of tones, every melody in itself carries its own harmonic creed, and through itself alone expresses this creed."[18] The next stage was reached with the invention of polyphony, when a new spirit of harmony arose. With Rameau, finally, the most recent and also the narrowest period in the development of harmony was initiated. This fourth section of Schenker's essay is the briefest, but throughout it is clear how much Schenker is enamored with the idea that it is the oldest period in the development of harmony that is the most real and the most natural, the idea of harmony that Schenker argues was already understood by the Greeks.

There is a consistency to the first part of Schenker's essay that allows us not only to understand its real intent but to see as well its connection with more general intellectual problems. Schenker's discussion of musical parameters is not in the usual sense an analytic discussion, nor even yet an aesthetic one. It is not analytic because Schenker is not concerned with defining intrinsic characteristics of the musical materials themselves, and clearly not in connection with particular musical cultures or styles, or, indeed, of individual pieces at all. And it is not aesthetic in the programmatic sense, for example, that Eduard Hanslick gave to it in the third chapter of his book on *The Beautiful in Music,* where he was concerned with making precise the connection between each musical characteristic and the effect it would have aesthetically on the listener, the combination of effects

and their interrelationships, and, finally, the general laws from which such observations might be derived.

Schenker's discussion of musical materials is rather philosophical and historical, indeed, both at the same time, in the way that most nativist conceptions of human knowledge in the nineteenth century were conceived in terms of gradual yet necessary evolution. Schenker has, in fact, ordered his discussion of musical parameters from the most ancient and speculative to those more closely related to known musical traditions. The most ancient of all is musical sound itself as a universal human capability, and the essay itself, in fact, opens in a particularly characteristic way in this regard: "Just as every organ in man has the urge to fulfill those individual features and needs allotted to it, so should the glottis and vocal chords of the first man have compelled him to [produce] the first sound."[19] So it is really the faculty of sound as (eventually) music that Schenker is talking about; he even suggests that it is actually a kind of biological need or drive that needs to be fulfilled, and that first comes into being as an expression of certain feelings or emotions. What we have been calling musical materials or parameters is better characterized, therefore, as musical *faculties* or *competence.*

The second part of the essay opens with this very idea, when the faculty of repetition is introduced: "We would have certainly taken a great step forward in the knowledge of musical technique, if one had investigated when, where and how the most powerful and distinctive peculiarity of musical art, i.e., so-called repetition became incorporated in it for the first time."[20] And still in line with these abstract faculties are those that Schenker discusses in the first two parts of the essay as he tries to speculate about the various stages in which intrinsic and self-governing musical faculties become emancipated from language and their early dependence on language and linguistic properties. The great age of such faculties as the will toward sound (as music) and repetition cannot, of course, be maintained in any plausible way for less generalized musical properties. Nevertheless, it is instructive to see Schenker attempting at least to begin the story of counterpoint and harmony as early and as prototypically as he can. As far as the harmonic faculty is concerned, I have already pointed out the degree to which Schenker prefers the earliest stage of development, the one that Schenker associates with the musical thinking of the Greeks, as the essential and most characteristic. In the case of polyphony, which is so intrinsic a property of the Western art tradition, Schenker does not speculate about periods all that anterior to the recorded tradition of the beginning of polyphony, even as it was understood in Schenker's time by music historians. But he emphasizes another aspect of the origin of the polyphonic faculty clearly enough in the following description: "When one sang in parallel fourths and fifths, at the time of the first outbreak of two- and three-voice counterpoint, it happened, I am convinced, not because intervals were

consonant with one another according to the theory, but because it was possible for anyone to sing the melody as he knew it, in spite of the fact that he sang it beginning with another tone. Is it not touching and at the same time natural that in the beginning nobody wanted willingly to resolve to serve the other person (who was singing along) in tones, that for the time being it could occur to nobody to renounce the melody that was as it were his personal possession."[21] Now this is not an unreasonable hypothesis about the beginnings of polyphony, but Schenker conveys in his description a naturalness and inevitability on the one hand, with the feeling of almost primeval innocence and simplicity, and thereby, by suggestion alone, extreme age on the other hand that is certainly striking.

It is the abstract, universal and gradually evolving musical faculties rather than materials that Schenker is trying to characterize in the first half of his essay. By musical faculty I mean those natural attributes of musical endowment that are necessary and inevitable characteristics of man's propensity for making music. And they are, therefore, meta-characteristics of musical knowledge rather than technical properties of particular musical styles or genres, from which the latter are rather the specific cultural utilizations and transformations, fixed to particular time and place. So it is clear why Schenker is most successful in his descriptions of more abstract principles such as repetition, or the general feeling for melodic gestalt, modelled at first on properties of language. Indeed, it is hard to characterize the way in which Schenker has attempted to describe musical faculties, that is, the nature of musical knowledge, without at the same time recognizing the historical or evolutionary context in which the whole discussion is placed. Schenker has tried, in the first two sections of the essay at least, to characterize a kind of prehistory of musical competence, tracing the faculties of musical knowledge from their inception in human history through several, for the most part speculative, or at least hypothetical stages of development. And it is a teleological and entirely organic portrayal, in which Schenker attempts to locate in the native human capacity for music a series of stages which are prefigured from the very beginning, each stage arising out of the previous one in a kind of necessary and inevitable progress. To take an example I have already discussed, Schenker says the following about repetition: "Repetition, this innate invention of music, should now prove better than anything, that music already thousands of years ago carried within its own womb its own certain constitutive principle and . . . was emancipated from the word much earlier than is supposed by music historians."[22] There are several ideas bound up in descriptions of this kind. One is the premise that the more basic and essential the musical faculty, the earlier does it make its appearance in the course of the evolutionary development of music, a premise which accompanies most nineteenth-century idealist historical methods. If it is, in other words, a kind of musical universal, then it would be of little value to consider it merely as

a late arrival bound up with a particular musical culture. This is why Schenker attempts whenever possible to move back in time the appearance of those universal musical properties discussed in this essay. And there is also bound up in this description the conviction that musical faculties and musical technique are as much as possible intrinsic and musically autonomous properties, not dependent on other media or external circumstances.

It is this fusion of the evolutionary, teleological method and the insistence on musical faculties, or competence that gives the original stamp to the first half of Schenker's essay. The presence of the first part alone would not call for so much comment, for, at least in its common Hegelian significance, this fusion of teleology with competence informed much historical writing about the arts in the nineteenth century. But in musical historical writing it is usually bound up with attempts to realize in the history of musical style and genre something of the specific stages postulated by Hegel about the actual growth of the relation of form and content. Even in Ambros's *Geschichte der Musik,* his attraction to the organicist idea of plant-like growth is fused with a kind of Burkhardian cultural history. And while there is no historical context, for example, to a work like that of Hauptmann's *Harmony and Metre,* and in spite of Hauptmann's avowed debt to Hegel, that work is one of purely logical, not philosophical dimension. There the author has tried to reduce the properties of harmony and rhythm to a small set of premises and operations. In spite of the profound influence of evolutionary thought on almost every branch of music study during the period of Schenker's early writings on music, and certainly in the most general ways on Schenker himself during these years, it would be hard to find a significant parallel between Schenker's ideas, as I have discussed them so far, and other contemporary works in musical historiography or theory. Nevertheless, there are parallels, in other branches of scholarship, which probably had no determinant influence on Schenker, that form part of a larger intellectual family, and that will certainly help us to see more deeply into the purpose and significance of Schenker's thinking during his first decade as a writer. Indeed, it is often these parallel, although not necessarily contemporary, fields of inquiry, very often surer and more accomplished in aim, that can be so illuminating in establishing the meaning of other less explicit intellectual enterprises.[23]

IV

Among the most revealing conceptual juxtapositions with the first half of Schenker's essay on the evolution of the musical faculties are the treatises on the origin and development of language in the nineteenth century. In the last sections of his essay, Schenker is for the first time explicit about his dissatisfaction with current histories of music [Entwickelungsgeschichte der

Musik], and this objection is repeated several times and in different ways. Now it is not apparent from such comments that it is the work on language evolution and universals to which we should turn in order to uncover some of the interesting parallels with Schenker's early essay, but I think that there is no doubt that the century-long tradition in German scholarship concerning the question of the origins and evolution of language provides an important point of comparison. From the opening sections of Schenker's essay alone, the comparison should strike one as fruitful. Indeed, the opening paragraph of the whole work is emblematic of the beginning of most discussions about the origins of language. Here, in its entirety, is Schenker's opening section:

> Just as every organ in man has the urge to fulfill those individual features and needs allotted to it, so should the glottis and vocal chords of the first man have compelled him to [produce] the first sound. Just as the songbird uses only shrieks and rattles for the common urge to dispute and quarrel, or borrows the poetry of song for the instinct for love or procreation, or the hunger instinct, which is kindred with it, or greets the whirling fullness of the sun's light with bright whirling tones, so, in the first man, every heightened mental state whose essence was joy, every heightened sensuality must have set the vocal chords in motion, while the pale soundless word imbued with ideas and reality served for weak mental states and other dull functions. Now since the faculty of speech and music must have been innate in the first man, there is no reason whatsoever to assume that tone came first and then the word, or the reverse, that the word came before the tone.
>
> Indeed, the first singing was a sudden spontaneous eruption of an accumulated mental or physical desire, similar to when one hears today children or shepherds sounding aimless joy in aimless jubilation.[24]

Compare this to a passage that occurs early in the famous, and certainly representative monograph on the development of language by Wackernagel:

> The sounds that we hear from animals are nothing more than the expression of a more or less grossly sensual feeling and indeed for the most part are completely involuntary expressions. . . . And although more than one animal might have been constituted physically to give articulation to language sounds, not one of them does this, not one, therefore, speaks in words: the non-speech sound is suitable and sufficient for what they have to say. Man, on the other hand, with the sounds of his speech organs, also communicates, of course, his mere feelings, which depend on his brute side, and gives expression to them with sounds similar to those of animals, now instinctively, as the newborn child with squalling and whimpering, now ad libitum and consciously as when he laughs. . . . But man also has reason, and this he expresses in sounds and by means of them gives expression to his concepts and thoughts about the things around him, about how they are put to use, their qualities and their reciprocal relationships. . . .[25]

The nearly obligatory themes at the outset of every study on the origin of language during the last century are represented faithfully in the examples just quoted: for example, reference to the speech organs as the vehicle for articulated language, the contrast between the instinctive language of the animal kingdom and the language of thoughts and concepts of man, the significance of child language. Schenker, of course, has almost from the outset set the stage for bringing attention to music rather than language. Still, his conclusion about the relative emergence of language and music, and the theme of the emancipation of the latter from the former, which takes on such consequence later in the essay, sound hardly different at all from this passage toward the end of Wackernagel's essay:

> In the beginning language and singing were essentially one; in the middle period poetry and song were at least closely bound up with each other. Now in the third period there is poetry without song, and while earlier instrumental music was usually subordinate to song, now it stands rather on its own terms, on its proud feet, and expresses for us *Songs without Words*. That is, the sense of tone, that at one time lived in man but which no longer governs the language of man and for which language no longer is any good, seeks its freedom from it. . . .[26]

The original insight of these studies on the origin of language that make the comparison between them and Schenker's essay striking was the assumption that it was possible to outline the various stages in the growth of language in terms of general and universal properties of form-creating significance, independent of the specific languages which exemplified these various stages. These language properties, although they were generally arrived at by a comparative study of the Indo-European languages, and were then arranged in some hypothetical chronological order from which general principles of development were extracted, had mostly to do with phonological development and processes of word formation and morphological shape. And in spite of the small number of languages that formed the basis of these kinds of study, it was generally believed that somehow what was uncovered in the way of a chronological scheme of stages in the development of language (not languages) had actually a universal basis. In most hypotheses of this kind, each stage, less primitive than the preceding, has grown out of the one before in a natural and necessary way, disclosing a kind of plant-like growth and enrichment. And each stage could be realized by a perhaps infinite variety of particular languages. Grimm, for example, is quite explicit about the organic nature of the whole developmental process:

> Accordingly there are to be assumed three, and not simply two steps in the development of human language. The first stage is that of the creation, growth and establishment of roots and words. The next is the blossoming

outwards of a complete inflexion. And the third is that of the instinct toward thought, in which those inflexions that are thought to be insufficient are dropped. The union of words and logical thought, a union that was attempted naively during the first period and brought to full perfection in the second, is once more brought about with a clearer consciousness of its goal. This is the natural and inevitable succession of foliage, sap and ripe fruit.[27]

Even Grimm, whose monograph cannot but appear to us so quaint in comparison with the same tradition half a century later, makes it clear that his discussion of the history of language is not a history of individual styles or idiolects, but typological and universal in terms of the emergence of features of content ultimately common to all languages. And since it was usually assumed in these studies that the universal properties of language typology actually underlay all of the world's languages, it was possible to understand the present existence side by side of living languages some of which were more or less basic than others, or more or less ancient than others. Language types, in other words, from the point of view of the complexity or age of their content, would not decisively replace each other so that the less developed or more ancient ones might become obsolete in favor of the more evolving ones. It was implicit in the treatises on language evolution that there existed a relatively constant and fixed set of properties that reappeared continuously in different guises and different combinations, in spite of the continuousness of language change. Thus language evolution fell into line with biological evolution much more closely and revealingly than was the case with the usual historical description of musical forms and styles.

Perhaps even this brief discussion of some of the ideas implicit in the treatises on language origin and development in the nineteenth century will help to demonstrate the close affinity between these studies and some of Schenker's aims in the first part of his essay. We cannot follow here the complex path of relationships and associations within which our comparison reflects the more general applications, direct and indirect, of evolutionary thought in the more humanistic disciplines. But from the vantage point of the studies on language evolution, less speculative and personal than the work of Schenker, and certainly part of an ongoing tradition of a kind that does not provide any direct foundation for Schenker's essay, we can appreciate the originality and the delicate insights that Schenker sought at this early stage of his work. I will let the following summary of both endeavors stand as a suggestive conclusion to the discussion of the first half of Schenker's essay. Music and language emerged as an innate capacity in man at roughly the same time, both at first as automatic and natural responses to both external conditions and inner needs and feelings. Eventually both language and music, still depending on each other for guidance and instruction, became disassociated from each other to develop intrinsic

form generating properties. These emerged gradually but necessarily, each stage giving rise to the next in a process of increasing complexity and richness. It was from these repertories of potential faculties of form that individual languages and individual musical styles emerged. Schenker had to work with considerable strain on occasion to hold up his end of the comparison, but the struggle certainly helps to clarify the purpose of the first half of Schenker's essay.

V

It is the second half of Schenker's essay that will concern us first in the following sections. Although not so unified or singleminded of purpose as the preceding sections, it is, among other things, a discussion of the problem of musical form, both from an intrinsically musical perspective as well as from the perspective of composer and listener. Its greatest significance, however, lies in the degree to which it reveals Schenker's preoccupation and response to contemporary musical issues. In this regard, the second part of the essay can be seen, for example, with particular profit as a vigorous attack on the formalism of Eduard Hanslick.[28] This is the point of view I will follow and crucial to it is Schenker's distinction between form and content. Form is an abstraction, externalized from the idiosyncratic or unique quality of individual pieces, that serves to summarize broad stylistic features. What is real is individual, and only what is individual has an independent existence. Form is, therefore, the basis of a comparative study, and has, unfortunately, according to Schenker, served far too long as the basis of the writing of music history, although it can help to furnish some of the stimulus to the composer's fantasy, by providing stylistically acceptable or successful models to consider and ultimately to reinvent. This attitude about the precedence of content over form is one of the principles of Schenker's anti-formalism. It is not the only basis, and most of the related ideas, aesthetic and formal, in the second part of Schenker's essay are, although for different reasons, anti-formalist as well. When a content has found expression in form, and the form is repeated and copied in well-known, and eventually stereotyped and obviously imitated idioms, it is often claimed, significantly by Hanslick, that the content and its form of expression weakens and disappears.[29] Hanslick is thinking of the evolution of stereotyped forms (modulations, cadences, harmonic progressions and even specific genres), a view of musical evolution that entails a sequence of stages which, in fact, become obsolete and disappear, giving rise to the next generation of innovations. But Schenker sticks to his view of the primacy of *Inhalt,* or content. For him, content is eternal and is only reinvigorated by the imaginative power, or fantasy of the creative artist.

This emphasis on individual content rather than generalizing form is

supported by another belief that dominates this part of Schenker's essay, shared with Hanslick and many others toward the end of the nineteenth century, that melody is the most fundamental element of musical content—"where there is no melody the very soul of music is lacking."[30] The parametric emphasis in this period of Schenker's work, therefore, is not on the orderly and restricted lawfulness of voice-leading structure, but on the infinite variety and distinctive originality of melodic style.

There is, finally, another belief, not expressed as directly as the others, but recognizeable throughout Schenker's essay and in a variety of contexts in many other writings of the period. I will introduce it, in fact, from one of these, written in 1894: "In the literature of music there are works that came about in such a way that within the endless chaos of fantasy the lightning flash of a thought suddenly crashed down, at once illuminating and creating the entire work in the most dazzling light. Such works were conceived and received in one stroke, and the whole fate of their creation, life, growth and end already designated in the first seed. A work of just this sort couldn't be conceived in an atmosphere without reflection; dust settled on to it during its creation—its becoming—and that was as little preventable as the dust which accumulates on any object surrounded by air."[31] For the moment it is the last part of this passage that should interest us; the idea expressed in this part is clearly relevant to Schenker because he insists on it even when it does not at first seem all that likely. Let this one example, then, illustrate the importance Schenker gives to the ability of the composer to create freely and to instill according to his will the mood and character of a piece that is determined ultimately by a variety of sources of a personal and therefore biographical nature. It is a plea, surely, against the tyranny of mechanical rules and cold logic in favor of the infinite variety of moods, styles and genres that are created by the composer's fantasy. It is, in other words, the voice of a young composer reacting against the detached formalism of Hanslick's dogma. One should not forget that the years during which Schenker wrote his first musical essays and criticism coincided with his own efforts as a composer. This concurrent compositional activity must have played an important role in the formation of his musical identity, and, in fact, we should not be surprised to see this early dimension of Schenker's self-image get in the way, during this period, of the logic of his evolving musical ideas.

What I have emphasized so far are a set of beliefs—the primacy of melodic style, the emphasis on the individual fantasy of the creative artist, and the significance of individualizing content over form-type—that form an interrelating and mutually supporting structure running through most of Schenker's writings during this period, and particularly striking in the important essay that has been the focus of our attention. These are not particularly controversial attitudes; Schenker held on to some version of them for the rest of his life. Indeed, they are both compatible and malleable

enough to be found among theorists and other writers on music with the most widely divergent technical perspectives. For Schenker at least, they formed during this period a belief system of primary ideas that required little argument or logical demonstration.

Let me take up now the most striking anti-formalist idea of Schenker in the second part of his important essay, his claim that music has no inherent logic or causal nexus, and that the frequently used organic metaphor, in reference to the logical necessity or coherence of a piece, is really misapplied. This is a troublesome idea, because it seems so fundamentally in opposition to Schenker's more mature work, where it is his emphasis on the inner necessity of the synchronic laws of musical coherence that forms the basis of the idealist and organicist interpretation of the mature Schenker. What we make of these views cannot be based on a comparison of a single aspect or theme detached from the complicated systems of thought, constructed at different times and according to different needs, in which they play a role. The idea of organicism in different periods of Schenker's work absorbs its meaning from its function as part of different complexes of ideas, from what it opposes itself to and what it seeks to explain, and from how it combines with other ideas. If there is a significance to such a comparison, then, it must emerge from the defining context.

The primary argument that Schenker gives for his anti-organicist stance is the following. Organic growth or coherence is a property that can occur only during the composition process, that is, in a psychological sense and not in a structuralist sense. Even during the compositional process itself, specific conditions for this have to obtain. It is only during the play of fantasy of the artist, when the similarity of materials control the actual process of unconscious creative activity, that musical coherence can result. Otherwise, the composer will be too subject to the directions and digressions of his own will. The result of these conditions is that the music deceives the listener who responds as if real musical coherence or logic actually exists when it does not. And this illusion is created by the imitation by the musical materials of the rhetorical properties of language, with which music has been so long associated, and by the longstanding tradition of characterizing music judged to be organic with the language of organicism itself. So here again, he is anti-formalist in a way that is opposed to Hanslick. This difference is strikingly apparent, for example, from the following passage in the third chapter of Hanslick's celebrated essay: "In music there is both meaning and logical sequence, but in a musical sense; it is a language we speak and understand, but which we are unable to translate. It is a highly suggestive fact that, in speaking of musical compositions, we likewise employ the term 'thought,' and a critical mind easily distinguishes real thoughts from hollow phrases, precisely as in speech. The Germans significantly use the term *Satz* ('sentence') for the logical consummation of a part of a composition, for we know exactly when it is finished, just as in the case of a written

or spoken sentence, though each has a logic of its own."[32] Now this is precisely the train of thought that Schenker took to one conclusion, Hanslick the opposite. For the latter, it simply confirmed intuitively his claim that intrinsic to the musical materials themselves an "organic completeness and logic" is realized, while for Schenker it was the basis of a delusion, leading the critic to believe that the wholeness he intuitively sensed in a piece of music actually resided in the musical materials themselves.

Schenker's anti-organicist position, as I have discussed it so far, has to be seen as based on arguments that are constructed within a somewhat contrived and unsystematic philosophical framework, in order to stand in opposition to ideas of Hanslick and others. In many other writings during this period Schenker is more direct and less argumentative, and his own, often largely intuitive ideas give a much clearer representation of his patterns of thought. The passage from Schenker's article about the pianist d'Albert that I discussed earlier should be helpful to us again. There you will recall that he observed: "In the literature of music there are works that came about in such a way that within the endless chaos of fantasy the lightning flash of a thought suddenly crashed down, at once illuminating and creating the entire work in the most dazzling light. Such works were conceived and received in one strike, and the whole fate of their creation, life, growth and end lay already designated in the first seed."[33] Here Schenker confirms for us that there are some works whose compositional origin must be described as an organic process. In examples such as these, and, of course, many others where Schenker is more explicit about the compositional history of musical works than he was in the more philosophically complex essay that I have been discussing, the language of organicism could hardly be more explicit. Whereas in the first half of Schenker's essay the language of organicism was applied, often by implication, to the gradually evolving musical competence of man, in the second part it is applied rather to the creative activity of the composer. We should be prepared to believe, then, that when Schenker is struck by the compelling coherence of a work, he attributes it to the organic character of its compositional origin. But we should not be surprised that Schenker, upon reflection, attributes this same reflective activity to the composer, and once that happens it becomes hard for him to see the primacy of the musical materials unaffected by the more conscious reflection and will of the composer. Indeed, it is the last part of Schenker's description that expresses just this idea: "A work of just this sort couldn't be conceived in an atmosphere without reflection: dust settled on to it during its creation, its becoming – and that was as little preventable as the dust which accumulates on any object surrounded by air."[34]

Once Schenker's emphasis moves away from the composer and the compositional act, or from the question of aesthetic enjoyment, we are on surer ground. We do not need to wonder, in other words, if there is any music at all whose logical necessity of continuation is in the last analysis only

"the appearance of an intellectual logic [a logic of thought]"[35] and not a necessary part of the musical materials themselves. When extolling the coherent works of the German tradition in comparison with the contrived works of the composers of program music, for example, Schenker seems in no doubt whatsoever. Schenker is convinced that there is, indeed, music that is coherent, or that sounds coherent. He never explains how you can recognize such coherence from the music, but it is normal nonetheless, he says, to characterize such musical coherence as having arisen in a certain way. One then describes the music as having a logical beginning and end, a continuous sense of development, and so on, ideas that he claims are not inherent to the music but borrowed from logic and rhetoric. Schenker's argument, therefore, throws away the very evidence for which it was created. There is no mistaking coherent from non-coherent music, at least for Schenker. The terminology of rhetoric is simply used to distinguish the one from the other. It is, in other words, metalanguage, not musical (i.e., analytic) language, and as such it happens to come from rhetoric and logic. What bothers Schenker, I suppose, although he is not able to see the problem, is that it is not indigenous to music or really identical with the musical materials themselves. But it is not foreign to nor does it detract from the coherence of music to express the feeling of it either in a language that emphasizes the actual unfolding of the music in time, or in some other metalanguage that is not music.

It is clear, in fact, from many writings of Schenker during this period that he recognizes perfectly well the usefulness of logical or rhetorical metalanguage as a legitimate means of characterizing the organic coherence of music, especially in those contexts where no appeal or reference is made to the compositional process. In his article on Bruckner, for example, which he wrote in 1896, he says the following about Bruckner's melodic style: "At times he lacks the acuteness for the feeling for the beautiful, and he loses the power to let two thoughts follow each other properly, even when he was able to put down one and then the other skillfully enough; at other times, he tries in vain to spin out only a single thought from single moments of inspiration, each one added to the other, in which case the thought does not achieve any unity at all."[36] Is there any difference at all between what Schenker says here and the following, which he wrote in 1923, nearly three decades later: "Even for a Bruckner the art of prolongation was not achievable; his ear in many cases could not hear together beginning and end of a single motion. . . ."[37] Perhaps he felt more comfortable with this metalanguage the more he came to understand its causes, that is, the more he was able to make explicit the nature of musical content. Indeed, in his most mature work, once the specific musical content was worked out in the usual form of a series of analytic levels leading from the *Ursatz* to the surface, Schenker would often paraphrase and elaborate the musical content in this very same metalanguage, in which the gradual

temporal unfolding of the music from beginning to end was emphasized, and often in a colorful and impressionistic language. Only now the bounds of this paraphrasing were fixed in advance.

VI

It is not inappropriate to return in this summarizing section to the conclusion reached by Pastille in a recent article that dealt with many of the questions surrounding Schenker's arguments against an organicist position that I have just now taken up. I hope the reader is prepared to accept now the utter absurdity of the view that, to paraphrase Pastille, Schenker moved gradually from anti-organicist to arch-organicist throughout the course of his writings. In the first place, I think that any view that characterizes Schenker, during any part of his intellectual development, as fundamentally opposed to essential attributes of organic thought would have to appear questionable, if not downright odd. The evidence from the totality of his work is that he accepted unequivocally the German idealist tradition of his earliest education and background and knew in a fairly intimate way the works of Goethe, Kant, Hegel and Schiller and, of course, many others. Certainly it would be foolish to argue that, because it is only during his middle and later periods of work where the names of the great German masters come to be mentioned and quoted, it was only then that he came to know them and understand and acknowledge their determining influence. The fact is that he always knew them, and he could have always quoted them. What changed significantly during the course of Schenker's work is that he came to have reasons to refer to them, that is, he could summon them up to provide support and understanding for his musical discoveries. Indeed, they could very well have helped him to see more clearly their implications. And if he was receptive to their stimulus and influence during the years of his important achievements, then he could have been as easily receptive to their stimulus and influence from the very beginning.

So it is not surprising that even in his earliest period of work, that period which has been our principal concern here, the influence and stimulus of organic thinking can be established in more than one context. There is first the organic view of the gradually evolving musical competence of man described in the first half of Schenker's essay, a view in which a strict teleology of musical faculties approximates the modern concept of linguistic competence, and yet was by necessity fashioned out of the prevailing evolutionary, diachronic paradigm of the period. And because Schenker still conceived of musical competence in a primarily idealistic and evolutionary way, he could accept without any strain the historiographical method of Ambros which, together with its developmental approach, adhered to a respect and acceptance of the pluralistic relativism of individ-

ual cultural phenomena. Indeed, throughout Schenker's early writings there is a surprisingly respectful attitude toward the music of non-German musical styles and earlier musical cultures. It would not be out of place, in fact, to characterize the relationship of these views, a universal musical competence of individual faculties and the possibility of a potentially infinite variety of musical styles and cultures, as the relationship between a more limited and constraining background and the ever evolving foreground of musical styles. And although Schenker could not have used these concepts of background and foreground at the time, they underlie what would come to be seen as an essential strategy of Schenker's thinking. Must we not see, then, the first part of Schenker's essay as organic in conception and thrust in the most profound ways, regardless of the fact that the word organic is never used, or that the context is essentially diachronic and not synchronic, as it was later to become.

In the second part of his essay Schenker discusses a number of aesthetic questions that are meant to oppose aspects of a formalist doctrine that for Schenker may have been best represented by Eduard Hanslick, a doctrine that Schenker saw as an unacceptable contradiction of the primacy of the composer's fantasy and its many-sided impulses. And here too these views are borne out in his critical writings; for example, in his articles on Brahms and Bruckner, where the Romanticist preference for seeing the ultimate explanation and character of the music in the personality and character of the artist is always apparent. It is during the course of this part of Schenker's essay where some shift from the diachronic to the synchronic can be seen in Schenker's instinctive attraction to organicist thought, when the compositional process is characterized at least for some music as an organic process. The content and struggles of Schenker's work during this period as a whole suggest that his argument against organicism is not only entirely out of keeping with his deepest intellectual instincts and modus intellegendi, but strikes one as inherently self-contradictory. Nor was Schenker able, during this period, to tolerate a completely synchronic and formalist organicism. This was the case, I think, not only because his attention was not yet turned to the internal problems of harmony and counterpoint, where purely musical discoveries would eventually lead him to find a natural synchronic context for organicist method, but because the dominance of his thoroughgoing belief in the primacy of melody and of the fantasy and will of the individual composer kept the purely formal sphere of musical content to a large degree sealed off from participating in Schenker's dominant organicist impulses.

If we turn back for a moment from the more long-range perspective of the development of Schenker's work to the original context in which the work of his first decade was fashioned, there is no doubt that it belongs squarely within the ideas and polemical situation of his early years. There was a long tradition, for example, of debate and argument over the issues

raised by Hanslick's famous monograph, that was inaugurated only a year after its publication with the appearance of Ambros's *Die Grenzen der Musik und Poesie.* This debate was renewed in earnest in 1885, when the seventh edition of Hanslick's monograph appeared, during the very first year, in fact, of Schenker's studies at the University of Vienna. The main protagonists at the time were Robert Hirschfeld, who wrote articles on music both for the *Wiener Zeiting* and the *Abendpost,* and who completed his degree at the University the year before Schenker arrived as a student and became, in the same year, *Lehrer der Musikästhetik,* and Friedrich von Hausegger, whose attack on Hanslick in his *Die Musik als Ausdruck* initiated the controversy.[38] I have mentioned already that during the next decade Schenker came to know Hanslick, and we know now that by the first decade of the coming century Schenker had become a close friend of Hirschfeld.[39] It could not have been insignificant for Schenker's intellectual development from the time of his enrollment at the University of Vienna to see and hear at close range these discussions and publications on fundamental questions of music evolution, musical aesthetics and music historiography.

It is often difficult to detect clear influence and guidance from individual works of scholarship on the early intellectual development of any scholar whose independence of mind can be seen in many ways from the outset, and yet in other ways is imbued with the general atmosphere and trends of contemporary thought. But it would be difficult indeed not to see, for example, the monograph of Hausegger as having played perhaps a seminal role in Schenker's early thinking, and certainly in the major essay we have been considering. Here is the programmatic task that Hausegger announces in the first pages of his study: "Our immediate task, then, will be to go back to the very beginnings of our art, so as to get to know out of what elements it was formed, what in essence has remained constitutive and vital, what has been brought to it from the outside, what, therefore, is to be recognized as its characteristic attributes, what must be separated as irrelevant, how its essence has been intensified, enriched, deepened, and how it has come to be altered, impaired and endangered."[40] From these words alone, Hausegger's purpose is clear: his study is to be, not a history of musical styles and cultures in the manner of Ambros, for example, but a tracing of the evolutionary course of development of the essential attributes of man's musical endowment, its unique properties and its expressive potentials. From this more general perspective, the closeness of Hausegger's purpose to that of Schenker is striking. Of course, Hausegger's subject betrays, as well, the profound influence of Darwin, and through the course of Hausegger's work, the influence of Helmholz, Wundt and many others is apparent. In spite of the common parentage and similarities of the two works, Hausegger's fundamental aim is to replace the formalism of Hanslick with an aesthetic of taste and feeling that moves beyond the purely naive and poetically subjective to a more scientific and experimental

basis, in which muscular reaction, bodily motion, pulse and heartbeat are seen as the foundation of a connection between feeling and tone. The genetic-biological foundation of Hausegger's study is worked out systematically and in some detail, and specific properties of the rhythmic and tonal language are derived from purely biological universals. Schenker's work will seem naive, ad hoc and vague in comparison, yet his insistence on more general and abstract form-building constituents of musical competence, independent of their actual stylistic realization, has a more modern ring within the context of the cognitive perspective of recent decades.[41]

In surveying the entire course of Schenker's work from the vantage point of the earliest decade of his musical writings, it would be no easy matter to connect this first decade in a direct and purely linear way with what was to come later. When the earliest years seem to be most unlike what emerged later, for example, in the claim about Schenker's anti-organicist position, upon closer analysis it is the deeper similarities that ultimately stand out. And when the similarities at first seem most striking, there is a world of difference underlying them. When Schenker criticizes, on the very last page of his essay, the tendency of writers on music history to emphasize the outward, purely formal or generic character of music, rather than the inner execution of content, this is part of a plea to consider the individuality of each musical expression rather than those features of outward form that are shared. But later, the very same emphasis on the "innere Technik des Inhalt" over outward form became part of the search for the shared essence of the universal content of the tonal language. In the earliest period, in other words, in keeping with his historical flexibility, Schenker sought to distinguish general musical competence from the rich variety of styles and musical cultures. In his mature work, the distinction was between a single concept of musical content and the variety of its individual realizations in specific musical works.

Of course, the actual beginnings of Schenker's musical thought, on which I have tried to shed some light here, will help us to make some worthwhile comparisons. Schenker, during the course of his own musical researches, eventually abandoned the diachronic and evolutionary paradigm of the last decades of the nineteenth century for the synchronic and structuralist attitude of the early twentieth century. In this connection, he is to be compared to the other pioneering scholars of his time who took part in the same intellectual shift; for example, the Genevan linguist Ferdinand de Saussure, the French sociologist Emile Durkheim and the Russian Formalists of the Moscow and Petersburg schools. He thus abandoned ultimately the possibility of a view of stylistic diversity as open-ended and rich in the potential for creative change and experimentation for one restricted to the prolongational potential of a restricted and fixed syntax of competence. And so he gave up the possibility of a significant historical perspective for a frozen and ultimately false historicism. Perhaps had he lived

longer, he might have established many of the links with his earlier work that should appear to us from his later work as closed off and inimical. But since this cannot be, it would be therapeutic, indeed, if this emerging picture of his youthful attitudes forced us to evaluate his later work with more care and less teleological zeal.

In the totality of his work during the first decade as a writer on music, Schenker attempted the delicate balance of an aesthetic of the particular with the evolutionary history of the essential. This is what we should see as the original caste of Schenker's early work, and as the dramatic and unexpected foundation for his later theories.[42]



NOTES

1. Heinrich Schenker, *Harmony,* ed. Oswald Jonas, trans. Elisabeth Mann Borgese (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954): xvi.
2. An example of this kind of constantly evolving anticipation is the idea that the most background level of Schenker's early and middle period analyses (which Schenker referred to in a number of ways: e.g., in his monograph on Beethoven's Piano Sonata, op. 101, as *Ton-Urreihe*) became middlegrounds in his later work, as Schenker worked ever more deeply back to the *Ursatz.* But this idea cannot be true in any way that is not trivial. Whatever unusual form the most background level assumed in Schenker's earlier work, it was a melodic construct that projected some version of the piece as a whole; middlegrounds by definition elaborate only a part (or parts) of such comprehensive structures. No later middleground progression could simply duplicate the most background level. If all that is meant by the claim is that the content of a most background level will end up in Schenker's later work distributed somewhere among various middlegrounds (or that a middleground, not middleground progression, eventually comes to have the same content as the earlier background, as the result of successive middleground derivation), then it is hardly a claim of much interest. Any comparison of this kind between earlier and later analyses of Schenker would reveal fundamental differences of analytic belief, beliefs that are very often quite contradictory in nature. Yet the claim offered by such comparisons is still made without any demonstration—to take one recent example, in Lee Rothfarb's engaging book *Ernst Kurth as Theorist and Analyst* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1988), p. 37, for example.
3. Jamie Croy Kassler, "Heinrich Schenker's Epistomology and Philosophy of Music: An Essay on the Relations Between Evolutionary Theory and Music Theory," in *The Wider Domain of Evolutionary Thought,* eds. David Oldroyd, Ian Langam (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1983), p. 222.
4. Ruth A. Solie, "The Living Work: Organicism and Musical Analysis," *Nineteenth Century Music* 4 (1980): 147–156.
5. Kassler, ibid.
6. See, for example, Michael Ermarth, *Wilhelm Dilthey: The Critique of Historical Reason* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978), especially the first chapter, for a thoughtful discussion of Dilthey and his view of what he thought of as poetic idealism.
7. William A. Pastille, "Heinrich Schenker, Anti-Organicist," *Nineteenth Century Music* 8 (1984): 29–36. I will have more to say about this article later in this essay.
8. There is a list of articles published by Schenker during his lifetime, as well as articles published posthumously, in Nicholas Rast, "A Checklist of Essays and Reviews by Heinrich Schenker," *Music Analysis* 7/2 (1988): 121–132. For the earliest period, 1891–1901, about which I am concerned in this essay, there are important omissions in this checklist. I list all of these omitted articles in an Appendix to this essay.
9. Jg. 26 (2, 9, 16, 23, 30 May, 13, 20 June 1895): 245–6, 257–9, 273–4, 279–80, 297–98, 309–10, 325–6. Pastille, ibid., has included translations of some important passages of this essay. The final installment of Schenker's essay has been reprinted in *Musiktheorie* 3/3 (1988): 237–242. There is some discussion of this essay as well in Stephen Hinton, "Musikwissenschaft und Musiktheorie oder der Frage nach der phänomenologischen Jungfräulichkeit," *Musiktheorie* 3/3 (1988): 195–204.

10. See Manfred Wagner, *Geschichte der Österreichischen Musikkritik in Beispielen* (Tutzing: Schneider, 1979).
11. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1945).
12. Max Kalbeck, *Johannes Brahms,* 4 vols. (Berlin, 1904–14), vol. 4, pp. 141ff.
13. Schenker (1895), p. 246. All translations, unless otherwise indicated, are mine.
14. Schenker, ibid., p. 257.
15. Schenker, ibid., p. 257.
16. Schenker, ibid., p. 258.
17. Schenker, ibid., p. 273.
18. Schenker, ibid., p. 273.
19. Schenker, ibid., p. 245.
20. Schenker, ibid., p. 257.
21. Schenker, ibid., p. 258.
22. Schenker, ibid., p. 257.
23. See, e.g., Werner Friedrich Kummel, "Musik und Musikgeschichte in biologistischer Interpretation," in *Biologismus im 19. Jahrhundert: Vorträge eines Symposium vom 30. bis 31. Oktober 1970 in Frankfurt am Main,* ed. Gunter Mann (Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke Verlag, 1973): 108–146.
24. Schenker, ibid., p. 245.
25. Wilhelm Wackernagel, *Über den Ursprung und die Entwickelung der Sprache,* second edition (Basel, 1876), pp. 6–7.
26. Wackernagel, ibid., p. 34.
27. Jacob Grimm, *Über den Ursprung der Sprache,* fifth edition (Berlin, 1862), p. 39.
28. Helmut Federhofer's comments in his *Heinrich Schenker: Nach Tagebüchern und Briefen in der Oswald Jonas Memorial Collection* (Hildesheim, etc.: Georg Olms Verlag, 1985), pp. 12ff. on the essential nature of Schenker's important essay of 1895 and its relation to the works of Hanslick seem to me conjectural and misleading. The plan of a work, *Geschichte der Melodie,* that Schenker was thinking about, and mentioned to Hanslick, is referred to in documents of a year earlier than the publication of Schenker's essay. And while it only proves to emphasize what I have already claimed about the importance of melody for Schenker during this period, it would not be accurate to consider Schenker's published essay (the larger work of which it is supposed to have formed a part has disappeared) as a treatise on melody, as Federhofer suggests, although ideas that Schenker had in mind for the earlier project no doubt found their way into his essay of 1895. That the latter cannot be interpreted as simply a treatise on melody is surely clear from the present essay. Hanslick's notes to Schenker that have survived are cordial and polite and certainly suggest that he was favorably disposed to Schenker. But we really do not know what his reaction to Schenker's essay was. And, of course, as was usual with Schenker in all periods of his work, he did not usually mention or refer directly to contemporary works of scholarship in such philosophical essays, and so does not mention Hanslick at all.
29. Eduard Hanslick, *The Beautiful in Music*, trans. Gustav Cohen (The Liberal Arts Press, 1957), Chapter 3.
30. This is the expression that the Austrian theorist Friedrich von Hausegger gave to this same view in his *Die Musik als Ausdruck,* second edition (Vienna, 1887), p. 131.
31. Schenker, "Eugen d'Albert," *Die Zukunft,* Bd. 9 (6 October 1894), p. 33.
32. Hanslick, ibid., pp. 50–51.
33. Schenker, ibid.

34. Schenker, ibid.
35. Schenker (1895), p. 297.
36. Schenker, "Anton Bruckner," *Die Zeit,* Bd. 7 (20 June 1896), p. 185.
37. Schenker, *Der Tonwille* 5 (1923), p. 46.
38. For Hirschfeld's attack on Hanslick, see his *Das kritische Verfahren Ed. Hanslick's beleuchtet von Dr. Robert Hirschfeld,* second edition (Vienna: Löwit, 1885).
39. See Federhofer, ibid., pp. 12 ff.
40. Hausegger, ibid., p. 4.
41. I cannot give here more than some indication of the sympathy and resonating kinship that I see between these studies of Schenker and Hausegger. But the intent, the language and imagery and the association of ideas in Hausegger's work should strike anyone with a knowledge of Schenker's work in general as surprisingly kindred. To take another example, this time from a discussion by Hausegger (ibid., p. 159) of form in the works of Beethoven: "Beethoven's sonata form is an unbroken melodic stream that sweeps away by its force all of those elements that are interspersed as part of the form." Of course, such examples by themselves would call to mind other writers, but any sensitive study of the whole of Hausegger's work, for me at least, would reveal a deep kinship with Schenker's important essay.
42. This essay is a much longer, revised and elaborated version of a talk given at the Third Music Analysis Conference in Oxford, England, in September, 1988.

APPENDIX

The following is a list of Schenker's published articles and reviews for the years 1891–1901 that were not included in Rast, ibid.

Musikalisches Wochenblatt
Kritick. "Herman Gradener. Quintet Nr. 2, op. 19," (21 April 1892): 214–16.

Neue Revue
"Im Wiener Conservatorium," (21 February 1894): 318.
"Hofoper (Smetana's *Kuss*)," (7 March 1894): 375.
"Theater an der Wien," (19 September 1894): 377.
"Hofoperntheater (Hummels *Maria*)," (10 October 1894): 475–76.
"*Königskinder* von Humperdinck," (21 May 1897): 646.
"Hofoper, Smetenas *Verkaufte Braut,*" (8 October 1897): 448–49.
"Theater an der Wien, Puccinis *Bohème,*" (15 October 1897): 473–74.
"Hofoperntheater, Smetana, Dvorak, Tchaikovsky," (26 November 1897): 654–55.
"Hofoperntheater, *Struwwelpeter,*" (14 January 1898): 82.
"Hofoperntheater, Bizet's *Djamileh,*" (28 January 1898): 143–44.
"Hofoperntheater, Leoncavallos *Bohème,*" (6 March 1898): 292.

Die Zeit
Bücher. Le Comte de Chambrun und Stanislas Legis, *Wagner* (Paris, 1895), (28 September 1895): 206–207.
Bücher. Carl Reinecke, *Die Beethoven'sche Klaviersonaten. Briefe an eine Freundin* (Leipzig, n.d.), (4 July 1896): 1415.
Bücher. Ernst Possart, *Über die Neueinstudierung und Neuinscenierung des Mozart'schen "Don Giovanni" (Don Juan) auf dem kgl. Residenztheater zu München* (Munich, 1896), (1 August 1896): 78.