



---

Review: WHY WE GOT INTO ANALYSIS AND WHAT TO GET OUT OF IT

Reviewed Work(s): CONTEMPLATING MUSIC: CHALLENGES TO MUSICOLOGY by Joseph Kerman

Review by: Michael Cherlin

Source: *Theory and Practice*, 1986, Vol. 11 (1986), pp. 53-74

Published by: Music Theory Society of New York State

Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41054207>

---

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [support@jstor.org](mailto:support@jstor.org).

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at <https://about.jstor.org/terms>



Music Theory Society of New York State is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *Theory and Practice*

JSTOR

WHY WE GOT INTO ANALYSIS AND WHAT TO GET OUT OF IT

Michael Cherlin  
State University of New York at Stony Brook

CONTEMPLATING MUSIC: CHALLENGES TO MUSICOLOGY

by Joseph Kerman

Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1985, 255 pages

Truths of Persuasion

There are multiple perspectives from which to view or review Joseph Kerman's Contemplating Music. Kerman's thoughts and observations, although primarily limited to musical thought in the American and British university systems during the decades that span the course of his own career, range from the scholarly-critical to the autobiographical, from assessments of colleagues to surveys of the academic disciplines associated by a common interest or dissociated by conflicting interests in the study of music. The present review will be undertaken from the vantage of a practicing music theorist. Although I hope to avoid an excessively restricted overview, I will focus primarily on the issues that directly touch the field of music theory.

Let us begin by placing the book in context, for surely Kerman means to invite us into his own cultural web, gradually woven in the course of a distinguished career.

Kerman's truths -- like most of our truths -- are truths of persuasion. Truths of persuasion create our values, our histories, and though we may be hesitant to admit it, our sciences and our world. One significant corner of that world is populated by its universities, and one tiny corner of those universities is occupied by music faculties. The various faculties, music among them, compete for shares in the World University as the World University competes for shares in the world. Borrowing language from Harold Bloom, we can say that while "weak scholars" fight for their place within a discipline, "strong scholars" fight for the place and shape of their disciplines in the university. Joseph Kerman must be counted among the strong scholars.

In 1980 Kerman wrote an article for Critical Inquiry, "How We Got into Analysis, and How to Get Out," the substance of which reappears in Contemplating Music.<sup>1</sup> The article is an encomium of enlightened criticism, accompanied by a shaking of the professorial forefinger at musical analysis. Analysis, according to Kerman, "supplies the chief mental spark" in current musical studies, but remains naive about its own

ideologies and blind spots, in that it is not likely to "examine, discuss and indicate what it never thought of examining, discussing, or indicating."<sup>2</sup> And Kerman questions Robert Morgan's plea for a more comprehensive view toward analysis, not because of Morgan's program but because Morgan clings to the word analysis when "what he seems clearly to be talking about is criticism."<sup>3</sup> Had not Kerman disliked the word analysis so much, the title for his article might have been "How to Get into Analysis and What to Get Out of It." This is surely closer to what he means to say.

But the "how" of our revised title still does not quite hit the mark. For Kerman, "how" is prompted by a more fundamental "why," which is allied with his notion of criticism, the central concern of Contemplating Music. Except for the passages that reminisce, the book is written in a hortatory mode (to borrow a term Kerman uses). Kerman's "contemplating" is not passive meditation; his book is nothing if not an exhortation. Kerman wants the study of music to move in a certain direction, and though he proposed no detailed plan of action, it is clear that his main concern is not so much to describe what is as to argue for what it might become. Contemplating Music is to be read as How to Contemplate Music, conditioned by Why We Contemplate Music. The "why" is not of the genetic sort; rather, it questions our reasons for being involved in musical contemplation (or, more generally, historical contemplation) in the first place.

"Why" questions of the kind that motivate Kerman are out of fashion in scientific thought. "Why" inquires into purpose, and scientific man does not ascribe literal purposefulness to nature. "How" has become wedded to technology, and the devaluation of "why" has associated "how" with the often mindless and sometimes dangerous applications of that technology. (I digress from Kerman's arguments, but I trust he would not dispute my concern for a larger cultural context.) As I read it, Kerman's central argument is the argument of humanism. Humans make choices, and our actions have meaning and value; an understanding of our history must address this meaning and value. In musical analysis, the critical "why" forces the analyst to face his own ideologies, reminding him of a purpose behind the techniques of analysis. To the extent that the reasons for technique have become tacit, forgotten, or even overlooked, Kerman's argument will be salutary. It would be arrogant to suggest that such questioning is irrelevant to music theory. But it is also arrogant to suggest that music theorists are deaf to such questions. Truths of persuasion exist in a world of differing persuasions.

To return to Kerman's title: the book's subject is not music per se but rather the contemplation of music. For the most part, the book avoids discussion of actual music, and instead presents Kerman's critical draft of musical academia in the United States and Britain. There is a certain irony here, given the central position of music criticism in Kerman's program for musical studies. Kerman may be presenting the book as a model for critical, historical thought, but it clearly is not a model for thinking critically about music. It is as though he has abandoned what he perceives as his most important work in order to step outside of that work and locate its import and context. This is not the ballgame; it's the Kerman postgame wrap-up.

### Dividing the World

Musical scholarship, by Kerman's account, divides into three parts: musicology, music theory, and ethnomusicology. Composition and performance as such are excluded. ("Historical performance" would seem to be an exception; it receives no mention in Kerman's three-part division, but it does receive its own chapter in the book. This suggests a notion of "history" that we will consider later.) The scholar evidently must express ideas through learned books and articles. (Hans Keller's nonverbal analysis receives mention presumably only because of its contrast with Keller's penchant for contentious verbosity.) The three disciplines stake out different territories, but they are distinguished more by their disparate approaches than by the musics they seek to understand.

Kerman identifies the respective ideologies of musicology, theory, and ethnomusicology as historical, structural-analytical, and anthropological. I will let these stand provisionally without comment, and will also delay questioning the assertion that ideologies more than subject matter define the various disciplines. Instead, I shall move on to the idea of "criticism."

"Criticism" is a motivating force that applies in different ways to each of the big three. We have already noted that the study of "meaning and value" is central to Kerman's notion of critical thought, to his humanism. However, it would seem that not all of the humanities are equally humanistic. This is made clear in his critique of "a deliberate policy [for many musicologists] of separating off their musical insights and passions from their scholarly work":

I believe this is a great mistake; musicologists should exert themselves towards fusion, not separation. When the study of music history loses touch with the aesthetic core of music, which is the subject matter of criticism, it can only too easily degenerate into a shallow exercise. At the same time, I also believe that the most solid basis for criticism is history, rather than music theory or ethnomusicology. (pp. 18-19)

Music theorists are likely to feel sympathetic to the first of Kerman's "beliefs." If the "aesthetic core" can be reached through an intimate knowledge of the musical work, then thoughtful analysis would seem to aim at the "fusion" Kerman hopes for. His second belief, however, is likely to be unsettling. If we assent that criticism is essential to musical understanding and that it should be grounded in an understanding of history, then a clear hierarchization of the big three follows, and musicology becomes our wiser sister.

Another aspect of Kerman's program for music criticism emerges in his discussion of the distinction, made by Arthur Mendel, between "the fascination of establishing facts, and relations between facts" and an interest "in the musical works themselves -- as individual structures and as objects of delight." Kerman observes: "It is this second 'different' interest in music as an object of delight, I believe, that provides the primary impetus for many, if not most musicologists, including (as I also

believe) Mendel himself. It is an interest that can be called critical" (p. 32). By this account, music history, as the basis for criticism, should be focused on individual works, our objects of delight.

As Kerman associates Mendel's objects of delight with critical thought, he associates "establishing facts" with "positivism." The word positivism (occasionally neopositivism) is used a lot in Contemplating Music. To summarize Kerman's basic argument: "positive" musicology gains meaning and value only through its engagement with critical interpretation. Though this seems sound enough, Kerman's use of the word positivism leaves me uncomfortable. The issues involved in assessing the meaning and impact of positivistic thought in our century are complex. Because he has an axe to grind -- the subordination of the logic of inquiry to a critical impulse -- Kerman oversimplifies and overgeneralizes. I doubt that there is a consensus within the scholarly community as to what precisely constitutes "positive" knowledge, and there are differences of working method and critical opinion among those music scholars who might be comfortable with the label "positivist."

One of the central problems in "establishing facts" is summarized in Kerman's discussion of Leo Treitler's "Musical Analysis in a Historical Context." <sup>4</sup> (Notice that Kerman still dislikes the term "analysis"):

This hammers away at the theme of the complicity between observation and interpretation. Analysis depends on the selection of certain elements from among the many true elements existing in a work of art; it is not the correctness of the analysis that matters, but the grounds on which one set of facts rather than another has been chosen for emphasis. The argument in this early essay is somewhat inconclusive, the term 'analysis' being used so broadly that its reference becomes diffuse. What is clear, however, is Treitler's refusal to separate the observation of facts (which others might call the 'objective' side of musicology) from the uses to which those facts will be put for purposes of interpretation (the 'subjective' side). (p. 133)

Since "facts" are preconditioned by the interpretive goals to which they will be put, the two-step procedure of first gathering facts and then interpreting them is based on a false dichotomy. Music theorists should be particularly sensitive to this problem, since theories are self-consciously interpretive and selective. Unfortunately, musical analysis is not always approached so self-consciously. Though the creators of theoretical paradigms are not likely to forget how those paradigms select and shape data, nevertheless, when a theory becomes a given, its users are likely to forget its shaping influence on their analysis.

This and other arguments against a naive "positivism" are compelling. I find less convincing the critique of a range of issues raised in Kerman's discussion of Heinrich Schenker.

In a two-barrelled assault, Kerman guns for both Schenker and Milton Babbitt as positivists.

Music as expounded by Schenker is never concerned with metaphors of 'feeling' or 'expression' but only with the internal relation-



ship of musical elements. Music is structure. Musical discourse must be purely musical.

No one has picked up on this theme more insistently than Milton Babbitt, who has seldom missed a chance to ridicule the use of 'incurable' statements about music. The language is that of the logical positivists, from whose doctrine Babbitt has never been able to escape. (pp. 74-75)

The thesis about Schenker is not quite accurate, as several quotations from Schenker will show. In Free Composition Schenker writes: "In its linear progressions and other comparable tonal events, music mirrors the human soul in all its metamorphoses and moods . . . . How different is today's idol, the machine!"<sup>5</sup> He describes the "true meaning" of the fundamental structure:

Creation may have its origin anywhere, in any suitable voice-leading level or tone-succession; the seed, by the grace of God, remains inaccessible even to metaphysics. Yet we must remember that all growth (every continuation, direction, or improvement) finds its fulfillment only through the control of the fundamental structure and its transformations, through constant contact with background, middleground, and foreground. Thus in the creative act the fundamental structure is ever present. It accompanies each transformation in the middleground and foreground, as a guardian angel watches over a child.<sup>6</sup>

These are clearly not the comments of a positivist. Neither Schenker's conception of musical works nor his conception of music history fits the program of the philosophical "Vienna circle." He is more closely related to Hegel than to Carnap.

Nevertheless, Kerman is right to the extent that Schenker's analyses almost exclusively point toward aspects of structure and function (not just musical structure, however). And moreover, while most latter-day "Schenkerians" do not share Schenker's metaphysics, they do share a more "positive" version of his ideas about musical structure and musical functions. In fact, most music theory and analysis over the past thirty years, at least in the United States, has been concerned principally with structure and function. Yet few theorists would insist that music cannot express anything other than its own form.

No living theorist has had a more profound impact on the field of music theory than Milton Babbitt. But it would be a mistake to separate Babbitt the theorist from Babbitt the composer. Babbitt makes the shift from thinking "about music" to thinking "in music" with integrity, not because his music is "theoretical" but because his theoretical conceptions become aurally cogent. (The music of some twentieth-century composers does not display a close correspondence with the "operation" by which its materials are generated; Alban Berg, Pierre Boulez, and Karlheinz Stockhausen strike me as examples. I doubt that a knowledge of Berg's concatenated row forms changes the way we hear the corresponding passages in his Violin Concerto; there seems to be a separation between "how it was made" and "how it sounds." The music of other composers, such as Arnold Schoenberg, shows closer correspondence between formal operations and aural cogency.

Kerman is aware of the connection between Babbitt's theoretical writings and his compositions:

Few musicians can comfortably thread their way through Babbitt's more difficult papers or those of certain of his students. No branch of music theory since the Middle Ages has given so strong an impression of curling away from the experience of music into the far reaches of the theorists' intellects. The impression is deceptive, of course, because the theory is intimately implicated with music that is composed -- some of it music of unquestioned stature. (p. 99)

Yet Kerman treats the theory as though it were consequent to composition rather than integral to it when he observes that "ultimately Babbitt's prestige rests on his compositions, not on his theory; nobody would ever have paid him any heed if they had not been impressed by his music" (p. 104). This underestimates the interconnectedness of theory and composition and devalues the creative aspect of making theory. It might be correct to say that if Babbitt were not such a powerful thinker in music it would be unlikely that he could be such a powerful thinker about music. It might also be correct to say that Babbitt's compositions eclipse his theoretical writings. Even though the dichotomy is shaky, the observation would probably please Babbitt. He is, after all, first and foremost a composer -- his preferred mode of expression is music. Nonetheless, had he never written a single note, his contribution to music would still be first-rate. Like his compositions, Babbitt's theoretical works are "objects of delight," creative statements that change the way we think in and about music. The same might be said of any fine contribution to musical scholarship. Were there no continuity between the ways we think about music and the ways we think in music, our endeavor as theorists, musicologists, and ethnomusicologists would be futile.

Theories form and organize data through what we may call their "controlling metaphors." Kerman objects that the metaphors of positivism, because they avoid descriptions of "feeling" and "expression," cannot address what we value most in music. Nonetheless, whatever can be expressed through music must be expressed through ordered sound, the vehicle for musical expression. (I do not discount orderings by chance in this formulation.) This may seem trivial, but it is at the heart of the matter. Babbitt's metaphors for musical expression and experience focus carefully on ways of ordering sound. Adapting Kenneth Burke's term, we can identify three "master tropes" in Babbitt's description of music: structure, function, and transformation. Structure refers to "sound shapes." (In the music Babbitt writes and writes mostly about, the primary structure is the set.) Function refers to relationships among "structures"; Babbitt's preferred term is associations. And transformation refers to the "operations" by which we move among functionally related structures.

Whatever is expressed by music -- whether emotional, metaphysical, physical, or "formal" -- must somehow be expressed through musical structures, functions, and transformations. (I provisionally, but not wholeheartedly, discount the "body language" of performers.) Structure, function, and transformation are metaphors for describing our conceptions

and perceptions of musical expression and experience. Take these away and nothing musical is left.

Too often, "metaphors of feeling or expression" take the place of careful listening rather than sensitize us to the musical expression. Positive language is a "corrective therapy" against such distractions. But any approach adopts its own interpretive metaphors, even if they are the metaphors of group theory, and misapplied "positive" theory can be as irrelevant and distracting as any "incorrigible" prose.

Another matter of contention is the apparent antihistorical attitude of positivists, though the severity of this attitude varies greatly from thinker to thinker. But we should not forget that the creative thinker also creates a historical space within which his works are conceived. (Harold Bloom marks off that space for strong poets with his "map of misreading"; a less Oedipal theorist might prefer a "map of creative reading.") Creative thought is surely conceived and interpreted in a historical context that is partly its own creation, and changing contexts result in changing meaning. Babbitt is a creator of musical context and hence meaning. His reading of musical history is integral to his work, and, like his precursor Schoenberg, Babbitt revises history to locate his own place within it.

Clearly, the relations between "positivistic" thought and other modes of interpretation involve complicated issues. Humanists and scientists, I suppose, will be attempting to resolve those issues for a long time to come.

We have noted that Kerman finds the study of history to be the most solid basis for criticism, and that he places that study within the domain of musicology. My portrayal of Babbitt as a creator of historical contexts and a revisor of history is meant in part to deconstruct Kerman's edifice. I shall attempt to carry that deconstruction further.

Kerman chastises theorists by claiming that they "nearly always confine themselves to Western art music, past and present. It is characteristic, too, that even when they deal with past music, they decline to deal with it in historical terms" (p. 13). The refusal to deal with music "in historical terms" is one of the ideological distinctions between theory and musicology referred to earlier. However, just what those historical terms might be is not so clear. As Kerman might point out, musical works have reception histories; depending upon the complexity of its history, a work might be viewed historically from multiple perspectives, perspectives that accrue as long as a work continues to live within a musical tradition. The creative work of the theorist continues such a tradition, and, in a different way, so does the creative work of the historian. Re-viewings are as "historical" as first viewings, as Kerman recognizes:

Is it the case, then, that musicologists deal only with music of the past -- with music, indeed, of the rather distant past? Certainly this does not follow from our working definition of musicology as the study of the history of Western art music. History runs up to the present. Only in cant usage does 'history'



mean 'the past'. For someone driven by a passion for understanding things, or by a passion for musical objects of delight, there is no logical distinction between today's music and yesterday's . . . . (p. 37)

Nonetheless, Kerman's view of history, like that of most historians, is essentially a conservative one. To conserve something is to keep it from being lost. The historian conserves past contexts by reconstructing those contexts and bringing them into a present context; through shaping our past, he shapes our present. The creative artist or speculative thinker reverses this process: by creating a new "present" he recreates our past. There will always be a dialectical tension between these two antithetical modes. And the richer dialogue occurs when each informs the other. This Kerman knows too -- but he sometimes forgets.

It is not only in conventional usage that "history" means "the past." History that conserves is history that is concerned with the past. Kerman's assertion that theorists tend to avoid dealing with music in historical terms is meaningful if not precise. And when he describes a "historical performance movement," we know what he is talking about. This history is one that must be reconstructed out of the past. Otherwise there would be no theories but those stated in historical terms, and no performances save historical ones.

One area in which music history as creation and as re-creation intersect is musical analysis -- or as Kerman might prefer to call it, the critical interpretation of musical works.

#### Music Theory and Music Analysis

The third chapter of Contemplating Music, titled "Analysis, Theory, and New Music," consists in the main of a survey of American music theory and analysis over the past forty years. Its temporal span is that of Kerman's professional career, and, like the rest of the book, the survey it offers is a personal account of what has particularly engaged and distressed him over the years. While avoiding technical description, Kerman identifies and takes the measure of the ideologies of theory and analysis that he finds the most noteworthy, complete with names, dates, and places.

Two general theses seem to inform Kerman's overview. The first posits a significant difference between the motives for analysis and those for compositional theory. The type of theory most relevant to practicing musicians has traditionally been concerned with highly practical matters: tuning, notation, and so on. Along with the type of theory that tries to locate music's position within the greater scheme of things, practical theory stretches back to antiquity. In contrast, music analysis (at least in the modern sense of the word) is a much younger discipline. The emergence of analysis coincided with the establishment of an accepted canon of tonal masterpieces during the nineteenth century. Analysis is a critical response -- as Kerman puts it, a "validation" of a work's status. Spawned in the nineteenth century, analysis was invigorated during the twentieth century by theorists who reacted against modernism and took refuge in the study of the traditional repertory. The historian is

interested in theory because "the theory of an era reflects its musical concerns, themselves bound up with the problems of contemporary music as they were then conceived" (p. 60); he is interested in analysis because, along with other aspects of historical context, analysis is integral to a critical understanding of the musical work.

The second thesis, which assumes the first, concerns itself with the limitations of analysis which require that it be placed into a larger critical perspective.

For if the musicologists' characteristic failure is superficiality, that of the analysts is myopia. Their dogged concentration on internal relationships within the single work of art is ultimately subversive as far as any reasonably complete view of music is concerned. Music's autonomous structure is only one of many elements that contribute to its import. Along with preoccupation with structure goes the neglect of other vital matters -- not only the whole historical complex . . . but also everything else that makes music affective, moving, emotional, expressive. By removing the bare score from its context in order to examine it as an autonomous organism, the analyst removes that organism from the ecology that sustains it. It scarcely seems possible in this day and age to ignore the fact of that sustenance. (p. 73)

There is no doubt that the tendencies Kerman identifies do exist, yet perhaps he exaggerates. A consideration of historical norms and deviations from those norms is virtually always, at least implicitly, part of musical analysis. An analyst's observations about harmonic syntax, voice leading, rhythm, phrase structure, formal design, and so forth, are necessarily grounded in some understanding of the work's context. As Kerman recognizes, the organic metaphor, a favorite among analysts, implies as much. A truly "autonomous organism" is inconceivable, for to be organic is to continue the evolution of precursors and carry the seed of descendents.

Theorists have indeed been interested in historical context, but a context different from that which has interested musicologists. Musicologists often seem to study a work by digging up information on the composer's Oedipal strivings, extramarital affairs, and religious affiliations (persecuted minorities are especially fruitful in this regard) and by investigating documents of all varieties -- even perhaps the score itself (especially its paper type and size). Culture's web becomes so thick that hardly any room remains for the musical work. There is plenty of superficiality and myopia on both sides of the academic divide. Still, as long as we are aware of our shortcomings there is no need for shame or recriminations -- life is too short and art grows longer.

The chapter opens with the strange observation "Metaphysics is older than historiography, and the theory of music is a great deal older than musicology" (p. 60). What are we to make of this? It is an odd relationship that Kerman suggests, one that associates the theory of music with metaphysics as historically antecedent, and historiography with musicology as historically posterior. The Oxford English Dictionary defines historiography as "written history," but this is not Kerman's

meaning. By historiography Kerman means the study of historiographic method, a study that flourished in the nineteenth century -- the century that introduced something close to our present concept of musicology, music analysis as we now understand it, and the notion of a fixed repertoire (giving analysts something to analyze and musicologists something to chronicle and evaluate). Historiography in this sense is the comparative study of theories of history, as manifest explicitly or implicitly in the methodological procedures or assumptions of historians. Historiography is necessarily critical, but it is also theoretical, since theories cannot be compared without some criteria for comparison.

Metaphysics, the most surprising element in Kerman's dictum, is that branch of philosophical thought that searches for first principles. It seeks out and defines the most basic categories of being and knowing. It assumes universal validity and hence negates distinctions of time and space. All kinds of theory-making share with metaphysics the establishing or affirming of categories of being and the relations among them. But metaphysics, whose categories aspire to be absolute, has fallen on hard times. Positivists, pragmatists, and phenomenologists disavow the big truths that were dear, if not near, to Plato; timeless truths are out of step with the times. Kerman's association of theory and metaphysics is not meant to ennoble the theorist. His apothegm implies that theory, like metaphysics, seeks timeless descriptions of unchanging universal conditions. And much theory has indeed been a search for first principles; the Schenkerian Ursatz, a reduction which in turn reduces to (or is generated from) the triad, is a current example. In contrast, historiography, like musicology, describes changes of conceptual organization over time, and hence remains self-conscious regarding the contingency of method and values. But theorists aren't necessarily devoted to first principles, and historians aren't immune to the influence of their own historical time and place.

Citing Claude Palisca's article on theory in the New Grove Dictionary,<sup>7</sup> Kerman remarks that throughout history "almost any kind of disciplined thought about music seems to have been admitted under the blanket of theory":

The history of music theory, in this broad sense, is part of the subject matter of musicology; and the first thing to ask about theory in any historical period is what musical elements theorists felt it necessary to speculate about . . . . Theory, like aesthetics, has to be understood historically, for the theory of an era reflects its musical concerns, themselves bound up with the problems of contemporary music as they were then conceived.

The description (part of which we have already considered) seems reasonable enough: the history of anything musical is or can be part of musicology. The musicologist aspires toward as comprehensive an understanding as possible, and the descriptions of theorists are part of the historical bequest. Yet the description ignores much about the creation of historical contexts, the significant role of the historian as creator, and in particular the role of the creative theorist who, by his rejection, modification, or adaptation of old ideas and by his discovery

of new ways to interpret music helps to create not only the emerging present but also the ever-changing past. In this broad sense, the history of music theory is part of the subject matter of music theory.

The description above again places the historian at the center of musical thought. Kerman's conviction of the historian's importance seems to provide him with a healthy stimulus, giving him energy and zeal. The poet William Blake claims that "the Poetic Genius is the true Man, and that the body or outward form of Man is derived from the Poetic Genius." The zealous historian might claim that "History is true Mankind: it is his most comprehensive poesis, the sum of his making." The zealous theorist might counter, "Theoria is true Mankind: it is the contemplation that forms our categories of being and knowing." Each behaves like a metaphysician, placing himself at the center and surveying the Creation, which becomes his own.

The inclusion of "New Music" in the chapter title "Analysis, Theory, and New Music" refers to the intimate connection between contemporary theory and composition. As Kerman points out, the alliance between theory and composition is nothing new. And though many recent developments in composition seem to disdain such an alliance, I suspect that as long as we have a need to be thoughtful through music we will continue to have a need to be thoughtful about music.

But Kerman wishes to separate the kind of theory associated with contemporary composition from the more recent phenomenon of theories wedded to analyses that target an already established canon of works. In formulating this division, he cites William Benjamin on the subject of music theory "as currently practiced in the United States and its intellectual satellites." Benjamin identifies "an unnatural confluence of two streams of thought which ought to, and inevitably will, reject one another because they represent mutually contradictory values." One stream is the Schenkerian tradition, and the other "is a spin-off of avant-garde composition." <sup>8</sup> Kerman considers Benjamin's evaluation "a highly constricted (and highly emotional) reading of the situation":

Yet for all its myopia, this vision of modern theory as reported by one of its most able younger practitioners cannot be discounted entirely. For it does represent reality of a sort. It represents the reality of an academic situation which was marked, until quite recently, by oppressive orthodoxies to an extent that made musicology and ethnomusicology seem eclectic and positively hospitable to new ideas by comparison. Theory has been a small field built around one or two intense, dogmatic personalities and their partisans. That is changing; it was a bit late in the day for Benjamin to be writing as he did in 1981, I think. But it was (and still is) a bit early to see what significant new directions theory is taking. (pp. 62-63)

When Kerman says that "theory has been a small field," I assume that he is referring to the discipline as it has been redefined in America, particularly by Milton Babbitt and Allen Forte and their students at Princeton and Yale. Among other things, that redefinition has resulted in the training of musical scholars as professional theorists along the lines

of the training received by professional composers, performers, and historians. There were things to be lost as well as gained by the resulting specialization -- what we gain in depth, we tend to lose in breadth.

The Ph.D. program at Yale was the first doctoral program in music theory in the United States, and no other program has been as significant in establishing music theory as an "independent" discipline. The two streams that Benjamin identifies are central to the Yale program, and this is due largely to Allen Forte. I remarked earlier that strong scholars fight for the place and shape of their disciplines in the university. This is all the more vital when a new or redefined field emerges, and it is rarely achieved by committee. It takes the tenacity and persuasiveness of an individual to create or redefine a discipline, and while those disciplines are young they remain profoundly influenced by their scholarly fathers.

It is natural and inevitable that the field would become more diversified as it matured. I suspect that the advent of Schenkerian and "set-theoretic" studies will eventually be integrated into a larger historical picture. Nevertheless, their fecundity up to now, both as fields of study in themselves and as spurs toward meaningful alternatives, should not be underestimated. One must keep in mind that their practitioners have fostered a professional attitude toward the study of music theory, and have not neglected its historical documents, even those outside its currently favored streams. The establishment of music theory as a serious discipline has been healthy not only for the study of theory and analysis per se but also for the lifeblood of musicology. To oppose ideas that seem antithetical to his own vision is more than Kerman's prerogative -- it is his calling. But to fail to recognize a debt where one exists is delinquent.

Kerman begins to place Benjamin's thesis into his own perspective by summarizing the nineteenth-century practice of wedding theory to analysis in establishing or "validating" a musical canon.

The impetus behind tonal theory was the technical demonstration of the merits of a body of music which was in fact valued on grounds that were far from merely technical.

This is what William Benjamin was getting at, I take it, by his remark about the 'mutually contradictory values' represented by the two strains into which he divided today's (or yesterday's) discipline of theory. Avant-garde theory is practiced quite frankly as an aid to -- even as an aspect of -- avant-garde composition. Tonal theory -- what Benjamin invidiously called 'the Schenkerian tradition' -- is practiced rather less frankly as a type of criticism . . . . What was and is primary is the validation of a body of treasured musical compositions. (p. 66)

I will not venture a second guess as to whether Kerman has correctly interpreted Benjamin, but I will comment on his idea regarding the motivation for pursuing tonal analysis, and on his distinction between tonal theory and "avant-garde theory." To my mind, we analyze music (any kind of music) primarily because we want to understand it better. We may



wish to experience it more deeply, or to perform it more effectively; we may enjoy the very process of analysis, for there is a certain joy in coming to an interpretive understanding. Or we may wish to gain a better command of the composer's craft, to know how the music was made or how to make something like it. We analyze to clarify and interpret what is elusive, whether it be the composer's craft or the composition's context. But interpretation is not "validation." Validation denotes proving something's worth or good standing. Art is not covered by binding statutes of excellence, however, nor can it be tested by scientific means. I have no doubt that interpretation is a critical act, but I cannot see how "validation" can apply. Moreover, a categorical distinction between compositional theory (for any kind of music) and interpretive or analytical theory cannot be made. We can be certain that the composer, like the historian or theorist, needs his critical wits about him. The composer's reception of tradition represents critical historical thought, and his understanding of the formal potential of his musical materials represents critical theoretical thought.

The supposed opposition between analysis as criticism and avant-garde theory as an aspect of avant-garde composition also gives rise to a conservative's bias in Kerman's description of analysis.

It seems clear . . . , though it may not be easy to substantiate, that the crisis of modernism sent many musicologists on twelfth- and thirteenth-century crusades. It is easier to see how it drove analysts into nineteenth-century bunkers, bunkers lined with the masterpieces of the traditional canon extending from Bach, whom the nineteenth century had made its own, up to Brahms and no further. If it can be said that modernism turned many musicologists into musical conservatives, it must also be said that modernism turned many theorists into reactionaries. (p. 70)

Kerman refers specifically to Schenker and Tovey as examples of the latter and many other theorists and analysts have followed them. Yet twentieth-century theory and twentieth-century music have also stimulated analyses, and there are many who have responded to the "crisis of modernism" by turning to analysis for clarification. Kerman overestimates the tonal monopoly on musical analysis; though he does give credit to some who have worked on twentieth-century repertoire (George Perle, for example), his admitted lack of interest in newer music clouds his assessment of the work that has been done.

The idea that analysis should be part of a more synoptic music criticism is developed further in Kerman's summary of the "Beyond Analysis" exchange between Edward Cone and David Lewin.<sup>9</sup>

Theory, [Lewin] remarked, makes appeals on several different levels in attempting to formulate 'general sound-universes' of various kinds of music. It may appeal to divine or natural law, or to the intellectual consistency of a system, or else empirically to the practice of great composers. In the latter case, the theorist 'is naturally going to point out passages from the literature as support for the putative pertinence of his notions . . . .'

But if the theorist probes pieces with the primary end of validating his theory he is not, according to Lewin, truly analyzing them. Analysis must be directed to the explication of the work of art as an individual entity, not to the demonstration of general principles. Analysis must 'always reflect a critical attitude toward the piece.'

Cone objected sharply to Lewin's hard and fast distinction between theory and analysis . . . . But he did not disagree with him about criticism . . . .' The artist must be a critic. The observer must be a critic . . . . We should recognize the limitations of both theory and analysis, and . . . should call upon all modes of knowledge, including the theoretical, the analytical, and the intuitive, to help us achieve a proper critical response to a piece of music.'

. . . As to the point of issue between them, I certainly agree with Lewin on the difference in principle between analytical exercises performed in aid of theory, and 'true' analysis done in aid of criticism. This is the kind of analysis that matters to historians, as well as to critics. In practice -- here Cone is obviously right -- one cannot always draw sharp distinctions. (pp. 68-69)

It is interesting to consider the shifts of meaning that occur as we move from Lewin's understanding of analysis that must "always reflect a critical attitude toward the piece," through Cone's more synoptic "critical response to a piece of music," to Kerman's "analysis done in aid of criticism."

I take Lewin's meaning to be that analysis always reflects a critical attitude, simply because the analyst must decide what to address and how to address it. The analyst tries to describe what he finds engaging in the music, and the engagement is by its very nature a critical response. However, when "analysis" is preconditioned by an a priori method, it does not address the piece directly. Instead it discovers either how the theory engages the piece or how the piece engages the theory. The analyst becomes theorist when his engagement is such that it interrelates theory and practice, when he becomes sensitized to what the theory addresses and desensitized to what it does not address. Rather than let the piece suggest the analytical approach, the theory selects and shapes musical significance, telling the analyst what counts as "data" and how to interpret it. A critical attitude remains, but a third party has become involved.

Cone recognizes, indeed insists, that analysis is a critical response. (I assume, perhaps incorrectly, that no particular distinction is meant by the shift from "attitude" to "response.") He also insists that the intimate connection between theory and analysis makes a clean separation of the two untenable. On first view, Lewin might seem to be more the idealist and Cone the pragmatist. Lewin's distinction between theory and analysis seems to be black and white in a world painted in mixed shades. In reality, there is always complicity between the two -- they are inseparable. Nonetheless, in practice, analyses always tend to be highly

selective, and that selectivity is usually conditioned by theoretical formulations that had already been embraced before undertaking the analysis. The distinction between "doing theory" and "doing analysis" is useful because it heightens our awareness of the shaping force of theory. Even if black-and-white situations cannot exist, the distinction makes us more aware of the mix.

While Cone emphasizes the inseparability of theory and analysis, his understanding of "analysis" seems more circumscribed than Lewin's, and more in agreement with Kerman's. For Cone and Kerman, analysis is only part of "a proper critical response." Lewin, although he is not explicit on this matter here, routinely integrates into his analyses observations presumably drawn from Cone's "other modes of knowledge." Here I am thinking of his sensitivity to referential, ideational, and historical contexts, all of which Lewin apparently considers well within the purview of analysis. As in the distinction between theory and analysis, finer categories of interpretive thought can be helpful in attaining a richer understanding. Furthermore, there is a complicity among these modes of thought, and they remain inseparable. Cone would deconstruct just where Lewin would categorize, between analysis and what lies beyond.

Lewin's "analysis that reflects a critical attitude" and Cone's "analysis that is part of a more embracing critical response" devolve into Kerman's "analysis done in aid of criticism." To be fair, we should note that elsewhere Kerman identifies analysis as "a type of formalistic criticism." Although his conception of "formalistic" is meant to accentuate the limits of analysis, this formulation at least allows a critical attitude to remain integral to the performance of analysis. "Analysis done in the aid of criticism" is different, however, separating analysis from a critical response and making it a handmaiden who must remain at a respectful distance from the Queen herself. Kerman poses his formulation as though he is in general agreement with Lewin, but (unless I have misunderstood) he is not. As Cone places categorical distinctions between analysis and other modes of critical response, Kerman, at least implicitly, drives a wedge between analysis and criticism.

Let us return now to the characterization of analysis as "a type of formalistic criticism." While I don't object to this formulation, I do object to the limits Kerman would place on formalism. A study of forms is only as naive as we make it. Whatever might lie beyond analysis must be understood eventually in the context of analysis, for it is analysis that places the work at the center of our attention. Geoffrey Hartman, addressing the subject of literary studies, states the case emphatically:

What is needed for literary study is a hundred percent of formalism and a hundred percent of critical intuition. Like all counsels of perfection this one sets an impossible ideal. But I do not see why the study of forms should distract from genuine critical intuition, or why there should be a competition between virtues. There are many ways to transcend formalism, but the worst is not to study forms.<sup>10</sup>

Hartman's "hundred percent of formalism" includes literary history, which in turn includes the continuities of ongoing traditions as well as the

discontinuities produced by stylistic shifts. Babbitt's creation of historical space emphasizes a discontinuity with the past; in his conception, the permutational systems of serialism displace the combinational systems of tonality. In contrast, Schoenberg's conception of music history emphasizes the nonevolutionary aspects of his work; he recreates history so that his "emancipation" is a logical continuation of tradition. While Babbitt remains our most important interpreter of Schoenberg's contribution, Edward Cone, whose approach to theory and analysis emphasizes historical continuities and transformations, comes closer to Schoenberg's view of history. Kerman emphasizes the importance of Cone's contribution to the "'transformationist' wing of modernist theory":

Around the time of his Stravinsky article,<sup>11</sup> Cone seems to have felt the need to enunciate and develop his position in a series of essays that are now classics -- 'Analysis Today', 'Music: a View from Delft', and 'Beyond Analysis'. In brief, Cone demands of any kind of music some recognizable transformation of or analogue to such categories as phrase, cadence, 'structural downbeat', unity, process, and teleology. All these are categories which have emerged from our experience of tonal music. He finds all this in Schoenberg, Stravinsky -- both early and late Stravinsky -- and of course Sessions; he is less sure about Webern; and he is sure he does not find it in most of what I have called the second phase of modernism, the avant-garde music of the postwar era. (p. 93)

While I feel uncomfortable with Cone's position with regard to musical aesthetics, I am sympathetic to the idea that post-tonal musics can and do embody transformations of, or analogues to, tonal structures and functions. Perhaps Schoenberg's twelve-tone music is not quite as continuous with the past as he would have had us believe, but neither does it constitute a thorough break with tradition. To say that a given Schoenberg piece is "based on tonal principles," or, alternatively, that it "shares no qualities with tonality" can never hit the mark. And this seems generally true for the music of the first half of our century and for "the second phase of modernism" as well. The historical relations among tonal and post-tonal musics are only part of a much larger cultural and historical scene; the point is that analysis need not exclude any connection that can make for a richer experience of the music.

One of the more sustained critiques in Kerman's survey of theory and analysis is directed toward the work of Heinrich Schenker and the theorists of the Schenkerian tradition. After presenting a reading of Beethoven's "Ode to Joy" theme (evidently based on Figure 109e/3 of Schenker's Free Composition but without specific citation) Kerman introduces "three standard criticisms of Schenker." In summary these are: 1) "Schenkerian analysis repeatedly slights salient features in the music," 2) "Schenkerian analysis ignores rhythmic and textural considerations," and 3) "In the crucial matter of the placement of the structural tones on the various layers, on which so much else depends, Schenker lacks persuasive criteria and seems arbitrary again and again" (pp. 81-82).

I would like to take up each criticism, less in order to defend Schenker -- although I will suggest a more sympathetic interpretation of his theories -- than because the criticisms raise issues that are interesting in most contexts of music analysis, not just in those associated with Schenker. Before addressing the specific criticisms, we should note that the label "Schenkerian" is itself somewhat problematic. Applied to Schenker himself, the label, as it is generally used, pertains only to his last works, those in which the concept of structural levels was fully developed. The early Schenker is not a full-fledged "Schenkerian," for his analyses dwell on surface salience and on matters of voice leading and counterpoint. (The 1912 analysis of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony is a case in point.) Even Free Composition, the main source for Schenkerian principles, was not meant to be a comprehensive dictionary of analytic techniques -- the book's specific topic is stated in its title. Ernst Oster discusses this issue in his preface:

Schenker originally meant to publish the first version of Der freie Satz as the third volume (part VII) of his Kontrapunkt. He intended to demonstrate that the voice-leading principles of strict counterpoint (der strenge Satz) also underlie the voice-leading events of actual "free" compositions, that is, of music written in freier Satz. (The emphasis is on Satz, meaning contrapuntal, or voice-leading, structure.) . . . . So, too, the present, final version of Der freie Satz deals essentially with voice-leading: this remains the primary viewpoint even in chapters that concern themselves with other aspects of music such as diminution, rhythm, and, most remarkably, form.<sup>12</sup>

Because Schenker died before the publication of Der freie Satz, we cannot know how he might have incorporated his last ideas into comprehensive analyses. Since the book addresses fairly specific issues, it is unfair to criticize it for not doing what it does not set out to do. If by a "Schenkerian analysis" we mean a study of voice leading, along with the concomitant study of structural levels and harmonic prolongation, then such an analysis will ignore questions that interest Kerman and most other musicians -- Schenkerians included.

But the greatest problem associated with the label "Schenkerian" is its divisiveness. Kerman, and others on both sides of the Schenker-dixit line, sometimes adopt rhetoric that casts all serious students of Schenker as exclusionary fundamentalists. Kerman's assessment of the Journal of Music Theory is an example: "While the Journal of Music Theory has always carried articles about past theorists and theory, those articles have been written by musicologists -- historians of theory -- and not by Schenkerians" (p. 84). In the passion of the moment, Kerman seems to exclude Schenker from the history of theory, while he separates those who are interested in Schenker's ideas from those who are interested in the rest of music's history, as though each group forms an exclusive club. Such a formulation is simply not accurate. Too many scholars belong to both clubs, and some of those have written non-Schenkerian articles on historical theory, even for the Journal of Music Theory.

Yet Kerman is not responsible for drawing the lines of battle. The fervor and even fanaticism of orthodoxy are grossly evident in the documents of



the founding father, and in those of his disciples too. There are passages from Schenker and Jonas that I can read only on an empty stomach. But there are many more passages from both men that strike me as brilliant. And it seems to me that most theorists who have seriously examined Schenkerian thought share my feelings. Take what you need and leave the rest.

Kerman's first "standard" criticism, that Schenkerians disregard salient features, raises interesting questions about musical significance. We can think about musical significance in two diametrically opposed ways. By one model, significance roughly correlates to dramatic impact: any musical event that is disruptive, distinctive, or surprising becomes significant. For example, a resolution delayed by a suspension is generally more striking than a direct resolution. The dissonance formed by the suspension has more dramatic impact than either the consonance of preparation or that of resolution. If we measure musical significance by degree of dramatic impact, the dissonance is "more significant" than its resolution. By the same criterion, a rhythm that disrupts the preestablished meter is more significant than one that does not.

The alternative model for musical significance is based on normative procedures or expectations, and it emphasizes relatively simple paradigms that underlie structural coherence. For example, a tonal piece is expected to resolve eventually to tonic; that expectation and its eventual fulfillment are essential to musical coherence and closure. If the final resolution is the most expected, most anticipated event, then all other events are given meaning by their relation to it. By this model, consonant tones are more significant than dissonant ones, and the final arrival of the tonic is the most significant of all. An interesting aspect of this second model is that the "distinctive" is conceived as receiving its impact only in its relation to the normative, which provides the context in which the "distinctive" operates as such. We can reformulate the second model to say that musically significant events are those that impart significance to events that cannot stand on their own. For example, the dissonant suspension is striking because it delays resolution. The expected tone of resolution therefore gives the suspension its impact and significance. Similarly, the expected metrical pulse gives the syncope its impact and significance.

Now it is obvious that music works by playing off the two kinds of significance that we have just described one against the other. The Schenkerian explicitly emphasizes the second model, and when Kerman says that Schenkerians ignore salient features his meaning of salience corresponds to the first. The salient event "jumps out" at the listener, while, if its absence is any indication, it jumps off the voice-leading graph into a place of Schenkerian non-significance, often even below the foreground.

The most stubborn problem of all is rooted in Schenker's idealism, in his determination to seek the essence of all tonal music in an invariable abstract formula rather than in its infinite, concrete, magnificent variety. As Charles Rosen has remarked, 'his method takes the form of a gradual reduction of the surface of the of the music to his basic phrase [the

Ursatz], and the analysis moves in one direction, away from what is actually heard and toward a form which is more or less the same for every work. . . . The work appears to drain away into the secret form hidden within itself. That is the impasse of every critical method which places the source of its vitality in an implicit form. . . . Criticism is not the reduction of a work to its individual, interior symmetries, but the continuous movement from explicit to implicit and back again. And it must end where it started -- with the surface.' (pp. 84-85)<sup>13</sup>

Rosen's criticism would be devastating indeed if voice-leading graphs could only be understood in terms of the one-way road to sameness that he describes. However, there is a more sympathetic interpretation, one that incorporates both types of musical significance and yet agrees with Rosen's "continuous movement from explicit to implicit and back again." That is: The various levels of a graph cannot be understood in isolation. Each structural level can only be understood as it relates to all other structural levels, and the entire graph can only be understood as it relates to the composition. The composition, "in its infinite, concrete, magnificent variety," contains, or is posited to contain, all the structural levels represented in a graph. So analysis ends "where it started -- with the surface." If the graph "leaves out" a note, that note is not to be forgotten but is instead to be heard in tension against a more basic, more simple structure. Schenker thus doesn't "get rid of" notes -- he relates them to one another in specific ways. (The fixedness of that specificity is to my mind a more vulnerable point than any of those Kerman addresses.)

Kerman's second major criticism is that "Schenkerian analysis ignores rhythmic and textual considerations." Schenker does in fact have interesting things to say about rhythm, even in Free Composition, and latter-day Schenkerians have contributed significantly to rhythmic theory (Carl Schachter and William Rothstein, for instance). Beyond the explicit discussion of rhythm, which constitutes only a small section of Free Composition, most of Schenker's graphs imply rhythmic structuring by their readings of melodic diminutions. Carl Schachter contrasts such "tonal rhythms" with other types of "durational rhythms," and the dialectic between tonal and durational rhythms provides an extremely fruitful way of thinking about rhythmic structuring.<sup>14</sup> As with the problem of surface salience, the amount of information about rhythm in a voice-leading graph depends on the way the graph is interpreted. If each level is compared to the others and all are compared to the actual composition (and this is the only way to make real sense of a graph), then the graph has much to say about rhythm.

The need to relate a voice-leading graph to the complete composition is intensified in music that sets a text. Free Composition does not address the special problems involved in studying vocal music, though it includes a number of examples from the vocal repertoire. Remember the principal topic and that Schenker does not set out to present complete analyses here. (Kerman's example, if it is indeed based on Figure 109 e/3, is a bit perverse. Kerman chides Schenker for not considering the text, but the music represented in the figure is clearly taken from the opening cello and string-bass statement, where there is no text.) The danger lies

in considering a voice-leading graph as a comprehensive analysis. It is clear that there are many aspects of composition that cannot be attended to in a voice-leading graph. But it is not clear why one mode of inquiry should exclude other modes.

Kerman's third criticism is that Schenker lacks persuasive criteria and seems arbitrary in the "placement of the structural tones on the various layers." As an example, Kerman points to Schenker's reading of two cadences in the "Ode to Joy":

The second couplet, beginning 'Wir betreten, feuertrunken', set to nearly the same music as the fourth and final couplet, 'Alle Menschen', is nonetheless treated differently in the analysis. [The final structural descent is considered to be at a deeper level than the earlier one.] Why, when this couplet makes its cadence at 'Heiligtum', must we interpret this as structurally different from the identical cadence at 'Flügel weilt'? (p. 82)

This specific example of alleged arbitrariness is easy to deal with. The cadence for the fourth couplet is depicted at a deeper structural level than the cadence for the second couplet, simply because, as Kerman himself says, the fourth is final. It closes the poetic strophe, and the textual closure coincides with the end of the principal theme. Even without the text, it is evident that the last cadence closes off the melody whereas the earlier ones do not. Surely Kerman would not insist that "the same music" must have the same function regardless of where it occurs in the piece.

The third criticism is distinct from the earlier two in that the argument has changed from a challenge to Schenkerian priorities to an allegation of logical inconsistency. While the first two criticisms isolate interesting aspects of music that seem to be shortchanged or even ignored by voice leading analyses, the third treats Schenker's ideas as though they represent a formal though flawed algorithm. If Schenker's musical judgments "seem arbitrary," this must be because they are outside of the "covering laws" of his theory. Kerman the humanist seems to be challenging Schenker for not being scientific enough; this is a result of his positivistic expectations, which are inappropriate because misplaced, and ironic because distrusted by Kerman himself. In my own judgment, Free Composition simply does not constitute a formal algorithm. While Schenker does assert the priority of certain musical shapes and functions, he does not supply a procedural method for analysis. For all its a priori assumptions, Schenkerian analysis is highly interpretive. Conflicting yet competent Schenkerian analyses of the same passage are possible, just as conflicting yet competent performances of the same piece are possible.

#### Battle for the Turf

In his fifth chapter, "Ethnomusicology and 'Cultural Musicology'," Kerman devotes a good deal of space to the contributions of Charles Seeger. One aspect of Seeger's work that Kerman admires particularly is his wide range of musical interests and his opposition to the polarization and fragmentation of musical studies. Yet Kerman admits that his own interest

in non-Western music "amounts largely to an interest in what it can bring to the study of Western art music." Placed in a broader context, the dilemma Kerman has hit upon here is one that affects us all, one that underlies the ecumenical as well as the divisive counsels of his book.

The study of music is simply too immense and diverse for anyone to be its master. No matter how synoptic our vision, we concentrate on some things only to ignore others; diversity, sad to say, brings with it conflicting values. As it happens, the resulting conflicts are emblematic of the conflict which, in the university as well as in the marketplace, leads to competition.

In the university, competition revolves around funding, chairs, tenure decisions, and the like, but most important, it centers on our sense of values, culture, and history. The process that results in what becomes canonized as "knowledge" is not so very different from the process of legislation; the canons of law, like the canons of knowledge, are hammered out through debate and persuasion. Neither represents a natural or neutral field to be discovered or defended. Kerman is acutely aware of all of this, and his emphasis on critical thought in Contemplating Music reflects it.

Music theorists might disagree with much that Kerman has to say (as might musicologists and ethnomusicologists). The book is provocative -- and to provoke was surely Kerman's intent. However, William Blake was correct in asserting that "opposition is true friendship," though only where opposition stimulates a positive response and a strengthening and clarification of one's own position. Perhaps Contemplating Music is more a memoir (professional life only!) than anything else. The egos of both friends and foes are often bruised when memoirs are published, and such will surely be the case here.

In the chapter on "Musicology and Criticism" Kerman emphasizes the significance of music analysis for the musicologist. In spite of the "analysts' narrow frame of reference,"

the best students have always been able to take something from analysis without accepting all of its postulates or submitting to all of its bigotries. And this, I believe, has had a liberating or at least a liberalizing effect on musicology.  
(p. 115)

And theorists might return the compliment to Kerman directly. The best students have always been able to take something from Kerman without accepting all of his postulates or submitting to all of his bigotries. And this, I believe, has had a liberating or at least liberalizing effect on music theory.

## NOTES

1. Joseph Kerman, "How We Got into Analysis, and How to Get Out," Critical Inquiry, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Winter, 1980), pp. 311-31.
2. Ibid., p. 319.
3. Ibid., p. 331; see Robert P. Morgan, "On the Analysis of Recent Music," Critical Inquiry, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Autumn, 1977), pp. 33-53.
4. See Leo Treitler, "Music Analysis in a Historical Context," College Music Society Symposium, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Fall, 1966), pp. 75-88.
5. Heinrich Schenker, Free Composition (Der Freie Satz), translated and edited by Ernst Oster (New York: Longman, 1979), p. xxiii.
6. Ibid., p. 10.
7. See Claude Palisca, "Theory, theorists," The New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians (London: Macmillan, 1980), Vol. 18, pp. 741-62.
8. William E. Benjamin, "Schenker's Theory and the Future of Music" (a review of Schenker's Free Composition), Journal of Music Theory, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Spring, 1981), p. 171; quoted in Kerman, p. 62.
9. See David Lewin, "Behind the Beyond," and Edward T. Cone, "Mr. Cone Replies," Perspectives in New Music, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Spring-Summer, 1969), pp. 59-72.
10. Geoffrey Hartman, Beyond Formalism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), p. 56.
11. See Edward T. Cone, "Stravinsky: the Progress of a Method," Perspectives of New Music, Vol. 1 (Fall, 1962--Spring, 1963), pp. 18-26.
12. Schenker, Free Composition, Ernst Oster's preface to the English edition, p. xii-xiii.
13. See Charles Rosen, "Art Has Its Reasons," New York Review of Books (17 June 1971), p. 38.
14. Carl Schachter, "Rhythm and Linear Analysis: A Preliminary Study," The Music Forum, Vol. 4 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), pp. 313-16 and 324-34.